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International
Trade
Sex aside, trade is
probably the oldest form of human interaction. Evidence of
trade between groups, both near and distant, goes back to
prehistoric times. Specialisation and exchange are fundamental
to our everyday lives. You catch the fish and Ill
milk the cows type contracts are trade bargains we all
continuously make. As nations we also trade at a great rate,
and since the end of World War II international trade has
grown dramatically. In Australia, for example, our imports
and exports have risen from about 15 to 20 per cent of GDP
since the 1980s.
For all its antiquity
and contemporary rates of growth, international trade is controversial
and much public policy debate is about barriers which are
or might be raised against it. The fact that it is controversial
raises two questions. First, what is about it that explains
its long life and its contemporary popularity? Second, if
it is as good as all that, why do some groups oppose it so
vehemently? Why, for example, in 1997 did we as a nation
decide to maintain trade barriers against cars and
textiles, footwear and clothing?
The
gains from trade
Economists explaining
the gains from trade typically draw on two concepts
absolute and comparative advantage.
Absolute
advantage
The essence of absolute
advantage is simple enough. Adam Smith wrote about the gains
to be had from specialising. It takes no great leap of understanding
to appreciate that if Sri Lanka is good at growing tea and
Australia is good at growing wool, it would make sense for
Sri Lanka to specialise in tea and Australia in wool. The
gains to be had from specialisation and trade are both important
and obvious.
Comparative
advantage
Comparative advantage
is another notion. The insight that trade can be mutually
beneficial between two parties even if one party is hopeless
at everything is one of the few propositions in economics
that can be demonstrated to be true and is nontrivial.
A country has comparative
advantage in the
production of a particular
product if it can produce it relatively more cheaply
(in terms of sacrificing production of another good) than
another country. Consider two countries Orchardovia
and Bananaland each producing two goods apples
and oranges with 100 workers. In Orchardovia it takes
one worker one year to produce a tonne of apples and one year
for a worker to produce a tonne of oranges. In Bananaland,
it requires two workers to produce a tonne of apples in a
year and four workers to produce a tonne of oranges. Suppose
with no trade, 25 tonnes of apples and 75 tonnes of oranges
are produced in Orchardovia and 20 tonnes of apples and 15
tonnes of oranges in Bananaland.
Now consider the opportunity
cost of oranges (what has to be sacrificed in order to produce
an orange) in each country. In Orchardovia the opportunity
cost of producing a tonne of oranges is one tonne of apples.
In Bananaland an extra tonne of oranges costs two tonnes of
apples. Therefore the opportunity cost of oranges is less
in Orchardovia, which means that it can produce oranges relatively
more cheaply (in terms of apples) than Bananaland. Orchardovia
has a comparative advantage in the production of oranges.
Similarly, Bananaland has a comparative advantage in the production
of apples.
So what?
you may ask. The key insight is that even though Bananaland
is not as good as Orchardovia at producing anything (in this
two-good world), trade between the countries will still be
mutually beneficial.
To see this, let Orchardovia
concentrate all its resources in orange production and let
Bananaland devote all of its resources to apple production.
Orchardovia now produces 100 tonnes of oranges and Bananaland
produces 50 tonnes of apples. If Orchardovia exports 20 tonnes
of oranges and in return receives 30 tonnes of apples, then
it will have 30 tonnes of apples and 80 tonnes of oranges
to consume. It is better off than before trade. On the other
hand, Bananaland now has 20 tonnes of apples and 20 tonnes
of oranges to consume. It is also better off (see table 1).
The fact that both countries are left better off is a result
of each country specialising where it has comparative advantage.
By co-operating in this way consumption possibilities are
expanded beyond the production possibilities of individual
countries.
Table
1: Comparative Advantage
|
Orchardavia
|
Bananaland
|
|
Opportunity
cost of orange
|
1 apple
|
2 apples
|
|
Opportunity
cost of apple
|
1 orange
|
half an orange
|
|
Production
and consumption before trade
|
25 apples
|
20 apples
|
|
75 oranges
|
15 oranges
|
|
Production
after trade
|
100 oranges
|
50 apples
|
|
Consumption
after trade
|
30 apples
|
20 apples
|
|
80 oranges
|
20 oranges
|
Thus the gains from
trade have a logical underpinning and do not rest in some
flimsy preference for flash foreign brands. Yet, as noted,
most public discussions are not about this wonderful way of
converting oranges into apples, or wool into tea, or beef
into potatoes, etc. Rather they are about persuading governments
to inhibit these conversions and to call this inhibiting activity
protection.
Protection
how and why
Why on earth would
governments come under pressure to inhibit trade? Why call
it protection? And how do they do it? Taking the last question
first, there is a large number of trade inhibiting policies.
