Rethinking AustraliaÕs Defence Ê
Review by Susan Windybank
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Defence Review 2000----Our Future Defence Force: A Public Discussion Paper
Department of Defence, Canberra, June 2000, 80pp.

The Federal Government has launched a fundamental review of Australian defence policy, citing major changes in our strategic environment, increasing budgetary pressures and important changes in military technology. As part of the review process, it released a public discussion paperÑDefence Review 2000: Our Future Defence ForceÑon 27 June 2000, and invited public comment. It also took the curious step of appointing a community consultation team, headed by Andrew Peacock, to travel around the country listening to and reporting on the views of the Australian public.

Some of the considerable public interest in defence issues is no doubt due to the ÔCosgrove factorÕ. Yet despite much triumphalist hype over AustraliaÕs involvement in East Timor, that small deployment in a low intensity environment allegedly stretched the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to its limits. Troop and equipment shortages meant that it could not have been sustained at its initial tempo for very long.

This lack of sustainability has focussed attention on the increasing difficulty of implementing the policy of Ôself-relianceÕÑdefence of mainland Australia and the sea-air gap (our northern maritime approaches)Ñ within current budgetary limits. The discussion paper makes it clear that the costs of maintaining a traditional military posture based on territorial defence, coupled with the expectation that the ADF should provide the government of the day with options for regional coalition operations and alliance cooperation, exceed available resources and will continue to do so (see pp. 16-32; 59-62).ÊÊÊ

ÊAt the launch of the paper the Prime Minister foreshadowed a marked increase in the defence budget, although he did not reveal its extent. This suggests that the real purpose of the paper is to prepare taxpayers for a boost in defence expenditure. ÔThe problem isÕ, as one senior defence analyst pointed out, ÔDefence has not come up with any priority for what in its expert view the money should be spent on. The public may rightly be wary of writing an open chequeÕ (Smith 2000).

Defence versus security

The discussion paper asks the public for its views on how the defence budget should be spent, where Australian military forces should operate, and what the armed forces should do without giving any indication ofÊ
the defence parameters or where threats
may come from in the future. Identifying specific countries as threatening Australia is impossible, both factually and diplomatically. But the public needs more to bite on than undifferentiated descriptions of the Asia Pacific region as Ôextraordinarily dynamic, complex and unpredictableÕ (p. 10). It needs to know the issues about which those in charge of AustraliaÕs national security are worried in the long term.Ê

The paper does not pay sufficient attention to asymmetric threats, that is the use of force by non-state actors (e.g. terrorism) or nation states (e.g. cruise missiles) in ways which circumvent conventional military defences. Nor does it openly acknowledge that internal turmoil arising from, say, ethnic tension or religious extremism, makes international armed conflicts increasingly likely and that AustraliaÕs involvement in coalition operations beyond the sea-air gap may not be as discretionary as was once thought.

Instead the paper focuses on the traditional use of armed force between nation states. Many analysts argue that the end of the Cold War and globalisation have reduced the prospect of major international wars. The paper does not dismiss such arguments, but it warns that Ôno responsible government could afford to plan on the basis of optimistic scenarios aloneÕ (p. 11), thus indicating a belief that major wars are still possible.

A strategic analysis based on perceptions of traditional threats necessarily implies that we need to plan for the worst; that is, unlikely but serious scenarios such as the possibility of a direct attack on, or full-scale invasion of, Australia. For the past 25 years this premise has shaped defence policy, and so the ADF has been configured for mainly territorial defence.

But the strategic environment has changed. We now live in an era of reduced traditional threat but increased uncertainty. The strategic debate in Australia continues to confuse ÔdefenceÕ with ÔsecurityÕ. As one analyst has pointed out, Ô. . .ÒdefenceÓ focuses on the risk of invasion while ÒsecurityÓ is a broader concept encompassing freedom from constraints by threats, intimidation or other pressures, from whatever source, that would unacceptably limit policy choicesÕ (Lim 1999: 2).

