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Economics,
Exuberance and Philosophy
Review by Andrew Norton
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here for PDF version
Capitalism, Democracy
and RalphÕs Pretty Good Grocery
by John Mueller
Princeton University Press 1999 335pp. $US29.95 ISBN 0-691-001144-6
RalphÕs
Pretty Good Grocery, for those like me who miss popular culture
allusions, is a fictional shop in the imaginary Minnesota
town of Lake Wobegon, a place invented by the humorist Garrison
Keilor. Its slogan is ÔIf you canÕt get it at RalphÕs, you
can probably get along without itÕ. For political scientist
John Mueller, this slogan sums up capitalism and democracy.
They may not supply everything, but what they donÕt you can
probably do without.
This
book has the feel of an American upper-year university academic
textbook, copiously referenced (the bibliography runs for
26 pages), and clearly if uncolourfully written. It even has
a summary of the bookÕs propositions up the back, as if for
an exam crammer. The textbook style is, however, very deceptive,
because this book contains many original and unusual lines
of argument alongside its synthesis of numerous other authors
and arguments.
Mueller
has something to upset just about everyone with a view on
democracy. There is currently much concern about an international
decline in political trust and, in countries with voluntary
voting, a drop in the numbers turning up to the polls. Mueller,
by contrast, is relaxed, pointing out that apathy and widespread
political ignorance are normal in democracies, and that apathy
can be a good thing, as it often leads to tolerance.
The
worriers about political trust are often conservatives or
leftists, but the views on democracy of thinkers that Policy
readers would generally respect, such as Milton Friedman
and Peter Berger, are also contradicted. They, amongst others,
argue that capitalism is a precondition of democracy, because
it creates many sources of competing power. History has provided
exceptions to this rule. In Bulgaria, for example, they had
several years of freedom of speech, free political organisations
and fair elections, all while the state controlled most of
the economy.
Other
theories of the pre-conditions of democracy, such as the spread
of literacy or the presence of particular cultural values
have also been falsified, as democracies have appeared in
nations in which they were lacking.
In
MuellerÕs view, democracy exists when people are free to lobby
and petition and governments are routinely responsive. Strictly
speaking this does not even require all the political rights
we normally associate with democracy, since womenÕs interests
have been greatly advanced by their lobbying even in times
when they did not have the vote. The prospect of effective
lobbying gives minorities a place in a system based on majority
rule, with Mueller giving the highly effective American civil
rights movement as an example, despite blacks making up only
about 10% of the US population.
Mueller
thinks that most theories of democracy are actually unhelpful,
since talk of necessary preconditions gives authoritarians
in countries where they are absent an excuse not to democratise,
and setting up unrealistic ideals is more likely to foster
disillusionment than change practice. We are better off accepting
democracies as what they areÑmessy but generally effective
ways of peacefully organising government.
If
democracy suffers from having too good an image, the reverse
is true for capitalism. As Mueller says, capitalism is Ôroutinely
assumed to inspire in its practitioners behaviour that is
deceitful, deceptive, cowardly, unfair, boorish, and lacking
compassionÕ. While these undesirable attributes can be found
in any society, Mueller argues that capitalism in fact encourages
their desirable antonym qualitiesÑhonesty, heroism, fairness,
civility, and compassion. The reason it does so is that it
is easier and less costly to do business with people who display
desirable attitudes to interpersonal relations, and that the
risk-taking entrepreneur is ÔheroicÕ in bringing new goods
and services to the market.
Mueller
concedes that these qualities are not always sincerely displayed,
but that people who are sincerely honest, fair etc. will in
fact do better, since they will find it less difficult to
be consistent. If people are perceived to be calculating and
manipulative in their display of the capitalist virtues they
will encourage cynicism.
While
all this is a useful corrective to the standard left/conservative
critique of capitalism, I found MuellerÕs most interesting
argument about capitalism to be that it was the rise of Ôbusiness
virtuesÕ that facilitated rapid economic growth from the 19th
century. While various 18th century writers, including Adam
Smith, did notice a connection between civility and commerce,
it was only in the mid-19th century that it became elaborated
advice, with P.T. BarnumÕs The Art of Money-Getting.
