Better Than the Australian Industrial Relations Commission
By Des Moore
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The thesis of this article is that getting rid of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) (at least in its present form) and giving trade unions no special rights is likely to do more to reduce unemployment than any other policy change.

In his (leaked) letter to the Prime Minister of 3 December 1998 on options for action to reduce unemployment, Workplace Relations Minister, Peter Reith, argued that Ôthe prescriptions for creating jobs and reducing unemployment are reasonably well known. The hard part is gathering the political support for implementation.Õ I believe that this is basically correct and, perhaps optimistically, I am assuming that the Minister's longer term objective is reducing regulation to an absolute minimum.

To gather support for this objective, one has to put forward both a convincing argument against the present regime and a convincing alternative. For a community that has become so indoctrinated with the belief that the AIRC ensures a fair go, this is not an easy task.

The common law alternative

It is important to recognise that the common law ÔsystemÕ is a coherent and viable alternative to the present regime. Indeed, distinguished jurist Professor Richard Epstein has argued that there is an Ôabiding intellectual unityÕ between the basic common law concepts of property, contract and tort, which he has expressed as follows:

Property law governs acquisitions of the rights persons have in external things and even in themselves. Torts governs protection of the things reduced to private ownership. Contracts governs transfer of the rights so acquired and protected. This trinityøacquisition, protection and transferøexhausts the range of legal relationships between persons. It is just this universality which lends coherence and power to the legal achievements of the classical common law. (Epstein 1985: vii)

For employment relationships, the key principle under common law is that the worker and employer should basically be free to decide on the content of their relationship because both parties expect to benefit from entering a contract: otherwise why would they enter into it? There are, however, exceptions to this freedom which protect the public interest, such as the unenforceability of contracts entered into for illegal purposes or which involve significant abuse of third party rights. Courts have also come to be prepared to imply a duty by an employer to provide a safe workplace.

Moreover, the common law protects the processes involved so as to ensure that the principle of freedom of contract is not abused and that the rights of the parties to the contract are protected. Thus, the traditional common law protections mean that contracts procured by the use of force, fraud or undue influence are not upheld by the courts. Nowadays, unfortunately, this may extend to contracts deemed to have been entered into in a manner which is ÔunconscionableÕ, a term whose definition appears to be something of a moving judicial feast. Contracts are also not generally enforceable if made by infants and incompetents.

Under the common law, unions would not be accorded any privileged position as they have been under the existing regime in order to correct the (mis)perception of inequality of bargaining power. Voluntarily formed unions would thus be subject to the same treatment under the law as other voluntarily formed associations.

This means that during the period of a contract there would be no Ôright to strikeÕ or withdraw labour unless contained in an agreement or implied by an agreement. Equally, in circumstances where unions had no privileged position, where union membership was voluntary, and there was no bar to disassociation, there would be no need for external intervention or supervision of union decision-making, other than to ensure that the rules applying to all such associations were being upheld. In those same circumstances, a case could be made for allowing an employer to stipulate either that an employee will not join a union or that he wants a closed shop. However, labour transactions, like other transactions, should be subject to anti-trust law as a means of deterring the acquisition and abuse of monopoly power.

The main changes compared with the present regime would thus be the elimination of any privileged position for trade unions and the elimination or severe restriction of the capacity for third parties to undertake extensive intervention in certain important areas: in the determination of minimum pay and conditions; in the dismissal of an employee even when that is in accordance with the contract of employment; and in a dispute between employer and employees or unions over pay and conditions.

A major potential problem in returning to reliance on the common law would be the judicial activism that has developed under which courts have increasingly intervened in private relationships with the object of delivering what some judges perceive as social justice. The simple repeal of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 would thus run a very real risk that, before long, the courts would adopt similar interventionist practices to the AIRC. In New Zealand, a strong tendency of this kind has emerged since the passage of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991. The Australian courts, particularly the Federal Court, would doubtless extend further the doctrine (sic) of unconscionability to require an employer to show that a contract is Ôfair, just and reasonableÕ: i.e., in the eyes of the particular judge concerned. That would create considerable uncertainty.

One possible counter to such judicial activism would be to impose limits on the jurisdictional empire building of some courts. The previous Federal government was forced to restrict the jurisdiction of the Federal Court on certain immigration matters where that courtÕs judicial activism had outworn the patience even of the government which had appointed most of its members. There is certainly a case for preventing or restricting that politicised courtÕs jurisdictional capacities in regard to workplace relations matters.