A few of them are listed in table 2. The traditional one is
a tariff. Consider the tariff Australia applies to motor vehicle
imports. In 1998 this tariff is 20 per cent. This means that
when you import your Mazda for, say, $15 000, you must pay
$3000 import duty through the Customs Department. Your Mazda
costs you $18 000. And Australian car manufacturers in Australia
could charge $3000 more for their local versions of a Mazda.
It is as simple as that. Protection or as it might
equally be called taxation of imported goods, always
involves some device that raises the price of goods.
Why call such a device
protection? One answer to that is that the people
who benefit from taxation of imports the people who
produce goods which have their prices bid up at home
are indeed protected from imports. But the rest of us are
clearly taxed. Why dont we call trade inhibiting measures
taxation? It would seem that the people who are being taxed
have not put together as good a public relations program as
the people who are being protected.
Table 2:
Some trade restricting measures
|
| A tax on imported
goods and services |
| A restriction
on the amount of a good that can be imported (either in
quantity or value terms) |
| A licence restricting
who can import |
| A payment made
by the government to assist businesses in production |
The reasons why they
havent are simple enough. The people who stand to benefit
from a particular piece of protection are typically clustered
in some way and pretty much aware of the benefits of the protection,
and for them the benefits are significant. Whereas the people
paying the tax are typically widely dispersed, and for each
of them the cost of the protection is quite small even
if in aggregate the costs are large. And even where people
are aware of the costs there is a tendency to overrate the
benefits.
Whatever the reason,
it is certainly a very effective public relations program
to be able to describe as protection a situation which boils
down to Australians in protected industries saying to Australian
consumers, give me some of your money so that I can
keep doing what I am doing.
Protection
(taxation) and jobs
Protection is said
to increase jobs in import competing industries. This is because
those industries will be larger, due to the more favorable
conditions that they experience. But an industry developed
behind a wall of protection tends to become inefficient. While
competition at home might be hot, real efficiency tests require
international competition. The main pain from sustaining inefficient
industries happens through reduced incomes. But it is not
as if those reduced incomes enable employment to be maintained.
Take, for example, Australias two most heavily protected
industries, the textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) and
passenger motor vehicles (PMV) industries. Chart 1 shows that
employment has been steadily falling in these industries over
the past thirty years. This is despite large fluctuations
in the level of protection. There is no link between protection
and jobs, with the high levels of protection in the early
mid-1980s seemingly unable to halt the flow of jobs out of
these industries.
Chart 1a: Does
protection affect employment?
Clothing and footwear

Chart 1b: Does protection
affect employment?
Motor vehicles
The perception that
protectionism saves jobs is further weakened when we look
at the effect of protection on employment in the whole economy.
Protection (taxation) means those inputs for production that
are (or could be) imported will be more expensive. For example,
a farmer will have to pay more for machinery, as will a manufacturer
who uses computers. With increased costs will come a scaling
down of production, and therefore job losses. This is most
evident in export industries, where demand is very sensitive
to price. Therefore it is naïve to just focus on the
import competing industries when looking at the employment
effects of protection (taxation). Protection should not be
looked at in terms of protecting jobs in import competing
industries, but rather transferring resources including
labour from efficient, non-protected industries, to
inefficient protected ones.
Paul Krugman in a
1993 article provides an illustration of the confusion between
protection (taxation) and jobs:
An entrepreneur starts
a new business that uses a secret technology to convert US
wheat, lumber and so on into cheap high quality consumer goods.
The entrepreneur is hailed as an industrial hero although
some of his domestic competitors are hurt, everyone accepts
that occasional dislocations are the price of free market
economy. But then an investigative report discovers that what
he is really doing is shipping the wheat and lumber to Asia
and using the proceeds to buy manufactured goods whereupon
he is denounced as a fraud who is destroying American jobs.
Protection pushes
import prices up, which means that consumers cannot afford
as many goods and services. Tariffs cost the average Australian
family $1000 per year. If tariffs were cut then they would
be able to purchase an extra $1000 of goods and services.
This would not only benefit the consumer, but would also benefit
producers, as demand would increase. The flow on from this
would be increased production and employment.
To summarise, tariffs
and other protective devices place a hidden burden on consumers
and producers in non-protected industries. The aim of this
hidden premium is to keep jobs in Australia; however, it seems
to have little effect on the industries that it is supposed
to assist. To everyone else in the economy this premium is
a cost that limits consumption and production.
Sometimes proponents
of protection (that is, protection for them, taxation for
you) will say some industries must be able to compete,
but what about a bit of protection to help them get started.
This is the so-called infant industry argument. But experience
shows it is very difficult to pick industries to protect (and
to know which ones you are taxing), and even harder to withdraw
support once given to them.
Protection levels
have been falling in Australia. For example, the effective
rate of assistance (to be thought of as the cost advantage
that domestic producers gain as a result of protection) in
manufacturing (the main beneficiary of protection in Australia)
fell from 15 per cent in 1989-90 to 6 per cent in 1996-97
and is expected to fall to 5 per cent in 2000-01. This is
largely due to tariff cuts in the TCF and PMV industries.