Mueller
speculates, plausibly enough, that books like this were part
of a culture shift that made doing business more pleasant
and less risky, and therefore contributed to rising living
standards.
Happily
enough for think tanks, Mueller also gives plenty of credit
to ideas entrepreneurs for improvements in ways of life around
the world. Democracy rose not so much because there were any
essential preconditions, but through a marketing process that
involved successful product testing, the failure of competitors,
fashion and luck.
Similarly,
capitalism greatly benefits from the successful establishment
of a consensus that says that economic well being should be
a dominant policy goal, that wealth should be gained through
exchange rather than conquest, that international trade should
be free, and that economies do best when governments leave
them alone.
I
hope this book comes out as an affordable paperback, as it
provides a useful overview of the literature on the culture
of capitalism and democracy, as well as offering many interesting
arguments of its own.
Review by Stephen Kirchner
Irrational Exuberance
By Robert Shiller
Princeton University Press 2000Ê
296 pp US$27.95Ê ISBN
0-691-05062-7 Ê
hillerÕs
book takes its title from a famous remark about the US stock
market made by Alan Greenspan in late 1996. But the title
is also apt given that Shiller is a leading proponent of the
school of behavioural finance, which calls into question the
rationality of participants in financial markets and the efficient
markets hypothesis. ShillerÕs book proved to be remarkably
well timed, being published just prior to the sharp decline
in technology stock prices earlier this year.
Shiller
makes the very strong claim that the US stock market is in
the grip of an irrational speculative bubble and that Ôthe
recent high valuations in the stock market have come about
for no good reasonsÕ (p. 203). To support this conclusion,
Shiller cites a wide range of cultural and psychological factors
that are said to support the market over and above levels
that would be justified on the basis of economic fundamentals.
Shiller
draws heavily on the established body of behavioural finance
literature to make his case. However, as Shiller readily concedes,
Ôcorrelation is certainly not causationÕ (p. 43). The many
psychological and cultural factors that Shiller cites are
certainly consistent with the possibility that the US stock
market is overvalued. But Shiller is unable to demonstrate
(as opposed to postulate) a causal relationship.
There
is not enough evidence here to support ShillerÕs strong claims
about the overvaluation of the US market. Shiller goes so
far as to argue that Ôwhether the stock market falls or continues
its upward climb in the opening years of the twenty-first
century will neither prove nor disprove this bookÕs essential
thesis about irrational exuberanceÕ (p. 204), which makes
one wonder what could disprove it. Karl Popper would have
something to say about this. The idea that the US stock market
is high by historical standards is widely accepted and can
be readily supported by the use of conventional valuation
measures. We do not need to believe in the irrationality of
investors to conclude that the US market might be overvalued.
ShillerÕs
book certainly touches on some important issues. For example,
there is considerable debate over whether there is something
different about the US economy this cycle that might warrant
recent stock market valuations. Shiller is appropriately sceptical
about the role of Ônew economyÕ theorising in rationalising
current valuations. Unfortunately, the behavioural finance
literature cannot adequately address this issue. Shiller neglects
the growing literature on alternative valuation methodologies,
in particular, the application of options pricing theory to
stock valuation. Shiller also ignores inconvenient facts,
such as the growing popularity among investors of index funds,
which are firmly grounded in the efficient markets hypothesis.
The
preoccupation with valuations and speculative volatility obscures
the more important issue of whether the market for equity
securities in the US and elsewhere is continuing to allocate
capital efficiently. Of course, these issues are closely linked.
Behavioural finance theorists can supply us with good reasons
for thinking that irrational considerations enter into the
capital allocation process. But does this matter? The efficient
markets hypothesis is only an approximation of this process,
describing a tendency to converge onÊ
a market-clearing equilibrium. Like many other contri-butions
to the behavioural finance literature, ShillerÕs book targets
a straw man, a theoretical ideal that was only ever meant
to be approximately true. For the most part, markets ensure
that mistakes made in the process of allocating capital
are eventually exposed and that
their costs are privately borne. The key issue is to ensure
that the institutions that govern the allocation of capital
promote rather than hinder this process.
