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Regulating the Media:
It is Dangerous to Give it Special Status
by Robert Officer
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Competition
Law and the Media Sector
What
is so special about the media that leads politicians and media
pundits to believe we need Ôcross-mediaÕ laws? Although the
media has characteristics that clearly distinguish it from
industrial products and many services produced by a modern
economy, these distinguishing features alone do not warrant
a separate and special set of laws. Separating regulation
of the media from other goods and services often leads to
the very outcome that the cross-media laws are meant to prevent
ø the undue influence on information, and ultimately public
opinion, that a heavy concentration of media ownership is
supposed to create.
Defining the Media
The
media1 embraces all channels of communication.
Media products include the various forms of print media, electronic
media such as television, radio and various on-line services
including the Internet, and the telephone system. Its function
is to transmit information and/or entertainment from one source
to another.
Information
Information
is the acquisition, processing and quantification of knowledge.
It includes the functional aspects of using knowledge as well
as embracing knowledge itself. There are many types of knowledge
and forms of information so the question arises as to whether
or not one of the dimensions of the media is unique in handling
information or some particular form of information. If this
were the case,Ê then
that part of the media, including the information, would constitute
a separate market. Conversely, if one dimension of the media
were capable of crossing over all forms of information/entertainment,
then that dimension could link all forms of media into the
one market through the transitivity of competition.
In
this context it would appear that the Internet is capable
of providing all the information that could be obtained including
that from other sources. If so, the Internet should be included
in all the media markets and is the potential link providing
competition between the markets, so thatÊ one could define a single media market ø
at least in the context of information.
Entertainment
Entertainment
relates to satisfaction or a form of pleasure, which may involve
information. The source of delivery of entertainment clearly
has the potential to significantly affect the quality of entertainment
and therefore it is possible that there may be more ÔmarketsÕ
for entertainment in the media than for information.
Policy Concerns About the Media
Two
related considerations give rise to media regulation. Firstly,
there are the general competition issues which are relevant
to most economic activities. Secondly, there may be specific
concerns relating to the media, such as the information content
of the mediaÕs services or products.
Information
has many of the aspects of normal economic goods and as such
is subject to the laws of supply and demand. However, information
has some unique characteristics distinguishing it from other
economic goods or services. From an economistÕs viewpoint
the distinguishing feature is the difficulty of establishing
and, more particularly, policing the property rights overÊ specific pieces of information or knowledge.
When we cannot establish a property right over a particular
good there is a free riding problem and consequently under-investment
in thatÊ good orÊ
service relative to what is socially desirable. It
is this supposed under-investment which provides the rationale
for government involvement in the production of information
or knowledge, or at least a subsidisation of those who are
producing it.Ê
A
related aspect of the property right problem associated with
information is the Ôpublic goodÕ nature of some information.
This is information which, once produced, does not cost any
more irrespective of how many people use it. While the information
may constitute a Ôpublic goodÕ the medium through which it
passes need not be; for example, much of the information content
of a newspaper is a Ôpublic goodÕ but the newspaper is not.
In
general, producers require that the revenue generated by a
product will cover the cost of production, otherwise they
will have no incentive to produce. In the case of Ôpublic
goodÕ information, there should be no cost to the marginal
user of accessing it; it costs nothing to allow another user
to access the information and so it becomes impossible for
the initial cost of the information to be recovered. It is
an argument for government intervention, either by direct
provision of information or by subsidy, to enable the producer
to recover the costs of production.
Therefore,
the difficulty in establishing property rights to information
and the public good nature of much information can require
government intervention in the form of subsidies or the protection
of property rights, through patents and copyright. These in
themselves confer a form of monopoly on the recipient and
require careful consideration about how and to whom such rights
should be extended.Ê
However,
this is not the basis for most of the forms of media
regulation.Ê
Government
regulation often reflects the nature of the information itself.
The regulatory dimensions relating to the information provided
by the media are typically of three types:
¥ÊÊ Censorship ø A government believes certain
types of information should be restricted because they could
lead to anti-social behaviour.