Most defence commentators agree that the prospect of full-scale invasion is remote. Whether Ôself-relianceÕ should therefore remain the bedrock of Australian defence policy is a Ôkey question in thinking about our strategic needsÕ (p. 22). The paper considers that Ôwe are among the most secure countries in the worldÕ (p. 10). Geography makes the logistics of landing and supplying a credible force on Australian territory extremely difficult; the capabilities of the ADF and the extended deterrence provided by the US alliance add to the calculations that would be made by aggressors.

The paper nevertheless warns that Ôwe cannot rule out the possibility that a threat may developÕ (p. 18), despite conceding on the next page that Ôno country has any intent to use armed force against AustraliaÕ (p. 19). For this to change there would have to be a Ôsignificant deteroriation in our strategic environmentÕ (p. 19). Would it be possible to shelter behind a ÔFortress AustraliaÕ if the regional security environment took a turn for the worse? An isolationist stance in such circumstances would appear to be very risky for a nation dependent on access to maritime trading routes.

A direct attack on Australia would also be likely to involve AustraliaÕs neighbours such as Papua New Guinea and the tiny island states of the South Pacific. These are described as ÔvulnerableÕ, ÔfragileÕ and ÔweakÕ in the paper, and hence open to takeover by Ôpotentially hostile countriesÕ (p. 13). No external power has yet tried to take advantage of regional problems, indicating that the recent internal turmoil in Fiji and the Solomon
Islands is of more concern diplomatically than militarily. Given that these countries tend to look towards Australia to underwrite their security, how realistic is it to argue that they represent an Ôarc of instabilityÕ that could ultimately threaten Australia? They are more likely to be targets for Australian aid and other assistance.

The possibility that non-state actors such as pirates, transnational crime networks or people smugglers will use these states as homebases seems more plausible, thus bringing these problems closer to Australian shores. Such scenarios indicate that it is not necessary to attack or invade Australia to create serious difficulties. Is this a military or diplomatic problem? The answer is not clear cut. Situations may arise with little warning where diplomacy without military muscle could prove ineffective.

The status quo

The concept of Ôself relianceÕ is nothing new. Instincts towards isolationism have surfaced intermittently throughout Australian history, most notably after the Vietnam War. Until then, the policy of Ôforward defenceÕÑthe commitment of Australian forces to support efforts by allied nations in distant battlefieldsÑheld sway. The rationale behind this policy was simple: it was better, as the paper explains, to combat potential security threats far from Australian shores in the company of allies rather than risk confronting threats on our doorstep alone. But ÔVietnam made us wary of overseas military commitmentsÕ (p. 26). The US also seemed Ôless willing to engage in the regionÕ, with President Nixon indicating that the US expected its allies to take care of their own defence (p. 22). More recently, the US studiously kept its distance during the East Timor crisis.

Australian defence planners have therefore sought a comprehensive level of insurance against a broad range of potential threats. Thus they have maintained a high level of land, sea and air capabilities. This military posture was adopted by both the Whitlam and Fraser governments before being redefined in the 1986 Dibb Review as the policy of Ôself-relianceÕÑdefence of Australia without relying on the combat forces of allies. The problem is that the focus has tended to fall on conventional weapon platforms and expensive equipment rather than on personnel and operational needs. This has revealed current structural deficiencies and demands on the defence budget.

Over the last decade and a half, personnel and equipment costs have been rising while defence spending as a share of GDP has been falling. When former Defence Minister Kim Beazley launched the White Paper, Defence of Australia 1987, the document foreshadowed funding for Defence at a rate of Ô2.6% to 3% of GDPÕ in order to meet Ôself-relianceÕ objectives (Woolner 2000: 7). The next year it fell to 2.3% following KeatingÕs Ôbanana republicÕ warning. Since then it has fallen to 1.8%, the lowest level since 1939.

