John Howard’s Government has improved Australia’s relations with Asian countries, argues Andrew Robertson
The dramatic row between Australia and Indonesia over Canberra’s decision to grant temporary protection visas to 42 West Papuan refugees in recent months has overshadowed the Howard Government’s successful overall track record in relations with Asia. While the latest episode in the tumultuous relationship between Canberra and Jakarta is serious and has yet to play itself out fully, it is too soon to tell whether the current crisis is a low point in bilateral relations since East Timor or merely a ‘difficult phase’.
Australia’s current standing in Asia was assessed by Alexander Downer in a speech to the Asialink Chairman’s Dinner in December of 2005. He declared that Australia had ‘made more progress in the last three years than ever before’ and that ‘we are in an incredibly strong position in our economic and strategic relations with Asia.’(1) Notwithstanding the statement’s boldness, Australia’s position in the region is arguably better now than it ever was, and it certainly eclipses the level of closeness achieved under Gareth Evans and Paul Keating.
The Howard Government’s approach to engagement with Asia has produced clear and positive results for Australia. Increased involvement with Asia is evident across the board, from greater levels of economic interaction and immigration to closer cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues and heightened political dialogue.
Moreover, Howard has produced a foreign policy with unambiguous trends and principles that distinguish it from that of his predecessors. His approach has lifted Canberra’s regional profile and influence, but it has also led to certain difficulties, particularly through the use of careless rhetoric and triumphalism. Howard and Downer’s record is by no means perfect and many challenges lay ahead but the notion held by some critics that they have overseen a deteriorating relationship with Asia is a clear misreading of reality.
Foreign policy trends under Howard
There are three principal characteristics that differentiate the style and substance of Howard’s foreign policy from that of the previous Labor Government. Under the Liberals, there has been, firstly, a more consistent focus on bilateral relations, secondly, a growing emphasis on the role of Australian ‘values’ in foreign policy, and thirdly, a tendency to act with assertiveness and self-confidence.
The bilateral focus has been evident as a major component in Australian foreign policy over the last few years. While multilateral forums remain important, the emphasis has shifted away from such institutions as the most effective means of gaining advantageous outcomes for Australia. The negotiation of bilateral free trade agreements, as opposed to championing economic liberalisation through APEC, has been a prominent feature of Australia’s trade strategy under Howard. Likewise, in the area of political and security cooperation, there has been a proliferation of bilateral memoranda of understandings covering many and varied topics. Both Howard and Downer’s frequent visits to the region further underline the importance that has been placed on direct, one-on-one diplomacy.
The second aspect of the Liberals’ approach to engagement has been a keen awareness of Australian identity and a desire to maintain foreign policies in line with perceived Australian values. This was clearly spelt out in the 1997 Foreign Policy White Paper, In the National Interest. There would be no need for ‘reinventing Australia’s identity or abandoning the values and traditions which define Australian society,’ to facilitate effective engagement with Asia.(2) The 2003 White Paper took this concept even further arguing that ‘the values of the community’ are a major determinant of Government policies.(3) Advancing the National Interest proudly refers to the Coalition’s values-based foreign policy successes: ‘securing the independence of East Timor and playing an important role in the war against terrorism are only the most recent examples of Australia’s defence of its values in the world.’(4)
John Howard stressed soon after his election that Australia did not face a choice between its European history and Asian geography, it could benefit from both. The country would continue to interact closely with the region and at the same time maintain, and even strengthen, ties to those ‘great and powerful friends’, the UK and US. Many have criticised Howard’s decision to reinvigorate Australia’s links to its traditional allies, particularly with regard to his enthusiasm for supplementing US foreign policies. Alison Broinowski wrote an entire book about John Howard’s determination to follow George Bush’s US into the Iraq War, arguing that ‘our slavish subservience as allies is the very reason that Australia’s drift away from involvement with Asian countries, and towards regional pariahdom, continues.’(5)
Yet this is plainly not the case. There have been no identifiable adverse effects in Australia’s Asian relations as a result of the government’s decision to join the US in toppling Saddam. If anything, relations have improved since the invasion of Iraq, though not as a direct consequence of it. John Howard sees the ANZUS alliance as a regional strength and has been prepared to conduct engagement on Australia’s terms.