But a more generalised and practical solution would be to change the whole basis of the Workplace Relations Act by substituting new Federal legislation that affirmed certain rights of employers and employees to contract without constraints, or subject only to specified constraints consistent with the common law. In short, the common law applicable to the employment relationship would be codified so as to limit the discretion of the courts in handling such cases.

Such Federal legislation would presumably need to be based on the corporations power. In principle, that would not be inconsistent with the idea elaborated by Minister Reith at the National Press Club that use of that power Ôwould enable a coherent national framework of minimum standards to be established for the conduct of workplace relations in corporationsÕ (Reith 1999:Ê 4). The minimum standards, however, would mainly be concerned with the processes rather than the content of the employment contract.

A more radical alternative would be for the Commonwealth to opt out of the regulation of employer- employee relationships, leaving the field to the States. There is certainly no constitutional obligation on the Commonwealth to legislate under Section 51 (xxxv). However, while that approach has some attractions, it seems unlikely to achieve the same extent of deregulation. My sense is that, if a Federal government succeeded in a codified common law approach, there would be a good chance of that sticking.

In a 1991 paper, Epstein pointed out that the basic principles of common law started to be displaced in the late 19th century in response to the dominant intellectual trends of the time and, in particular, to the belief that the perceived bargaining imbalance between employers and employees needed to be redressed. In Australia, the establishment of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission early in this century followed a period of very considerable political, economic and industrial turmoil which included a series of major strikes and a period of economic stagnation that extended for twenty years from the early 1890s. This led many concerned people to look for a better way, dare I say a Third Way, of preventing a repetition of the disputation and achieving more equitable outcomes.

The response was arguably understandable, if misguided, in the context of the times. But whatever validity it may have had then is certainly no longer applicable in modern times. Indeed, my examination of how the system has operated in practice suggests that it has not delivered and that the premises on which it was founded were invalid. It is instructive also to recall that, when introducing the Bill to establish the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in 1903, Alfred Deakin emphasised that ÔThe object of this measure is to prevent strikesÕ and he firmly rejected the idea that legislation should attempt to regulate industrial affairs generally because Parliament Ôwould be incompetent to do so, because of the impossibility of drafting provisions, however well devised, so that they would meet all the contingencies, changes, and difficulties of different industries, which are subject in themselves to continuous alteration.Õ1 If such words were applicable then, they are much more applicable in todayÕs rapidly changing world.

Inequality in bargaining power

Whatever may have been the distribution of bargaining power 100 years ago, it is surely clear that there is nowadays no serious inequality of bargaining power in favour of employers and no prospect of that developing. There are many points which are overlooked by the BevisÕs of this world in this regard.

For a start, with around 1,100,000 businesses, including ÔsmallÕ businesses accounting for over 50 per cent of employment, employers compete actively for the wide range of available labour services. Differences in labour productivity and limits to the supply of different types of labour are necessarily reflected in wage differentials. Certainly, employers have the power to hire and fire: but they also need labour to operate their businesses and in their own interests they have to exercise that power with that in mind.

Moreover, it is by no means clear that the natural distribution of bargaining power in modern society is tilted towards employers. Indeed, many employers would claim that their bargaining position is relatively weak due to their vulnerability to workplace disruption or under-performance by employees or unions. One employer told me recently that, if a union campaign were successfully to disrupt his output, the continued existence of his business would come under threat within a few days. Further, the increased pressure from financial markets on public companies to produce satisfactory profits on a regular basis gives employees and unions considerable potential influence over working conditions.

There is thus nothing to suggest that deregulated market conditions would allow employers successfully to collude to fix wages and conditions.

Employers also compete amongst themselves in product markets and a fundamental point often overlooked in this context is that the share of national income going to profits is limited by competitive forces. If the rate of profit starts to rise, either generally or in a specific industry, additional investment will be attracted and profitability will fall back. What, then, is left after profits? By definition, the remainder of national income must go to employee wages or the self-employed.

Thus, even if circumstances arise where for a short period some employers are able to attract labour at lower wages and earn higher profits, new entrants and shortages of the required labour would soon lead to the going wage rate being raised in order to attract sufficient labour to expand businesses. The combination of a limited supply of labour (particularly labour of the right sort) and of competition between employers prevents exploitation. Sub-contractors, for example, who work on building sites and who actively compete against other subbiesÕ earn an average annual wage of around $40,000 without any ÔprotectionÕ other than their own bargaining power and trade skills.