This
raises some interesting issues for public policy, which Shiller
touches upon in his final chapter, ÔSpeculative Volatility
in a Free SocietyÕ. ShillerÕs policy recommendations are remarkably
modest, considering the extent of his earlier claims. To his
credit, he stops short of recommending the wholesale re-regulation
of financial markets. This is perhaps an implicit recognition
of the limitations of his argument. However, others who take
to heart his argument about the irrationality of investors
might not be so coy. Indeed, recent volatility in financial
markets and its implications for the real economy have seen
increased interest on the part of the authorities in improving
the governance of financial markets. This is the right focus.
Unfortunately, many of the proposals for improving governance
seek to substitute the very subjective judgements of the authorities
for the impersonal outcomes of markets.
There
is a problem here for the proponents of behavioural finance.
If we are overly subject to various irrationalities and cognitive
biases, surely these biases will have the most potential for
harm when they are held by decisionmakers with the coercive
authority to enforce those judgements. A wide range of less
than rational considerations undoubtedly drive markets. However,
the market for equity and other securities by its very nature
reflects opposing views of future develop-ments (Ôthe mean
expectation of the speculator is zeroÕ). An error of judgement
on the part of an individual or group of investors is eventually
exposed, assuming governments do not establish institutions
that interfere with the marketÕs discovery process.
Shiller
shows little appreciation for the role of government in promoting
speculative volatility. For example, the emerging markets
crisis of 1997-98 has prompted considerable interest in reforming
the international financial system. However, many of these
proposals seek to limit the free flow of capital and opportunities
for regulatory arbitrage. Yet it was a regulatory mistake,
namely, the distortions introduced by the Basle capital adequacy
requirements, that was an important factor in bringing about
the crisis. This highlights the importance of alternative
and competing frameworks of governance for financial markets.
The recent volatility in Internet and biotechnology stocks
followed the US governmentÕs quasi-judicial attack on Microsoft
and statements on the human genome project. The resulting
volatility in share prices can be attributed to an increase
in the equity risk premium, as investors became concerned
about the possibility of increased predatory activity by government
towards corporations.
As
the literature on behavioural finance and this book demonstrates
(p. 142), one of our strongest cognitive biases is our unwillingness
to concede the limitations of our own knowledge.Ê
Perhaps this is why HayekÕs appreciation of the knowledge
problem has so much difficulty catching on. Despite his fine
appreciation of our individual biases and collective irrationalities,
Shiller is all too ready to elevate his own judgements above
those of millions of independent decisionmakers. Irrational
exuberance indeed!
Review by Sean Kennedy
The Unemployment Crisis in Australia:
Which Way Out?
Edited by Stephen Bell Cambridge University Press 2000Ê 328 ppÊ $90.00
(hardback); $34.95 (paperback) ISBN 0 521 643945
he
latest employment figures appear to show an economy powering
along and creating truckloads of jobs. Hence, it may seem
an odd time to release a book arguing for a dramatic overhaul
of current economic policy in order to fix the unemployment
crisis in Australia. I doubt, however, whether the latest
unemployment figures would change the views of the authors
in this book.
The
main argument is that the current economic system is failing
to create enough jobs and is not effective at delivering fair
wage outcomes. They argue that the only solution is to increase
taxes on the employed and direct the extra revenues to public
employment creation.
Contributors
to Stephen BellÕs book include public policy commentators
Bob Gregory, John Quiggin and John Nevile and labour market
economists such as Raja Junankar and Roy Green.
Bell,
in the introduction to the book, states that the bookÕs objective
is to recognise and outline the magnitude of the unemployment
problem in Australia and to point the finger at current economic
policy settings. Bell argues that the current policy orthodoxy
leaves labour markets failing to distribute jobs
and incomes, effectively creating persistent unemployment
and increased wage inequality.