This leads into the third characteristic, the assertiveness and self-confidence apparent in Australia’s regional foreign policy, particularly since the Asian financial crisis that left Australia in a good economic position relative to its neighbours, and the successful military operations in East Timor. It is an important stylistic difference in the conduct of diplomacy to the days of Paul Keating and Gareth Evans when a softly-softly approach prevailed. In some ways this adds to the conceptual theory of engagement which was, under Keating, a more or less one-sided affair in which Australia attempted to quietly and unilaterally define itself as part of Asia. The new conceptualisation of regional involvement reflects a pride in Australia’s strengths and contains an awareness that ‘not only is it in our interests to build relations with Asia . . . but it is also in Asia’s interests to build relations with us.’(6)
Rapprochement with Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur
The most celebrated and important political improvement in Australia’s relations with Asia over the last few years has been the overall rapprochement with Indonesia and Malaysia. Even the Indonesian Trade Minister, Mari Pangestu declared in 2005 that Australia–Indonesia relations were at a high point.(7)
The government cannot claim all the credit for this progress. There have been incredible changes and upheavals throughout Asia over the last ten years that have fundamentally altered the shape of Australia’s policies and affected regional responses to them. Most significant have been the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the subsequent fall of Suharto in 1998 and the emergence of a new generation of political leaders in these two states, both of whom are much more eager to cooperatively engage with Australia and both of whom visited Australia last year.
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s visit in 2005 was the first by a Malaysian head of state in more than twenty years. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and five other Australian ministers visited Malaysia during 2005 and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s visit was preceded by two prime ministerial visits to Jakarta by John Howard in 2005 alone. He also visited in 2004. Downer and former Defence Minister Robert Hill have both visited Indonesia three times over the past year and Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, came to Australia in 2005 and 2004. More important than the visits themselves, however, is what they represent; healthier relations with two of our most important regional neighbours in a number of areas.
Trade continues to grow and defence links, while remaining strong with Malaysia under the Five Power Defence Agreement, were to be re-established with Indonesia following their suspension during the East Timor crisis. The plans with Indonesia have been put on hold in light of the current difficulties between Canberra and Jakarta, but will no doubt be back on the agenda before too long, given the continually converging long-term interests of the two. Malaysia is our fifth largest source of foreign students (20,000 in 2004) (8) and an agreement reached last year between President Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Howard will also help to boost the number of Indonesians studying in Australia with the provision of new government funded scholarships. Law enforcement cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia, particularly in the areas of people smuggling, counter-terrorism and illegal fishing, has also markedly increased under the Howard Government. In March of this year, the Australia–Malaysia institute was established to deepen bilateral cultural links. These improvements seem all the more remarkable considering that only several years ago Canberra was being vocally attacked by Kuala Lumpur and Australian troops were under fire from pro-Jakarta militia groups in East Timor.
Related to and part of the rapprochement with Indonesia and Malaysia has been Australia’s decision, after initially resisting, to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity. Perhaps the real reason for reluctance lay in the Howard government’s belief that it shouldn’t have to sign an essentially meaningless treaty in order to gain regional acceptance. Australia should be accepted on its own merits. But this judgement seriously underestimated the symbolic power of the treaty in the regional political framework. After finally signing, and with a little help from rediscovered friend Indonesia, firm supporter Japan and the powerful city-state of Singapore, John Howard managed to secure an invite to the Kuala Lumpur East Asia summit. Alison Broinowski, who declared in 2003 that ‘Australia’s chance of joining an all-Asian organisation has been lost’, must have felt somewhat embarrassed in December 2005.(9)
Bilateralism, multilateralism and aid
In other areas of cooperation, Australia is leading the way in the Asia Pacific. Twelve separate bilateral memoranda of understanding on counter-terrorism have been signed with regional neighbours in the past five years and Australia co-hosted with Indonesia a counter-terrorism summit in 2002 on the island of Bali. Intense law enforcement cooperation with Indonesia has grown into a meaningful bond not restricted to counter-terrorism investigations. It extends to cooperation in dealing with people and drug smuggling and, more recently, illegal fishing. Such broad cooperation is not restricted to Indonesia with numerous other anti-people smuggling and similar MoUs agreed to with other regional states.
Australia recently hosted the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development bringing together several key regional states to initiate a dialogue on environmental issues unbound by precedents set in the Kyoto Protocol. As with the East Asian Summit, it is too soon to tell what may become of this grouping, but it is Australia’s leadership and ability to facilitate a high level regional summit that is important here.
Australia’s ties with long-time friend and significant trading partner Japan are expanding. The relationship has matured markedly under the Howard Government, moving into areas beyond trade, as the Japanese begin to realise that Australia is more than just a source of raw materials or a great place to relax on the beach. Instead of being an almost purely commercial relationship, as it was ten years ago, cooperation now extends into areas of security, shared geo-political interests and a deepening cultural exchange.