In short, the notion that employers can drive down the share of wages, and will do so in a deregulated labour market, is completely false. That is not to say that the profit and wages shares remain stable: in Australia, those shares have fluctuated quite widely in response to cyclical influences and to employment-destroying wage surges that have reflected the quasi-monopolistic position accorded to trade unions under the existing system. However, over the longer term, and taking the profit share of both the corporate and unincorporated sectors together, there is certainly no sign of an upward trend: rather, the opposite (Moore and McGinnes 1996).2 The income share of labour in the less regulated US market also appears to have trended upwards over the longer term.

In any event, the bargaining parameters have been fundamentally altered by the transformation in the economic and social structure over the past twenty five years. In modern capitalist societies, even under the current relatively high rates of unemployment, all employees (and job seekers) have alternative options for obtaining income and the great majority also have alternative options to obtain employment. The growth in the services sector, in educational qualifications, and in shareholdings has dramatically changed the bargaining scene.

Employers also increasingly see employees more as partners and employees are increasingly accepting that there is a mutual interest in establishing a cooperative workplace. The old Ôthem and usÕ attitude is disappearing, and the old style trade union has lost most of its appeal. Employee cooperation is increasingly seen today as an essential ingredient of business success and employers are obliged to pay close attention to the welfare of their workforces. Otherwise, they will experience high rates of voluntary turnover of employees, absenteeism and sick leave, along with declining customer satisfaction and profit.

Indeed, unless an employer treats his employees fairly, and provides employment cond-itions which are broadly comparable with other employers, he risks losing workers with profitable knowledge and skills. So employers have a self-interest in retaining ÔsuitableÕ employees by treating them decently. This is not to say that employees do not need to protect their interests through suitable employment agreements: a small minority of employers are ÔbastardsÕ who will take advantage of a situation if they can.

Finally, there seems no reason why the market cannot supply adequate information at a reasonable cost to enable workers and employers to conclude satisfactory contractual arrangements. Relatively cheap bargaining services could be provided by new, information and service-oriented trade unions and by private sector agencies: indeed, that is already happening to some extent.

However, to meet concerns that would undoubtedly be raised that deregulation would weaken the bargaining position of unskilled and less educated workers who would not be able to afford to employ bargaining services, I propose that the AIRC be converted into a voluntary body to provide advisory/mediation services to those on low incomes on a subsidised basis. This body could also offer at low cost a range of standard employment contracts with provisions to protect the interests of both sides, and including dispute resolution procedures.

Such a body, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), has been operating in the United Kingdom for 25 years and it has succeeded in establishing a basically voluntaristic approach in relation to settling both collective and individual disputes. Thus, it now handles on an entirely voluntary basisøand settlesøthe great majority of collective disputes and nearly half of individual disputes. As it never seeks to judge the merits of the case or to impose solutions, that puts the onus to settle disputes where it should be: that is, entirely on the parties directly involved. Indeed, the ACAS approach is to encourage all employers to establish mechanisms to deal with disputes. Most importantly, and unlike our Commission, it has established universal acceptance of its impartiality. Apart from providing low-cost or free advice on industrial relations and employment issues, a non-compulsory body that was available in Australia to assist in the settlement of disputes would overcome any financial disadvantage that employees might experience vis-ˆ-vis their employer.

Advocates of the need to equalise bargaining power typically claim that the labour market is fundamentally different from other markets because it deals with relationships between human beings who have wide differences in wealth and power. However, the conditions under which people are employed are determined not by differences in wealth or power between employers and employees but by the capacity and performance of economic agents to produce goods and services that consumers demand. That is, in turn, a function of factors like labour market arrangements themselves, the skill base of employees, technology and the extent of competition within the system. The very complexity of employment arrangements, and the need for flexibility to make adjustments in the light of changing circumstances, make the parties to the exchange the likely best judges of their own interests.

The importance of institutional arrangements

Institutional arrangements that are highly regulatory and highly interventionist create a risk averse culture that is cautious about innovation. AustraliaÕs labour market arrangements are probably unique in the world in the extent to which third party intervention can occur in management decision-making on employment. We have established institutions that are relatively discouraging to investment and employment creation.

Interventionist arrangements such as AustraliaÕs undermine the basic function of management and create a culture under which management too often thinks first about whether a change is going to be accepted by unions and/or the Commission rather than whether it will improve efficiency. Innovation and change are accordingly less likely to occur here than in other less regulated labour markets.