The
proponents of supply side reform are criticised for failing
to understand the importance of the macro economy. The attack
covers well-trodden groundÑindeed it provides excellent reference
material for anyone who wishes to get a grip on the key arguments
from opponents of free markets.
Reading
the book, the attacks tend to portray supply side reformers
as being rampantly against the worker. Indeed, Quiggin, in
a characteristically entertaining chapter portraying the public
sector as a job engine, goes as far as to suggest that the
current unemployment crisis is a symptom of the classic Marxist
battle between workers and employers. Current policy is all
about ensuring as many workers as possible are exposed to
as much competition as possible so that employers can benefit
from the increase in bargaining power that comes when workers
fear unemployment.
Consistent
with this is a strong element running through the book that
it is not only the total level of employment but the type
of jobs created that is important. Jobs in the manufacturing
sector are preferred to the service sector and full-time jobs
are preferred to part-time jobs.
However,
it not all about criticising what Bell calls the Ôneo-liberal
orderÕ. A key feature is the attempt to map out the dimensions
of a broad plan to promote full employment. The argument for
such a plan runs like this:
¥
Since the 1970s, Keynesian economic policies have been replaced
by supply side policies (microeconomic reform) and less Government
involvement in the economy (e.g. privatisation, contracting
out etc.);
¥ÊÊ As markets have become more freer, the unfairness
inherent in such markets have become more pronounced;
¥Ê Removing supply side distortions in order
to reduce unemployment is based on the misplaced assumption
that the labour market works like any other market. For instance,
Bob Gregory reviews labour market deregulation policies in
the UK, New Zealand and the US and concludes that such policies
have had little impact on the absolute level of unemployment
in the respective countries;
¥Ê The demand side has been negl-ected. Not
focusing on the demand side has meant that the economy is
not running fast enough.
¥
Labour markets interventions, however, such as minimum wages,
job sharing and wage subsidies is not enough do enough to
create jobs (Elizabeth Webster, for instance, reviews the
outcomes of past labour market programmes in Australia). Real
impacts can only be achieved by getting the Government more
involved again in the job creation business.
As
you might guess there is lots of stuff here to get an activist
Government excited. Indeed, one chapter calls for a coordinated
industry, regional and industrial relations plan to be developed
to direct the economy to produce a ÔfairerÕ workplace.
Mostly,
the solutions are pretty broad and undeveloped. While there
is some muted discussion of the need to watch the impact such
expansionary policies have on the current account and inflation,
there is precious little discussion of the likely impacts
of this private wealth transfer on productivity, savings and
economic growth. WhatÕs more, there is the naive belief that
the Government will be better than private markets in picking
winning industries.
Also,
it in unclear how many of the currently unemployed will be
easily placed in the industry sectors considered worthy by
the authors. For instance, Quiggin argues for $20 billion
in extra tax dollars to fund job creation in education, health,
welfare, the environment and the arts. These industry areas
are typically made up of the highly skilled and tend to have
low unemployment rates. What jobs are there for the relatively
lower skilled poor who are currently unemployed? In addition,
past public sector job creation schemes typically have proven
to have large Ôcrowding outÕ effects where private sector
employment is simply squeezed by public spending with no real
impact on employment levels. It is not hard to imagine how
job creation directed at the education and health sectors
(for instance) would not result in similar outcomes.
Perhaps
the main failing of the book is that it has ignored the obvious
counterfactualÑthe United States. This country has one the
freest labour markets in the world and is experiencing full
employment of the kind advocated in the book (with much lower
shares of public sector employment compared to Australia).
Also, it is in the United States that supply side reforms
appear to have had a real impact on the level of long term
unemployed (see, for instance, the dramatic impact achieved
by the ÔWorkFirstÕ reforms in Wisconsin). Why the United States
has been able to achieve this when more regulated labour markets
havenÕt is a key question that goes unanswered in this nevertheless
interesting book.