¥ÊÊ Information ÔbiasÕ ø Governments sometimes
believe the information provided by the media could bias or
otherwise ÔadverselyÕ affect public opinion.
¥ÊÊ Competition issues ø A government believes
that undue concentration of the media could restrict the diversity
of views, opinions or information.
There
is genuine and legitimate concern about providing information
that is likely to lead to anti-social behaviour, such as information
about how to commit a crime. There is often debate about the
level of censorship required, usually related to the degree
of anti-social behaviour the particular information could
be expected to cause. Legislation involving the v-chip to
control television broadcasts of this type of information
has been recently introduced in the US.
But
while there might be legitimacy in controlling such information,
it is not uncommon for governments to justify censorship laws
and similar restrictions on information on the grounds that
they ÔadverselyÕ affect public opinion. In these circumstances
ÔadverselyÕ often means that it is disrespectful or otherwise
critical of government and its policies.
In
fact, much of the media regulation around the world is designed
to protect government. Governments often paradeÊ
it as a protection of the people against misleading
views, but it is really an attempt to entrench government
power or at least mute publicÊ criticism of its performance. The first thing
dictatorships do is to control the media; I can think of no
example where a non-government media group has been able to
successfully abuse its position on the scale of government-controlled
media.
Such
regulation does not benefit the population, only those who
wish to protect themselves from scrutiny. It is antithetical
to the true role of censorship and the notion of providing
diversity of views and opinions in the media.
Unfortunately,
the changes in Australian media laws and regulations over
the past decade could give the impression that they are directed
towards protecting government from adverse commentary and/or
to gain favour from those incumbents providing media services.
These regulations, resulting in restrictions on the development
of the media, have usually been Ôdressed upÕ in the context
of ensuring a diversity of opinions and competition in the
provision of media services.
ÔEditorial IndependenceÕ
A
group that has been particularly vocal about cross-media laws
is the Ômedia squattersÕ. Like the old pastoral squatters
or the more modern tenancy squatters, they claim territory
(in the media, in this case) without any property right. Arguments
for such editorial independence are no more legitimate than
the squattersÕ right to access the property in defiance of
the owners. There is no special legitimacy to the claim incumbent
media managers sometimes express about their right to Ôeditorial
independenceÕ ø which is usually a euphemism for a ÔI (we)
should not be held accountable to anyone but myself (ourselves)
and my (our) beliefs (read prejudices)Õ.
Claims
of ÔbiasÕ or media proprietors having too much influence should
be addressed through competition law.
Competition Issues
There
is nothing unique about the media or the services it provides
that requires special treatment with respect to competition
laws. There are no specific grounds to justify special legislation
for the media that are not already covered by the Trade
Practices Act (TPA).
There
is no question of the legitimacy of anti-trust legislation
such as the TPA in relation to economic activities, including
the media. Debate about the TPA usually relates to the application
of the laws and whether they are too lax in allowing concentration
that leads to an abuse of market power. Other debate centres
on whether the laws are too rigid and prevent industry from
evolving into forms that will ultimately serve the public
better.
Clearly,
the diversity of views and opinions which a society might
rightly expect from its media can be enhanced or protected
if there are no artificial barriers to entry into the media
and there is no undue concentration of market power.
The
ultimate power of access to many parts of the media, particularly
the electronic and telephonic media, is derived from government
licensing. Government restrictions on numbers of licences
have been a major barrier to entry. They have been justified
on the basis that the limited scale of the market could not
support more than a few players or scarcity of spectrum for
broadcasters. This is clearly anti-competitive;Ê there is no reason to expect thatÊ a competitive market would lead to an ÔexcessÕ number of operators.
In a competitive market, if operators were all unprofitable
their numbers would be unsustainable. If there were ÔexcessÕ
profits or influence then there would be entry. A competitive
market could be expected to allow an optimal number of players
insofar as there were no artificial barriers to access ø aside
from the issues relating to property rights and public goods
already discussed.