The effects of this interventionism are considerably exacerbated by its one-sidedness. Prominent legal authority, Graeme Watson of FreehillÕs, has described this asÊ Ôa serious imbalance which has undermined the standing of the Australian system and its institutions. In essence the imbalance arises because awards imposing obligations on employers are fully enforceable through the courts and subject to penalties in the breach. (However) Commission recommendations, directions and orders, requiring the cessation of industrial action are commonly ignored by unions and their membersÉÕ (Watson 1997).

Needless to say, much more than the standing of the system is undermined in such circumstances. Economists tend to focus on wage costs as the main determinant of employment. But the demand for labour is influenced by more than wage costs. What have not so far been widely acknowledged are the costs associated with institutional arrangements that heavily constrain entrepreneurial decision making. While these are mostly hidden, or at least not quantifiable, they are almost certainly large when viewed from a community-wide perspective.

A general idea can be obtained by considering the award ÔsystemÕ and bearing in mind its one-sided administration by the AIRC. In 1998, the then President of the Business Council of Australia claimed there were over 100,000 pages of documentation regulating workplaces. Prior to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 this would have included 3,200 awards of which 1,760 were regarded as major. Under that Act the AIRC was supposed by June 1998 to have ÔsimplifiedÕ these awards down to cover only 20 matters. However, to end July 1999 only 931 awards had been set aside and, of the remaining 2067, 1195 were undergoing simplification.

However, the real question is why any of the twenty Ôallowable mattersÕ need to be the subject of outside intervention. From the Attachment listing these twenty allowable matters, it will be clear that their retention allows the AIRC to continue to have a very interventionist and cost-imposing role.

The resultant inhibition on the conclusion of innovative employment agreements was aptly summarised by the OECD in its 1998 Economic Survey of Australia:

All this entails the risk that awards continue to constrain direct negotiations, dictate many working arrangements, limit wage dispersion and tend to make many registered enterprise agreements de facto Ôadd-onsÕ to existing awards rather than comprehensive agreements reflecting the reality of work.

How important are such matters? The short answer is that creating an innovation-encouraging environment is increasingly seen as very important. One of the worldÕs leading analysts of historical growth differences between countries, Angus Maddison, has argued that

If we are to explain why the economic growth experience of nations has been so diverse; and why income spreads are now so wide, it is necessary to go beyond proximate and measurable elements of causality and consider institutional or policy influences which may retard or encourage economic development. (Maddison 1995: 50)

This statement der-ives from the fact that the source of about two-thirds of economic growth is statistically unidentifiable. The usual assumption is that it largely reflects the effects of technological change. But as technological progress is generally accessible to all, policy and institutional factors play a crucial role in determining whether conditions are propitious for the application of such progress.

In launching the 1999 World Competitiveness Year Book showing the US as again a clear leader, Professor Garelli of the Swiss based International Institute of Management Development was reported in the Australian Financial Review as stating: ÔToday, the core of US competitiveness is a unique ability to grow using innovationÕ (Australian Financial Review, 23 April 1999). Australia needs to realise that this ability is importantly related to the lesser degree of government intervention in the US, including the lesser degree of regulation of the labour market.3

How the present system has failed

The popular image of the AIRC and the legislation regulating workplace relations is that it protects the average working man in various ways. In reacting to the (leaked) Reith letter of 3 December 1998, for instance, Senator Brian Harradine described the options canvassed in the letter as Ôa fundamental attack on something that is ingrained into the culture of Australia, and that is a right to a fair go through the umpireÕ and he postulated that implementation of its proposals would leave Ôthe most vulnerable employees unprotected, under-represented and exploitedÕ (Australian Financial Review, 19 February 1999).

While such claims do not stand up to close examination, it is not possible here to do more than summarise the main fallacies in and failures of the present system. A more detailed analysis is contained in my report, The Case for Further Deregulation of the Labour Market.