Following military operations in East Timor and the Pacific, Tokyo has taken notice of Australia’s active engagement in resolving regional security issues.(10) Both Australia and Japan are pivotal US allies in the region. A ministerial level trilateral security dialogue, initiated in 2002, facilitates closer cooperation between the three countries. At present, Australian soldiers are supporting Japanese self-defence force engineers in the southern Iraqi province of Al Muthanna, further deepening the defence relationship. Australia has been a supporter of Japan’s claims to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and Japan’s backing was pivotal in Canberra’s bid to secure a seat at the inaugural East Asia Summit. Moreover, 2006 is the Australia–Japan Year of Exchange marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Nara treaty and providing opportunities for greater cultural understanding.(11)
In many ways, Tokyo and Canberra have converging security and political interests that did not exist under the same circumstances as they had before. Both states are committed to nuclear non-proliferation and, as the tense situation in North Korea unfolds, have an increasingly crystallised interest in working together. Both states are affected directly by the rapid growth of Chinese regional influence and seek cooperative means to address it. These shared interests are underlined by the fact that Australia and Japan are both democratic societies with economies based on free market principles, they are ‘natural’ partners in Asia, and the relationship will continue to develop.
Australia under the Howard Government has also committed itself to the future of Asia through unprecedented humanitarian contributions. Canberra gave around one billion dollars in tsunami aid, the largest donation by a single government including the use of Australian Defence Force personnel to provide relief. The Government’s resolution to give so generously was a decisive factor in further strengthening Australia–Indonesia ties and demonstrated Canberra’s serious intent to contribute meaningfully to the region in a time of need.(12) Howard correctly measured the depth of genuine humanitarian goodwill among his constituents and seized a significant opportunity to portray Australia internationally as a kind and charitable nation. This was an enormous public relations coup for the Government and did much to enhance Australia’s regional image.
Economic and social engagement
These general political improvements aside, there have also been several important economic developments over the last few years that warrant investigation. Notably, Australian exports to Asian markets continue to rise, even in those states severely affected by the financial meltdown of 1997. As Alexander Downer pointed out, ‘Asian countries account for seven of our ten largest export markets,’(13) but the most significant change has been the emergence of the Chinese market as a destination for Australian materials. By some measures, China is already Australia’s second largest trading partner (14) and exports rose by more than thirty percent over the 2004–5 financial year.(15) In 2003, an agreement with Beijing was reached on the sale of liquefied natural gas worth around $25 billion, Australia’s largest ever export deal.
There have also been free trade agreements with Singapore in 2003 and Thailand in 2004, further opening the way for more meaningful economic relationships with these two countries. Discussions are currently underway for similar agreements with China, Japan, Malaysia and the ASEAN bloc.
As a society, too, Australia continues to foster a strong connection with Asia under Howard. With migration, the number of Australians who claim Asian ancestry is up to about 5% and between 1996 and 2001 the number of Australians born in Northeast Asia rose by 18%.(16) Four of the top five nationalities to which onshore residency visas are granted can be found in Asia (17) while our top six sources of overseas students are China, US, India, Korea, Malaysia and Japan.(18) The number of tourists from Asia is also increasing, with China expected to be our second largest source of tourists by 2008 and the largest in 2013.(19)
When all of these political, economic and socio-cultural interactions are taken together, it becomes quite clear that Australia’s relationships with its Asian neighbours are extremely robust. In the history of Australian foreign policy, the Keating/Evans period has been romanticised as a kind of ‘golden age’ of engagement with Asia, yet the Howard/Downer era outshines even this. By way of a simple comparison, John Howard visited the region more times in his first nine years as PM than did Hawke and Keating combined in their thirteen.
Challenges and hiccups
Immediate and ambiguous concerns centre on the glaring cultural divide between Australia and many of the nations that surround it. Issues stemming from an inherited values system that is somewhat foreign to the region can cause friction, particularly at the societal level.
Twenty years ago, an Australian article exposing the highly questionable business practices of the Suharto family (20) caused uproar in Jakarta. Indonesian authorities holding the Australian government, and the Australian society in general, responsible for articles appearing in one newspaper was indicative of a huge gap in political culture between Canberra and Jakarta. In this case, the distinction between an independent newspaper as part of a free press and a centrally approved newspaper as a mouthpiece for government views and policies created the misunderstanding.
Fast forward to the Schappelle Corby case in which the roles were reversed somewhat. Australians reacted strongly with calls for boycotts and a return of tsunami aid donations to what they saw as unfairly harsh sentencing. Alarmingly, threatening letters, bullet casings and even suspicious powders were sent to the Indonesian embassy in protest. Here it is a gap in legal cultures that creates tension, as the Indonesian system differs markedly to the Australian one with respect to the seriousness of drug smuggling. Under Indonesian law, lengthy sentences and even the death penalty are routinely handed down for drug related crimes that would attract a much lighter sentence in Australia.