In
recent years there has been some appreciation of the importance
of allowing open access and greater freedom for markets to
operate. This has been particularly true in the case of radio
where limitations on the foreign ownership of commercial radio
licences were removed in 1992. At least one group of stations
ø the Australian Radio Network ø is controlled by foreign
nationals. There are no limitations on advertising in radio,
except prohibition of ads for cigarettes and alcohol, and
the minimum Australian content rule has been replaced by a
code of conduct on use of Australian music.
Media Markets
There
is clearly competition between the various forms of media:
radio, television, print and, increasingly, on-line services
related to the Internet. However, it is equally clear that
this competition, or the extent to which one form of media
can replace other forms, is limited. The various forms of
the media are not perfect substitutes for each other. So while
we might define a media market, there will clearly beÊ
sub-markets or niche markets in which one form or other
of the media can excel to the detriment of other forms.
But
as all forms of media involve the transmission of information
and/or entertainment, they have the potential to compete with
each other. It would therefore seem inappropriate to have
distinct regulations for different elements or aspects of
the media because they are potential competitors. To get consistency,
to ensure fairness, equity and an appreciation of the social
benefits that should be enhanced by regulation, it is importantÊ thatÊ one
regulator has control of all aspects of the media, even if
there are specialist areas within the regulator dealing with
the technical specialties.
ÔEssential FacilitiesÕ
There
are issues related to some of the systems of media delivery,
in particular, providing access to essential facilities such
as the distribution system ø the cabling, for example. But
these issues are adequately handled under Part IIIA of the
Trade Practices Act. This section was recently introduced
to protect the users ofÊ Ôessential
facilitiesÕ ø infrastructure such as power lines, gas lines,
water and particular transport routes ø from being captured
by a major player in the industry who might restrict access
to them. In short, there is adequate protection under the
general competition laws to prevent the media market from
developing anti-social tendencies resulting from an undue
concentration of ownership.
The Relevance of Media Ownership Concerns
Much
of the concern expressed about the media relates to concentration
of market shares in the industry, and whether it may have
an adverse effect on public opinion and restrict the diversity
of views expressed. It is not ownership per se that
is of concern but the control of a media group in a concentrated
media market. Moreover, control may not require 51 per cent
of the equity of a media company; it could constitute a lot
less depending on the distribution of ownership of other shareholders
and their circumstances.Ê Those holding a majority of shares may not
necessarily use their influence to interfere in proceedings;
they may be Ôpassive investorsÕ, only interested in revenue
and returns.
Alternatively,
the shareholder may only force management changes if the investment
performance is inadequate. The key issue is receiving adequate
returns. If it is in the shareholdersÕ power, they will replace
the management which does not adequately service them. In
such circumstances the owner or manager must ensure that the
material distributed by the media organisation is acceptable
to customers in order to satisfy the investment requirements
ofÊ shareholders. One would therefore expect
that the views expressed by the organisation were consistent
with or otherwise in accord with what the consumers of their
product required, or else they would not be prepared to pay
for it.Ê
It
may still be claimed that some information is anti-social
and requires regulation, or more accurately, censorship. Under
normal circumstances one would only expect a media organisation
being able to profitably distribute anti-social views if those
views related to pornography or violence. Even in these circumstances
there is likely to be considerable controversy as to whether
such programming or information leads to anti-social behaviour
ø whether people who do not buy the product are adversely
affected by the behaviour of those who do. Clearly, there
are censorship and libel laws and other forms of protection
against unfair or unjustified attacks on particular groups.
The infringements are not a function of ownership per se
and therefore they do not require rules or regulations
relating to ownership.
The
real issue is whether or not media proprietors can ÔadverselyÕ
influence opinion and at the same time profit when there are
competing organisations selling or distributing alternative
views. In short, if there was open entry and no barriers against
groups or companies entering the media market, putting aside
the issue of censorship, would one be concerned about an entity
being able to adversely affect public opinion or distribute
views that lead to anti-social behaviour and do so profitably?