Balancing the budget has often been achieved by squeezing funds for operational readiness and sustainability (Woolner, Brown & Klintworth 2000: 21). This may no longer be possible. The prospect that the ADF will be deployed in more peacekeeping operations will add Ônew and significant cost pressures because of the need for maintaining higher levels of readinessÕ (p. 55). Meanwhile the cost of recruiting, training and retaining personnel accounts for 42% of the budget, and rising (p. 55).

Paying for increased salaries is unavoidable if Defence is to attract and keep specialists and other key personnel. But these costs threaten Ôto drain all other areas of the budgetÕ according to Derek Woolner, a defence analyst at the Parliamentary Library (2000: 23). ÔIf all the cost pressures present in the current budgetary structure were allowed to develop without correction, but assuming no significant attempt to increase the Defence budget from todayÕs levels, funding of major equipment would be stopped in about 2009Õ (Woolner 2000: 5). This suggests that the main battles over funding within Defence will be fought in the area of investment in new equipment.

An artificial crisis?

The paperÕs main message is that unless an increase in defence spending is forthcoming, some of the ADFÕs capabilities may have to be abandoned or significantly reduced. Phrases such as Ôdifficult choicesÕ are repeatedly used throughout the document to highlight the dilemma Defence allegedly faces in paying for increasingly expensive equipment and personnel at a time of growing regional instability.

Linking possible regional instability with the need for more defence dollars, however, suggests that Australia should be involved in more peacekeeping operations like East Timor in the future. Notwithstanding the inevitable negative reaction of some neighbours to the idea of Australia as Ôregional policemanÕ, the more Australia intervenes, the more will need to be spent on current engagements and the less will be available to develop capabilities for the future.

In addition to these problems, much of AustraliaÕs military hardware is reportedly reaching retirement at roughly the same timeÑso-called block obsolescence. The total replacement bill is estimated at between $80 to $110 billion (p. 54). At first glance this amount seems huge, but it is spread over 20 years or more and assumes the purchase of top of the line equipment. The paper notes that Ôwithout the major investment needed in fighter capability needed the problem of block obsolescence would not be severeÕ (p. 55). This suggests that the air force may have to settle for cheaper solutions than the American F22s when the time comes to replace our FA-18s and F-111s. Moreover, changes in technology indicate that not every item on the aging inventory list should be replaced individually.

The discussion paper unfortunately does not explore this. As one defence analyst pointed out, Ôis the public likely to come up with a clear choice? no new fighter aircraft? no new tanks? dismantle the submarines? If the salaried stategists in Russell Office cannot come up with such a clear view, what hope for the man in the street?Õ (Smith 2000).

Keeping up with the JonesÕ

Another recurring concern in the paper is that AustraliaÕs relative military capability will come under increasing pressure as regional defence budgets rise and capabilities become more sophisticated. The paper warns that

[s]ome combat aircraft now in service in Asia are better than our F/A-18s; many countries now operate anti-ship missiles capable of sinking modern naval surface vessels; the number of types of missile systems operating in the region has risen dramatically during the 1990s; regional submarine capabilities are growing; and surface-to-air missiles are proliferating. (p. 14)

Is it worth investing AustraliaÕs defence dollars on large, slow, vulnerable targets such as naval surface vessels that are easy to destroy? Or is it better to wait and invest in a new generation of equipment such as long-distance cruise missiles? Given the long lead times involved in capital-intensive equipment programmes, Australian defence planners need to be careful not to upgrade or replace existing equipment now that could be surpassed technologically within 15 years time.Ê These long lead times also mean that new equipment may already be outdated the day it enters service.

Furthermore, if crude comparisons of capability are interpreted at face value, then some members of the public may conclude that we are engaged in an arms race with our neighbours. They may well support the idea that Australia should boost its defence budget in order to Ômaintain our advantageÕ, thus locking us into a cycle of increased spending in an effort to keep one step ahead of the field. Given the size of AustraliaÕs GDP and population compared to the resources and economic potential of some northern neighbours such a goal is clearly unsustainable.