Review by Nathan Strong
LawÕs Order: What Economics Has
to Do With Law and Why It Matters
David D. Friedman
Princeton University Press 2000 329 pp, US$29.95 ISBN 0-691-01016-1
n
a world where laws seem increasingly complex, is there a unifying
analytical framework that allows legal rules to be rationalised?
David Friedman, Professor of Law at the University of Santa
Clara, argues that the economics discipline offers an extremely
useful toolkit for analysing legal systems. The purpose of
the book is not to develop optimal legal rules, but to describe
the tools which lawyers and economists can use to understand
the consequences of laws and whether particular legal rules
are good or bad.
In
Policy (Autumn 2000) the review of Megan Richardson
and Gillian Hadfield (eds) The Second Wave of Law and Economics
noted that despite the prominence of law and economics as
an Ôabsorbing and challenging scholarshipÕ, it has failed
to capture a large body of judicial acceptance. Richardson
and HadfieldÕs purpose is to remedy a Ômisconception that
Law and Economics is still, and must forever be, linked to
idiosyncrasies and perceived limitations of the Chicago School.Õ
Although
FriedmanÕs book sits firmly in the first wave of law and economics,
resting primarily on conceptions of rationality and economic
efficiency, it is nonetheless an important contribution to
the development of a wider understanding of the economic analysis
of law. The plain language style of writing and use of worked
examples makes it not only a thoroughly interesting and enjoyable
read for economists, but a work that should be readily understood
by lawyers, hopefully leading to greater understanding of
the value of economic analysis by the legal profession.
The
aim of the book, Friedman explains, is to question whether
legal rules achieve the purpose of economic efficiency, commonly
ascribed in economic analysis of law as the purpose of a legal
system.
The
book is divided into three parts. The first consists of an
explanation of what role economics has in the analysis of
law, including an explanation of the rationality assumption.
Friedman argues that the central assumption of economicsÑindividual
rationalityÑis an app-ropriate assumption with which to analyse
the effect of legal rules on human behaviour. Although people
do not always seem to act rationally, Friedman argues that
no other criteria for judging the effect of legal rules is
suitable. Analysis of legal rules cannot take into account
irrationality, because by its very nature it implies people
will act in unpredictable ways. No legal system can attempt
to define legal rules in a way to counter every irrational
action. Hence, Friedman argues, Ô[l]egal rules are to be judged
by the structure of incentives they establish and the consequences
of people altering their behaviour in response to those incentives.Õ
No
outline of what economics has to do with law would be complete
without an explanation of the concept of economic efficiency
and the Coase theorem. Friedman also devotes attention to
economic concepts of defining and enforcing property rights,
the allocation and burden of risk, moral hazard, adverse selection,
concerns with examination of outcomes and events ex ante
or ex poste, strategic action and gamingÑin essence
all the core concepts of microeconomic analysis.
These
analytical tools are then used in the second part of the book
to examine the core components of the legal system: property
law; intellectual property; contract law; tort law; criminal
law; antitrust and diversions to discussions of marital law,
sex laws and the sale of babies and body parts. Friedman also
examines legal standards of proof, liability rules, why some
damaging activities are torts, others crimes and others ignored.
All in all a comprehensive examination of the core concepts
in the legal system, and all described with the same set of
analytical tools.
The
final subject for the book is to question whether the common
law is efficient, as Judge Richard Posner has suggested. On
this point Friedman disagrees with Posner. He suggests that
it is unlikely that judges understand economics enough to
know that they cannot benefit favoured groups with general
rules. Even if judges do know that they should try to maximise
economic efficiency, it is by no means clear that judges are
in a good position to apply economics in a way that maximises
efficiency. As Friedman notes even good economists sometimes
recommend inefficient policies.
As
an empirical matter, Friedman suggests that the legal system
is efficient only in a general sense. Laws defining torts
and crimes, the application of strict liability to some actions
and negligence to others all seem to be efficient, but when
you look past the general pattern of legal rules it becomes
obvious that laws can be inefficient. Examples cited are the
refusal of courts to recognise agreements that waive rights
to medical malpractice suits or product liability, or unwillingness
to enforce contractual penalty clauses.