The notion of profitability is important because it implies
there is a sufficient number of consumers of the products
for the organisation to trade at a profit, which implies the
views are marketable in the face of competitive views. In
my opinion, it is only when those views are political and
inconsistent with the political powerbrokers that they are
likely to be found to be ÔadverseÕ or anti-social.
It
is particularly relevant in the context of todayÕs political
scene as to whether or not persons holding opinions, however
abhorrent to major sectors of the community, should be allowed
toÊ proselytise such
views or be subject to restrictions. It is clearly at the
core of the censorship debate ø a debate unrelated to the
current concerns about media regulation. Regulation is about
the market structure rather than regulating particular pieces
or types of information.
In
these circumstances, what role has ownership other than from
a competition policy point of view, where common intentÊ
across a number of entities with a common owner, or
collusion amongst a number of owners, could lead to undue
concentration and a restriction on the diversity of information?Ê
What
is being implied is that where there is an open entry and
a diversity of views, concern about distribution of information
only relates to censorship issues. If so, ownership is peripheral
to the core of the problem, which is the nature of the information.
A government is better off passing laws relating to that form
of information than being concerned about the type or amount
of media controlÊ by
a single owner.
Governments
should only be concerned about ownership when there are restrictions
on entry or there is likely to be undue concentration restricting
the diversity of views and opinions. In these circumstances
it is an issue of competition law; if there is a limited market,
then one does not want to see a concentration of ownership
in that market for reasons of market power.
There
is no reason to distinguish the media from other industrial
organisations for a specific competition test and therefore
they should be subject to the same laws and the same regulatory
bodies as other industries, namely the Trade Practices
Act and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC).Ê
The Specific Issue of Foreign Ownership
Advanced
communications and the speed of travel have linkedÊ significant centres of population, trade and industry, affecting
most aspects of economic and cultural life in these centres.Ê
There
is hardly a city that is not exposed to CNN International,
on-line business communication systems such as Reuters and
Bloomberg, information from the World Wide Web, and regular
visits by aircraft from around the world. Most large companies
operate across national borders, traversing domestic and international
economies. Moreover, it is often difficult to identify the
nationality of many of these companies. Cross-country investment
is increasing at a significant rate. The interest in things
foreign and the international marketplace dominates business
news. The coercion by governments for their industry to expand
internationally has broadened the mercantilist views of earlier
periods.Ê
It
is as pointless as it is futile to try to restrict foreign
influences on domestic cultures, as so many governments are
inclined to do. A generation ago tariffs and blanket prohibitions
on foreign goods were commonplace in an effort to prop up
failing domestic industries, but the intellectual battle of
the protectionists has largely been lost. The debate is now
about the pace at which industries should be opened up to
foreign competition.
As
an example of this change in attitudes to global and international
influences, banking has been amongst the last of the ÔpreservationÕ
industries that governments have attempted to retain as a
domestic industry. However, modern banking is rapidly becoming
simply a matter of information exchange with electronic funds
transfers being available, instantaneously, around the globe.
The more xenophobic a countryÕs banking system is, the more
it retards its development, to the ultimate cost of that industry
and its customers. At least some of the current financial
crises in Asia can be attributed to undue protection and direct
government influence on its banking sector. Fortunately, Australia
significantly opened up its banking system to competition
in December 1983 and the recent Financial Systems Inquiry
(Wallis Inquiry) recognised that the significant technological
change in banking will increase global influence on the domestic
market.
Along
with banking, the media in this country have been subject
to industry-specific regulation. Clearly, it would be inconsistent
for the media, which rely on information transfers in much
the same way as banking, not to be given a global dimension
to the ownership when banking has moved so far in this direction.
To restrict or attempt to preserve the domestic media industry
from foreign influence through controlling ownership would
impede the development and growth of the Australian media
and disadvantage its consumers.
Does Foreign Ownership Require Special Attention?