As it was the main declared object of the present system to prevent strikes and lock-outs, it is appropriate to start there. The record shows a simply horrendous number of working days lost from industrial disputation from 1913 through World War I until the depression of the early 1930s, when the rate of disputation dropped sharply for a time; then from the late 1930s it again rose to high levels, continued right through World War II until the early 1950s, and then it dropped back until the early 1970s. It then rose sharply and continued at a high level until the early 1980s, since when it has progressively diminished. International comparative data for the period from the late 1970s (the only period for which such data is available) shows that the rate of disputation has been consistently above the OECD average right up to the present timeÊ and, while differences in definitions of Ôindustrial disputeÕ mean that international comparisons need to be treated with caution, the experience of more deregulated labour markets overseas does not suggest that deregulation would increase disputation in Australia. It is relevant that, after reviewing the situation last year, Graeme Watson argued that the Workplace Relations Act 1996 had had little or no effect as industrial action is still Ôoccurring on a widespread basis with little interference from Courts and tribunals charged to ensure that it stop or not occurÕ (Watson 1998: 13-14). In short, as well as being a one-sided umpire, the present system has been a complete failure in terms of the main justification for its establishment.

A notable fallacy is that, while job security has diminished due to reductions in regulation since the 1980s, AustraliaÕs highly regulated system provides greater job security than in less regulated overseas markets. The facts are that there has been no significant change in the average duration of jobs in Australia since the early 1980s and our average duration is actually slightly lower than in less regulated labour markets such as the US and the UK. The media focus on Ôdown-sizingsÕ, and on such phenomena as the heavily over-blown employment problems of the Ôbaby boomersÕ (who have the lowest unemployment rate of any group and whose employment rate has actually increased since the 1960s), has created an unduly pessimistic view of job security. This has encouraged the development of legislation to regulate ÔunfairÕ dismissals which, while it may offer some temporary security to those in jobs, reduces security for the outsiders without jobs.

The AIRCÕs prescription of a working week of 38 hours is a farce. Within the average of about 36 hours a week now being worked by employees and the self-employed, over 20 per cent are working more than 49 hours. However, this does not necessarily indicate that work has become more stressful. There has been a major reduction in both physically demanding work and in the length of working lives.

There is also a myth that the AIRCÕs decisions bolster AustraliaÕs egalitarianism by ensuring a lesser inequality of incomes here than in most overseas countries. However, if we look at the area supposedly under the control of the AIRC, we find that since the 1970s earnings dispersion has widened and real minimum wages have fallen. In fact, there are at least eleven OECD countries with a more egalitarian earnings dispersion than Australia. Further, while earnings dispersion is wider in the US and the UK, this is scarcely surprising given the large minority groups in those countries and the generally lower average literacy and numeracy levels in those groups. The bogey-man of the US Ôworking poorÕ is just thatøAustraliaÕs highly regulated system has produced about the same proportion of working poor as the US's much less regulated system. With fewer (proportionately) adults with the lowest literacy and numeracy skills (see attached Chart), Australia should be doing much better than the US.

Nor do the AIRCÕs wage awards even provide a Ôfair goÕ for those at the bottom end. For low wage earners, it is the social security system which ensures a reasonable living standard by providing households in the bottom quintile with more than half of their incomes. In that sense, proposals to deregulate the labour market do not threaten to create an Ôunder-classÕøAustralia already has a large one. In fact, as the majority of low paid are living in households in the upper half of the income scale, it is nonsensical for the AIRC to be keeping wages up at the bottom end in order to try to ensure Ôsocial justiceÕ. If the Commission was really concerned to deliver social justice, it would be setting wages that would increase the employment chances of the unemployed, who are clustered at the bottom end of the household income scale.

While AustraliaÕs high unemp-loyment rates since the 1970s may be attributed to a range of factors, the AIRC has to accept a major share of the blame for them being consistently above the OECD average. Not only did it completely fail to prevent the employment-destroying wage surges of the mid-1970s and early 1980s: it actually facilitated their flow-through to the work force at large. Moreover, the inflexibility of the system, and the high degree of AIRC interventionism, slowed subsequent adjustments needed to bring labour costs back to competitive levels. It is scarcely surprising that AustraliaÕs employment rates are lower than in less regulated markets. In The Case for Further Deregulation of the Labour Market, I pointed out that, if we had the same proportion of our working age population employed as the US, we would have another 900,000 or so employed. That was based on 1997 OECD figures and the improvement in employment in Australia since then has probably reduced that to about 750,000, which is nonetheless equivalent to the total of Australian unemployed. In short, the unemployed in Australia are not getting a Ôfair goÕ.

The system must also share the blame for Australia being a relatively poor productivity performer at least up until very recently. Not only have our comparative levels of productivity been lowøup to 1992, the productivity gap relative to overseas countries was widening. While that gap has probably closed a little recently, it almost certainly remains wide.