This downward trend has been in place for quite some time,
as can be seen in chart 2. What can also be seen in this chart
is that despite the tariff cuts in the PMV and TCF industries,
protection in these industries is still quite high, with an
effective rate of assistance in 1996-97 of 28 per cent in
the PMV industry and 25 per cent in TCF.
Chart 2: Average
effective rates of assistance to manufacturing, textiles,
clothing and footwear and passenger motor vehicles.
Not only is Australia
reducing protection, but many other countries around the world
are as well. What are the implications of this for Australia?
Well, the news is generally good. Our exporters will not have
to overcome the barriers that they once did. This will increase
demand for our exports, meaning more production and jobs for
us and increasing our standard of living.
The
domestic economy in a world context
Chart 3 sets out some
recent trends in Australian trade patterns. Merchandise trade
with Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which
includes Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Philippines and Vietnam, has grown in importance, from 8·8
per cent of total trade in 1988-89 to 15·5 per cent
in 1996-97. This is an enormous increase. Trade with China
and South Korea has also seen similar booms. On the other
hand trade with the United States has fallen from 10·2
per cent of total trade to just 7·0 per cent over the
same period. Perhaps surprisingly, our trade with Japan is
not experiencing the same increase that has occurred in our
trade with other Asian nations. In fact the share of Japans
trade has fallen, from 27·2 per cent to 19·5
per cent. This is not to say that Japan is no longer important
to Australia, (it still remains our largest trading partner),
just less so than it used to be. Another area where our trade
has fallen is in Europe, but this fall is not quite as dramatic.
Figures for investment
show trends that follow the ones for trade. In 1990-91, investment
in Australia by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries,
excluding Japan, was under 29 per cent. By 1994-95 this share
had risen to about 31·5 per cent. While not as sharp
as the increase in trade, it is still an indication that our
international trade relationship with Asia is becoming stronger,
especially with South-East Asia. This is at the expense of
our more traditional trading partners such as Europe, the
United States and Japan.
Chart 3: Australia's
exports by country of destination
Multilateral
trade agreements
Obviously Australia
is not alone in benefiting from a reduction in another countrys
protection barriers: every country benefits. It is for this
reason that governments have been keen to reach agreements
where the parties concerned reduce protective barriers to
other signatories of the deal. The most obvious example of
this is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The GATT is a multilateral (involves many parties) agreement
between most countries in the world, specifying limits on
tariffs and regulations on other protection barriers. The
most recent round of the GATT was in Uruguay in 1993. Some
of the major agreements reached were:
- a reduction
of tariffs, opening up agriculture and textiles;
- the creation
of new rules freeing up the trade of services; and
- the creation
of the World Trade Organization.
There are also many
other major trade agreements in force, one of which is the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA includes
Canada, the United States and Mexico in a free trade zone.
The most relevant trade agreements to Australia are APEC and
CERTA. Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CERTA) is
a bilateral (involves only two parties) agreement between
Australia and New Zealand where, among other things, tariffs
between the two countries are eliminated.
Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) is a similar agreement whereby member countries
have committed to reduced trade barriers. There are 18 member
countries in APEC that include Australia, Japan, the United
States, and many of the developing Asian economies. These
member countries account for about 55 per cent of world GDP.
At present each industrialised country has agreed to achieve
free and open trade with the region by 2010, and each developing
country has agreed to do this by 2020.
While agreements between
countries might be a useful way of encouraging trade policy
reform, reducing protection would be beneficial for an individual
country regardless of the actions of other governments. The
argument that Australia should not reduce trade barriers further
until our trading partners reduce theirs is misguided. Over
the past 15 years or so many countries have substantially
reduced their trade barriers on a completely unilateral basis
that is, without regard to the actions of other countries.
These countries, which include New Zealand, the Philippines,
Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vietnam for example, have performed
well as have a number of countries in Latin America and Eastern
Europe. Indeed, the lesson from these experiences is not just
how mistaken it is to wait for others but rather how important
it is to go first.
References
ABS (Australian Bureau
of Statistics) 1997, Australia Economic Indicators December
1997, AGPS, Canberra.
Brown, N. and J. Wiblin
1997, Trade Liberalisation: Opportunities for Australia,
AGPS, Canberra.
Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade 1996, The APEC Region: Trade and Investment,
November, AGPS, Canberra.
Industry Commission
1997, Trade and Assistance Review 1996-97, AGPS, Canberra.
Krugman, P. 1993,
What do undergraduates need to know about trade,
American Economic Review, Vol. 83(2).
Pearce, D. and S.
Cuthbertson 1993, Lets Talk Tariffs, Centre for
International Economics, Canberra.
Pearce, D and A.Stoeckel
1996, One Shoe Per Person, Centre for International
Economics, Canberra.
Sandy
Cuthbertson
and Leon Berkelmans are Managing Director and Research
Assistant respectively at the Centre for International Economics,
Canberra and Sydney.
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