The
fear of media proprietors ÔadverselyÕ affecting public opinion
is enhanced when those owners are foreign. The fear that foreign
owners not only influence the nature of the information transmitted
by their media companies, but might also be insensitive to
local political and cultural attitudes, runs counter to common
sense. The foreign proprietor is more likely to be apolitical
and sensitive to domestic culture than a domestic proprietor
simply because there is no reason for them to have a political
agenda unless they are a branch of a foreign government. The
very act of operating in a foreign community is likely to
sensitise foreign companies to domestic cultural values. In
order to maximise the value of its investment, the foreign
proprietor needs to take care not to offend the political
or cultural attitudes of its clients or potential customers.
Domestic
proprietors can choose to ignore these values because they
would not suffer the same level of censure. Further, the foreign
proprietor is more likely to view its media company solely
as an investment than a domestic proprietor, who is likely
to be more influenced by political patronage.
It
might be argued that a foreign proprietor would be more likely
to use material produced overseas than a domestic proprietor.
This may be true, but it should be remembered that the ultimate
arbitrator on the suitability of such material is a client
or consumer. Criticism of foreign situation comedies (ÔsitcomsÕ)
and movies is not dissimilar to the criticism that is directed
at the foreign-manufactured product. The critic is usually
the producer of the domestic product who opposes the competition
resulting from the foreign product.Ê
The
benefit of opening the media to global companies or to foreign
ownership,2 is that the domestic industry is opened up to global
products and all the technologies associated with them. The
enlarged scope of the global media company must give it access
to a greater range of products and therefore benefit the consumer.
Perhaps critics of the global media corporation are those
involved in the domestic industry who believe their domain
is threatened by the foreign entrant.ÊÊ
Concerns
about ÔundesirableÕ foreign influences may be genuine, but
are likely to reflectÊ an
attempt by domestic producers to restrict competition by restricting
foreign entry. The entry of foreign media into Australia,
through merger or acquisition of domestic companies, should
be handled in the context of competition policy. The best
regulator to make a judgement on the competitive effects of
foreign ownership is the ACCC. Otherwise, Ôorganic entryÕ
ø building an organisation up from a zero base ø should be
without restriction.
What
one hopes is the zenith in media xenophobia was the outcry
from many in the Ôarts communityÕ at the High CourtÕs Blue
Sky decision. This allowed New Zealand programs to be classed
in Australian content quotas because of the Closer Economic
Relations (CER) treaty, which gives Australia and New Zealand
equal access to each otherÕs markets. To witness the outcry
against the decision one would have thought it was the end
of Australian film and television.
The
decision highlighted the regulatory role of the Australian
Broadcasting Authority (not to be confused with the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation), which protects incumbents from
competition. It is a body that the government often hides
behind to prevent change or direct change when it cannot be
prevented.
Regulation of the Media Environment
It
is common knowledge that the media has changed dramatically
over the twentieth century. The most dramatic changes in this
information revolution have been occurring in the last decade
of this century. The development of the high speed and high
capacity personal computer together with optic fibre has resulted
in the growth of the Internet, one of the most astonishing
technological phenomena of the century. At the start of this
decade few had even heard of the Internet and even fewer used
e-mail for communication purposes. By the middle of the decade
up to 50 million people were accessing the Internet and it
has been estimated that the number of people tapping into
it has doubled every 12 months (The Economist, 19 October,
1996).Ê
The
system is suffering congestion and there are those who believe
it will suffer ÔgridlockÕ. But each time congestion develops,
advances in technology overcome it before the next congestion
point. The enormous capacity of fibre optics as a means of
distributing digital information will help to relieve much
of this capacity problem. Moreover, as MooreÕs Law3 indicates, the microchip has been doubling in performance
every 18 months and this is likely to continue for the next
decade at least. The consequence is that the capacity is exploding
at the same time as the rate of usage and there would seem
little doubt that the Internet as part of the World Wide Web4 will transform
all aspects of our life in both work and leisure. It will
affect every method of recording and transmitting knowledge
ø books, newspapers, magazines, movies, television, telephone
systems ø and probably cause the demise of a relatively new
invention, the fax.Ê
Companies
in every industry are using these advances in information
technology to re-engineer themselves, with an accompanying
increase in competitive pressures on those who lag behind.