Conclusion

There is an overwhelming case for abandoning the present institutional arrangements regulating workplace relations. Their underlying rationale is the fallacy that government intervention is needed to correct an imbalance of bargaining power between employers and employees. This is then wrongly perceived as requiring intervention in a wide range of relationships.

Government institutional arrangements which are highly interventionist are increasingly seen as having adverse effects on businessesÕ preparedness to innovate, which is the driving force behind economic growth and job creation. Given that Australia's workplace relations are highly interventionist, they must bear the lion's share of the blame for our high unemployment and low empl-oyment. They have also been a demonstrable failure if assessed by reference to both the original stated objective of preventing disputes and to subsequent claims that they provide an umpire that ensures a Ôfair goÕ for the Australian worker.

Accordingly, the existing legislation should be repealed and the AIRC converted into a voluntary advisory mediation service with subsidised services for low wage earners. But it is necessary to do more than this: judicial activism would likely mean that the ordinary courts would before long take over the previous perceived role of the AIRC. The Federal government should therefore substitute legislation which codifies the common law relevant to workplace bargaining and agreement making so as to affirm the rights of employers and employees to contract without constraints, or subject only to specified constraints consistent with the common law, thereby limiting the discretionary powers of the courts in handling such cases. Such a codification would include the protections against abuse of both public and private interests which the common law provides.

References

Epstein, R.A. 1985, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

øø 1991, ÔLiberating Labour: The Case for Freedom of Contract in Labour Relations,Õ Occasional Paper 36, The Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney.

Maddison, A. 1995, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, OECD Development Centre Studies, OECD, Paris.

Moore, D. 1999, ÔThe Performance of the US Labour Market,Õ Australian Bulletin of Labour 25(1).

Moore, D. and J. McGinnes 1996, ÔAre profits high?Õ Institute for Private Enterprise, June.

Reith, P. 1999, ÔGetting the Outsiders InsideøTowards a Rational Workplace Relations System in Australia,Õ Speaking Notes, Address to the National Press Club, 24 March.

Watson, G. 1997, ÔCompliance with Dispute Settlement Orders in Australia,Õ in R. Mitchell and J. Min Aun Win (eds.), Facing the Challenge in the Asia Pacific Region, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Occasional Monograph Series No. 5, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

1998, A Practical Review of the Workplace Relations Act Compliance Issues, Australian Mines and Metals Association, 5 August: 13-14.

Chart 1: Literacy and Numeracy Skills

Attachment:

Allowable matters to be included in awards under the

Workplace Relations Act 1996

¥ Classifications of employees and skill based career paths.

¥ Ordinary time hours of work and the times within which they are performed, rest breaks, notice periods and variation to working hours.

¥ Rates of pay generally (such as hourly rates and annual salaries), rates of pay for juniors, trainees or apprentices, and rates of pay for employees under the supported wage system.

¥ Piece rates, tallies and bonuses.

¥ Annual leave and leave loadings.

¥ Long service leave.

¥ Personal/carerÕs leave, including sick leave, family leave, bereavement leave, compassionate leave, cultural and other like forms of leave.

¥ Parental leave, including maternity and adoption leave.

¥ Public holidays.

¥ Allowances.

¥ Loadings for overtime or for casual or shift work.

¥ Penalty rates.

¥ Redundancy pay.

¥ Notice of termination.

¥ Stand down provisions.

¥ Dispute settlement procedures.

¥ Jury duty.

¥ Type of employment, such as full time employment, casual employment, regular part time employment and shift work.

¥ Superannuation.*

¥ Pay and conditions for outworkers, but only to the extent necessary to ensure that their overall pay and condition of employment are fair and reasonable in comparison with the pay and conditions of employment specified in a relevant award or awards for employees who perform the same kind of work at an employerÕs business or commercial premises.

* The Federal government has indicated its intention to delete this from the list of allowable matters.

Chart 1: Literacy and Numeracy Skills

Source:Ê London Evening Standard, 25 March 1999 (from Moser Report on adult basic skills in the UK showing that adults who lack basic skills are five times more likely to be unemployed).

Author

Des Moore is Director of the Institute for Private Enterprise and author of the November 1998 report to the Labour Ministers Council, The Case for Further Deregulation of the Labour Market. This is an edited version of a paper first presented as a Bert Kelly Lecture at Mallesons Stephen Jaques, Melbourne on April 27, 1999.

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