AustraliaÕs military capacity and influence are limited. A low population base and vast land mass, combined with a relatively small industrial capacity, virtually dictate certain choices: we cannot, for instance, afford to lose a large number of people or expensive weapons in combat. This places a premium on having a small but potent force. For this reason, it has been policy at least since the late 1970s to maintain a margin of technological superiority to maximise the effectiveness of AustraliaÕs small force. The paper points out that Ô. . . this is where our comparative advantage is likely to last longestÕ (p. 46).

The advantages of the military best able to coordinate all its constituent parts in the most cohesive manner has been dubbed Ômassed effectÕ rather than mass force.Ê The ADF calls this the Ôknowledge edgeÕ. But the discussion paper suggests that even this advantage is being eroded. It barely questions the ability of the regionÕs military forces to absorb new technology rapidly.

Professional skills transform technology intoÊ capability. Just as many businesses now recognise that the knowledge of their staff is crucial to gaining and retaining market share, it seems likely that achieving strategic objectives will depend more on the skills of military personnel to utilise, say, information technologies and less on equipment per se. To best accommodate technology that relies on networking, hierarchical organisations like Defence will need to not only adopt a more decentralised structure but also devolve responsibility and decisionmaking to more junior officers in the field. Sound leadership and effective training appear to be the key to military success. General SchwarzkopfÕs comment that Ôthe coalition could have won the Gulf War even if it had been equipped with Iraqi equipmentÕ underscores the importance of human factors rather than technology as being decisive (quoted in Semiamaw 1998).

Half full or half empty?

The assumptions behind the paperÕs focus on AustraliaÕs relative capabilities point to an unresolved ambivalence: does Australia need to defend itself with or against the region? Is it a source of threats or opportunities? Or both? Where some in Defence see cause for concern, others in Foreign Affairs see reasons for optimism.

The paper suggests that a return to economic growth within the region will pose new security challenges that may directly threaten or affect AustraliaÕs interests (p. 14). This is an echo of Samuel HuntingtonÕs clash of civilisations thesis that claimed that economic growth in Asia poses a threat because of the modernisation of regional military capabilities.

The paper concedes that the shift in countries (such as India, China, and some Southeast Asian nations) from armies to air and maritime forces is Ôappropriate for countries looking to develop their legitimate defence needsÕ (p. 14). Where regional defence planners were once preoccupied with internal security, they are now more concerned about protection of economic zones, hence a focus on the regionÕs maritime environment.

The positive defence benefits for Australia if Southeast Asian countries are more prosperous and better able to defend themselves are barely acknowledged. Yet the cumulative effect may be to make it more difficult for any one state to threaten Australia, its neighbours or the region in general. Moreover, as the 1997-1998 financial crisis demonstrated, an economically weakened region with many nations unable to take care of their own security generates considerable strategic anxiety.

Future strategic choices

Clearly, hard questions need to be asked about howÊ strategic analysis shapes defence policy before decisions about equipment and personnel are made. In other words, what should AustraliaÕs armed forces do in the future? The discussion paper offers three options: military operations other than war, such as peacekeeping; forces structured for regional security, that is a renewed emphasis on either Ôforward defenceÕ or Ôregional engagementÕ; and forces structured for defeating attacks on Australia, that is the current policy of Ôself-relianceÕ. These choices are presented as mutually exclusive alternatives, though in reality they represent a range of choice corresponding to policy emphasis.

Reorganising the ADF for peacekeeping requires mobile light land forces and a large army to enable Australia to sustain its presence and rotate its forces, with the navy and air force giving priority to providing logistics and transport (p. 62). Many analysts believe that peacekeeping and other non-military operations will be the ADFÕs most likely role over the next decade or so. Yet the paper effectively dismisses this option, warning that it would entail Ôsignificant cuts to our forcesÕ warfighting componentsÕ and a Ômajor departure in current policyÕ (p. 62). It is noted that New Zealand has opted for this approach for more than a decade, practically dismantling its military in the process. This suggests that there is some resistance within Defence not only to a change in policy but also a more fundamental change in traditional military culture.