As a result of this information explosion, the nature of national
economies is changing. National boundaries are becoming less
relevant, whole industries are becoming redundant, the demarcation
between activities is blurring while many professions are
changing their ways of providing service.
In
this context, it becomes difficult ø if not impossible ø to
define the bounds of a media market, other than to relate
it to all the modes by which information/entertainment can
be transmitted, including the Internet.
Regulation
includes controlling change to enhance social outcomes. In
the language of the economist, it is about reducing negative
externalities by ensuring that the judgements and decisions
of individuals take into account their social effects.
Good
regulation must have the means to forecast the effect on social
outcomes with and without regulatory intervention. Unfortunately,
the level of knowledge and capacity of the regulators is usually
limited to what they can glean from the industry participants
and external advice, which they often receive with a degree
of justifiable apprehension and suspicion. Inevitably, to
validate the arguments being advanced, they tend to look back
at what has occurred in the past. In the context of the media,
this is like trying to drive a car by looking in the rear
view mirror; it is dangerous because the future is not going
to be like the past.
Clearly,
regulating in such an environment of change is fraught with
danger. It is doubly dangerous to pick off a section of the
market and try to regulate that separately because of some
perception of difference or independence. The consequence
of not fully understanding the market boundaries will be to
penalise one of its active participants. These penalties could
have the same effect as pushing a boxer into the ring with
his shoelaces tied together ø the player will stumble and
fall at the first onslaught.
Conclusion
Regulation
of the media belongs within the context of competition law.
This is not an uncritical endorsement of the way competition
law is being administered and interpreted in this country.
The interpretation of competition law and how it is restructuring
ø or, rather, limiting the restructuring ø of Australian industry
is far too conservative, in the true meaning of the word.
The
interpretation of competition is almost always focused on
the past, as though the law should be interpreted to hold
industry in some sort of time warp. There is too little acknowledgementÊ
of prospective change and too much impatience for overt
signs of competition when there are no clearly identifiable
barriers to change and competitive pressures. The courts and
the administrators of the law are inadequately equipped and,
in the case of the courts, often inadequately trained to pass
sound judgements on competition.
It
is important to interpret competition law in a manner that
is not going to prevent the media industry changing and evolving
to meet the competitive pressures of globalisation. Those
administering competition policy should recognise that without
tariffs and other barriers to entry, few Australian industries
will not have to meet international competition or competitors
in some form or other.
Sound
industry policy, which is what Parts IIIA and IV of the Trade
Practices Act are about, would be greatly strengthened
if the Productivity Commission was given a more direct role
in analysing claims of breaches to these parts of the Act.
The ACCC and the Productivity Commission should be combined.
The judicial administration and judgements would be improved
by having a separate bench, trained or at least experienced
in commercial matters, dealing with trade practices and related
matters.
Endnotes
1
Media is the plural of medium, defined as an intermediate
agency of a channel from one source
to another
2 It is
interesting to reflect on the classification of News Corporation
as foreign owned. The company is headquartered in Australia
and excluding the Murdoch shareholding, probably has a majority
of Australian shareholders. Its popular image in Britain,
the US and indeed Australia, is that it is an Australian company.
Its proprietor, Rupert Murdoch, has American citizenship because
of that country's xenophobia in relation to its media, not
an example to follow in my opinion. The restrictive and xenophobic
media laws in many countries almost renders 'stateless' a
global media proprietor.
3 Moore's
Law is named after Gordon Moore who is Chairman of Intel,
the developer of the silicon chip.
About
the Author
Robert Officer is Deputy Director and AMP Professor
of Finance at the Melbourne Business School, Melbourne University.Ê
An earlier version of this paper was presented as a
Bert Kelly Lecture on December 4, 1997.
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