Friedman
concedes that economic efficiency is not the only criteria
for formulating and understanding legal rules, but it is probably
the best set of tools available for assessing the predictive
consequences of laws and whether they are likely to achieve
the outcomes that are desired. What Friedman makes clear is
that understanding laws from an economic framework raises
the level of debate by making clear precisely what is being
argued about. Economists will always be able to come up with
creative economic arguments to rationalise why one legal rule
is preferable to another, but by bringing economic analysis
to bear at least we can all conceptualise why.
Overall,
this book does an extremely effective job of trying to assist
lawyers and economists to rationalise the system of legal
rules by using standard economic tools. Although economic
reasoning often generates counterintuitive predictions about
what will happen as a result
of any particular legal rule, Friedman does an excellent job
of explaining
why such counterintuitive results are in fact right.
For
those who donÕt mind reading books online or who want to Ôtry
before they buyÕ, a copy of the book is available at http:/www.best.com/~ddfr/laws_order/.
Review by Michael Rush
Behavioral Law and Economics
Cass R. Sunstein (ed)
Cambridge University PressÊ
480ppÊ $US24.95 (pb) ISBN 0521667437
ome
time ago, a doyen of the Law and Economics movement was attending
a symposium to discuss the achievements and future of his
chosen field of inquiry. On that occasion, he also carried
a particularly interesting message:
I
urge the young law students here to keep plugging away
at Law and EconomicsÑsome day you will take over the world.
Years
on, however, this claim seems as unlikely to be achieved as
it no doubt was then.
In
Australia at least, Law and Economics has not had the impact
at law schools, in the profession or within the judiciary
that many of its advocates would have hoped or predicted.
One
of the main reasons for this apparent failure is because neoclassical
economics has traditionally provided the models and framework
for analysing the law. As there is a perception that many
of the assumptions on which neoclassical economics is based
are unrealistic, it follows that the policy prescriptions
of Law and Economics must also be questionable.
Therefore,
while Ôfirst-waveÕ theorists using the standard neoclassical
approach significantly raised the profile of Law and Economics,
its real world impact has been minimal.
In
response, a Ôsecond-waveÕ of Law and Economics scholars emerged,
to which the Behavioral School of Economics has added its
voice.
The
book Behavioral Law and Economics represents one of
the first attempts to collate the ideas and empirical studies
of behavioural economists who are using the tools of their
trade to analyse the law.
The
contributors represent a collection of academics who are not
in the business of providing a single specific theory of human
behaviour, but have, as Herbert Simon puts it, a commitment
to empirical testing
of neoclassical assumptions and to modifying economic theory
and predictions on the basis of what is found in the testing
process.
Over
sixteen chapters, the editor Carl Sunstein and his fellow
contributors also draw out the implications of their empirical
testing to consider the ramifications for the legal system
and public policy of behavioural departures from the neoclassical
homo economicus.
As
a recurrent theme in the book, these departures are referred
to as the three important ÔboundsÕ on human behaviour. In
other words, contrary to neoclassical economics, it is contended
that people in fact display bounded rationality, bounded will-power
and bounded self-interest.
Because
all three bounds represent a significant way in which people
will depart from the standard economic model, what follows
is a questioning of how useful or accurate the tools of neoclassical
economics are in generating sound predictions and prescriptions
for the law.
Among
the myriad of illustrations in the book, the assumption, for
example, of people being Ôself-interestedÕ, is tested.
In
a one-off game participant A is given $100, which she may
or may not choose to share with participant B.Ê
While A and B may not collude or bargain, B has the
power to refuse any amount offered by A, in which case both
A and B receive nothing. While standard economics predicts
A should offer one cent and B should accept, studies have
shown that persons in the position of A actually offer, on
average, between $30 and $40, with there often being a 50-50
division.
Apparently,
notions of fairness play an important role in rendering self-interested
behaviour ÔboundedÕ. Not only were people in the position
of player A willing to sacrifice their own material well-being,
but people in the position of player B would, in a show of
spite, often punish those who offered an insignificant amount
of money by refusing the gift, ensuring neither participant
received any money.