More serious consideration is given to the regional security option. At its most expensive, it involves developing expeditionary land forces in a way that allows them to contribute to high-intensity coalition operations, presumably in Northeast Asia (p. 61). The British have followed a similar path. They have moved away from geographic planning and territorial defence to organising their defence forces around packets of capability that can be mixed and matched into a variety of task forces to meet their key strategic objectives.

For Australia, this structure amounts to a reversion to the policy of Ôforward defenceÕ of the 1950s and 1960s. It may also require interoperability with US forces, possibly involving high-tech equipment based upon the US concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs for which the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 aerial bombing of Serbia and KosovoÑÔwar without fightingÕÑare thought to have been precursors.

A different approach to regional security would place Ôhigher value on maritime forces and the promotion of interoperability with the armed forces of regional countries (p. 61). The idea that Australia needs to cooperate with other countries in its own defence has not always been popular with some in Defence and the broader Australian community. Yet the paper notes that coalition operations are fast becoming the norm (p. 24).

If Australian governments wish to demonstrate that they are not only serious about national security but also care about regional stability, then the ADF needs to be able to manouevre in what is a maritime security environment.Ê This runs counter to the land force nature of AustraliaÕs military traditions and would involve major structural changes (including a new synergy between the army and navy along the lines of the US Marine Corps). The paper notes that this would be a Ôlegitimate alternative if the risks of direct attack on Australian territory by sophisticated forces were considered less likelyÕ (p. 61, emphasis added).

The defence of Australia and the sea-air gap, however, still appears to be the preferred option of the paperÕs authors. Yet despite the current policy emphasis on Ôself-relianceÕ, Australia is dependent on American sources for most of its military hardware and software. This will not change. The high tech military option inevitably requires larger economies of scale than AustraliaÕs small demand for military equipment makes possible.

The discussion paper questions the continuing relevance of Ôself-relianceÕ (p. 22), adding that, Ôtoo much of the debate on defence policy has centred on a supposed choice between ÒForward DefenceÓ and ÒFortress AustraliaÓÕ (p. 27). The Australian public has not been well enough informed about the range of choice between these two extremes. Yet the lessons of history indicate that defence of Australian security does not begin or end at our shoreline. It may be necessary to match AustraliaÕs diplomacy with a credible military.

Conclusion

If the Australian public is to make a sensible contribution to the defence debate, it will need to be much better informed about the implications of the principal strategic choices. But the paper does little to assist the average person in reaching an informed view. The aim of the review process appears to have had less to do with public consultation than public relations.Ê

References

Lim, Robyn. 1999. ÔAustralia and Maritime SecurityÕ, Okazaki Institute Special Presentation, 19 February 1999, Accessed: 12 August 2000, URL: http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/robyn.ausmari.html.

Semiamaw, W. Colonel. 1998, ÔThe Revolution in Military Affairs: All That Glitters Is Not GoldÕ, Department of National Defence (Canada), Accessed: 19 June 2000, URL: http:www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc1/038.html.

Smith, Hugh. 2000, ÔSpending Defence Dollars Needs CommonsenseÕ, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 July: 19.

Woolner, Derek. 2000. ÔPressures on Defence Policy: The Defence Budget CrisisÕ, Research Paper 20 1999-2000, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, Accessed: 12 August 2000, URL: http://www. aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1999-2000rp20.htm.

Woolner, Derek; Gary Brown, and Gary Klintworth 2000, ÔThe GovernmentÕs Defence Policy Discussion Paper: Issues and DirectionsÕ, Current Issues Brief 2 2000-01, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, Accessed: 8 September 2000, URL: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2000-01/01cib02.htm.

About the Author
Susan Windybank is Editor of Policy.

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