While
this one example certainly does not provide the knockdown
blow to the standard neoclassical model, time and time again
over the sixteen chapters departures from the conventional
predictions are demonstrated, and potential refutations purged.
Despite
raising some serious concerns about neoclassical analysis
of the law (which appears also to validate the legal professionÕs
concern about the attendant policy prescriptions), the book
has some drawbacks and limitations.
Firstly,
the authors recognise as a possible objection to their approach
the fact that Behavioral Law and Economics does not have the
advantages of simplicity and parsimony provided by the neoclassical
framework. Instead of providing a unitary theory, this new
perspective offers a more complicated and unruly picture of
human behaviour, making predictions more difficult.
In
this sense, Judge PosnerÕs previous response to lawyers wishing
to bring culture and human frailty to rational actors provides
a salient warning: Ôtoo many bells and whistles will stop
the analytic engine in its tracks.Õ
The
authors respond to such attacks by stating that simplicity
and parsimony are only valuable to the extent that predictions
from such a model of behaviour are correctÑand it is clear
from their analyses that they believe neoclassical economics
lacks the power to make universally correct predictions.
The
trade-off however, remains unanswered: if such behaviour,
which departs from the standard model occurs relatively infrequently,
should we abandon the benefits and theories of conventional
analysis in favour of what appears to be a more unruly case-by-case
approach?
A
second possible criticism is further provided by Judge Posner,
who commented in another context that Ôtoo great a readiness
to abandon the simple model in favour of alternative approaches
to behaviour at the first sign of difficulty, carries the
risk of overlooking avenues for economic answers.Õ
What
Judge Posner appears to be saying is that critics of neoclassical
economics too quickly point to anomalies with its assumptions
and their own real world experiences, without stopping to
consider whether the surprising facts can be reconciled with
existing theories.
As
Steven Landsburg once put it:
Imagine
a physicist, well versed in the laws of gravity, which
he believes to be excellent approximations to the ultimate
truth. One day he encounters his first helium-filled balloon,
a blatant challenge to the laws he knows so well.
Two
courses are open to him, he can say Ôwell, the laws of
gravity are usually true, but not always: here is one
of those exceptions.Õ Or he can say Ôlet me see if there
is another way to explain this strange phenomenon without
abandoning the most basic principles of my science.Õ
If
he takes the latter course, and if he is sufficiently
clever, he will eventually discover the properties of
objects that are lighter than air and recognise that their
behaviour is in perfect harmony with existing theories
of gravity. In the process, he will not only learn about
helium-filled balloons; he will also come to a deeper
understanding of how gravity works.
While
Behavioral Law and Economics might provide the basis
for a new understanding of human behaviour which supplements
the conventional analysis, the lesson is, if we are too quick
to abandon our most successful theories in favour of sparkling
new conjectures, we may soon be left with nothing at all.
Review by Sam Roggeveen
The Consolations of Philosophy
Alain de Botton
Hamish HamiltonÊ 265
ppÊ $40.00 ISBN 0679 4427 66
ThereÕs
a great scene in Mel BrooksÕ History of the World,
a comedy set in ancient Rome, in which Comicus (Brooks) is
collecting his dole money. ÔOccupation?Õ asks the woman behind
the counter. ÔStand-up philosopher,Õ replies Comicus proudly.
The woman looks puzzled and repeats her question. ÔStand-up
philosopher,Õ Comicus insists. The woman now looks suspicious,
then finally she twigs. ÔOhÕ, she says, Ôso youÕre a bullshit
artist!Õ
There
is good reason to think that BrooksÕ is the popular view of
philosophers as a class. Philosophers donÕt seem to know how
to talk clearly or bluntly. They use their great learning
merely to talk nonsense and create confusion. It is strange
that an activity once associated with clarifying some of lifeÕs
big questions is nowadays seen as a means to obfuscate.
In
The Consolations of Philosophy, Alain de Botton has
done his best to undermine this stereotype. This book is written
in plain English with the intent of explaining to lay readers
how the great minds of the past dealt with such eternal human
problems as unpopularity, poverty, frustration, inadequacy
and love. And so de Botton joins that growing list of authors
trying to answer the question which has puzzled so many publishers:
is it possible to write a popular book about philosophy?
The
answer is that the jury is still out. Sure, the book is popular.
ItÕs been a huge seller in the UK. But is it philosophy? Probably
not. For one thing, it feels just a little too easy to be
real philosophy. In the chapter on Nietzche, de Botton talks
about the consolations for difficulty, concluding that ÔNot
everything which makes us feel better may be good for us.
Not everything which hurts may be bad.Õ But there is no sense
in this chapter, or indeed the book, that philosophy itself
is difficult.
In
trying to introduce readers to profound ideas in plain language
and easily understandable concepts, de Botton seems to have
diluted these ideas until they are little more than truisms.
This brings us back to Mel BrooksÕ joke and why he was actually
wrong about philosophers. The truth is, good philosophers
donÕt speak in convoluted language just for the sake of it.
They do it because it is genuinely impossible to express complex
ideas fully without such language.
So
if we canÕt call it philosophy, how do we describe the book?
The Consolations of Philosophy has been called a new
kind of self-help book, an attempt at reviving interest in
the great philosophers by making them relevant to the problems
we face in our everyday lives. Of course, it is easy to scoff
at such a business, and indeed there has been no shortage
of superior-sounding guffaws coming from academic critics
of the book the world over.
But
perhaps we should be a little more charitable. After all,
it does no harm to an academicÕs love of Schopenhauer or Nietzche
to have the words of these great minds read in a simplified
way by others. And if nothing else, a self-help book inspired
by Plato and Epicurus is surely a step up from the kind of
snake oil usually inflicted on a gullible public desperate
to find the secret of happiness.
But
even if The Consolations of Philosophy at least avoids
the worst cliches and platitudes of that most
dire literary concoctionøøthe self-help bookøøit reinforces
the motivating spirit behind this entire industry; namely,
the modern worldÕs obsession with the self. Of course, philosophy
has always struggled with the question of what it means to
live the good life. In our age this struggle has been turned
completely inside out from a concern about ethics to one about
ÔfeelingsÕ. De BottonÕs book merely allies the great philosophers
to this corruption.
Thankfully,
The Consolations of Philosophy has a number of saving
graces. The first is that unlike other self-help books, some
of which promise happiness in just eight minutes per day,
it offers no easy solutions. In fact, some of de BottonÕs
advice may make the reader squirm rather uncomfortably.
For
those obsessed with the pursuit of wealth, for instance, de
BottonÕs conclusion is that this pursuit hardly ever brings
happiness and that it might be much better for us to concentrate
on more fulfilling ambitions like making friends and gaining
personal freedom. This begs the question: what kind of world
would this be if we all took de BottonÕs advice and stopped
trying hard to earn money?
De
Botton also argues that we ought to follow PlatoÕs lead and
be more direct with one another. It seems to de Botton that
there is far too high a priority placed on being liked and
too little placed on telling the simple truth. Again one is
forced to reflect on the consequences of such an idea if we
were all to adopt it. Perhaps The Consolations of Philosophy
is a more radical book than its safe and welcoming appearance
would suggest?
The
other saving grace is that The Consolations of Philosophy
is a pleasure to read. De Botton writes with verve and confidence.
Aside from the pithy prose, there is an abundance of pictures
to contribute to the light and carefree feel of the book.
These are often frivolous or self-consciously clever (e.g.
after writing that he found inspiriation for his book while
looking for a favoured brand of milk, we see a picture of
a milk carton) but occasionally do a great service to the
text. The picture of an utterly dejected Schopenhauer, hair
mussed up like a mad scientist and head in hand, sits neatly
above a quotation reading: ÔWe can regard our life as a uselessly
disturbing episode in the blissful repose of nothingness.Õ
Blunt
enough for you, Mel Brooks?
Policy
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