The case of Van Nguyen in which a young Australian was put to death in Singapore for an offence that would have attracted a far lighter sentence at home brought the cultural and legal differences into even sharper relief. As his hour approached there were even some voices within Australia calling for a boycott of Singapore and its products.
How to deal with the West Papuan and other asylum seekers is another problematic matter for the Howard Government. Last year the defection of Chinese diplomats created a minefield of a situation for Australian decision-makers who were worried about upsetting a sensitive Beijing. The more recent arrival of West Papuan refugees recreated the dilemma anew and the Government eventually made a choice between sending the Papuans home and enraging sections of the Australian public or granting them asylum and signalling to Jakarta a negative Australian view of the humanitarian situation in West Papua. This was undoubtedly a tough decision with large consequences for the Government, but one taken within the boundaries of Australian law, morality and perceptions. The entire issue of West Papuan independence is likely to put a large amount of stress on the Australia–Indonesia relationship in the years to come if the Government cannot create a sound policy to resolve it. In this respect, the asylum seekers’ being granted protection visas is just the tip of a far larger iceberg.
Despite the efforts of diplomats and responsible officials to limit the fallout over this issue it has only widened leading one commentator to lament that the current situation is ‘beyond diplomacy’.(21) But is it diplomacy, good or bad, that truly determines the ups and downs of Australia’s volatile relationship with our northern neighbours? Or are such disagreements inevitable even in the presence of competent diplomacy given the fundamental differences in culture, particularly political and legal culture, between Australia and Asia?
Diplomacy in a complex milieu
The so-called ‘Howard Doctrine’ involves Australia as a deputy sheriff of the US ready to throw its military weight around and even to carry out pre-emptive strikes against terrorist groups on foreign soil, should the need arise. It is less an official set of policy ideas than a labelling of Howard’s generally more confident tone with respect to Australia’s international role. But this self-belief walks a fine line between assertiveness and outright belligerence and questions Howard’s diplomatic skill. Indeed, Howard’s perceived arrogance in his rhetoric has led to negative reactions in regional capitals on more than one occasion.
The employment of such rhetoric has been a stumbling block to strengthening relations with Asia. When foreign media report Howard’s more enthusiastic words, they often create a damaging perception of an aggressive Australian policy. The negative effects of such words have been felt most sharply in Jakarta, particularly in the wake of the East Timor crisis. Howard’s comments at that time were viewed as triumphalist and humiliated an Indonesia that was in a particularly vulnerable position following the collapse of its economy and complete discrediting of its leadership. Furthermore, the ‘deputy sheriff’ remarks cast Australia as a rather unfriendly US lackey in the region, doing nothing to reassure neighbouring governments of our good intentions and commitment to Asia. Howard’s talk of pre-emptive strikes on regional terror groups did little to undermine that view. Yet, for all the bluster (notably more colourful when it involved Malaysia’s Dr Mahatir) none of the damage inflicted through rhetoric has been irreparable. Nor is there any reason that it will be now as a result of the West Papuan refugee issue, although interestingly, this time Howard has been mild in his use of words by comparison to Yudhoyono who has menacingly warned Australia not to ‘toy with Indonesia’.
The careless use of volatile phrases is not the only problem facing Australia in keeping its strong position in Asia. There are more important geo-political challenges looming in the years ahead. China is the central variable, its policies and actions have the potential to cause major headaches for decision-makers in Canberra, particularly with regards to Taiwan.
As it stands, Australia is an adherent to the ‘one-China’ policy, which means that Australia does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign, independent state. But while DFAT insists that it is ‘clear and consistent’ in its Taiwan policy (22), former defence official Tony Pratt pointed out in the Canberra Times that a 2005 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee report into Australia’s relationship with China forgot to include Taiwan in a map of ‘China and its Provinces.’(23) According to Pratt, this act ‘undermined the 33 years of Australia’s one-China policy,’ and the mistake has since been corrected in the publication. Yet the ambiguity is worrying.
Alexander Downer also contributed to Australia’s messy policy stance on Taiwan in much publicised comments during a 2004 visit to Beijing. He indicated that Australia would not automatically support the US militarily in the event of a conflict with China over the island, complicating Australia’s ‘two-pronged’ strategy of engaging simultaneously with the USA and PRC. To be sure, it is the US factor in Sino–Australian relations that will prove most difficult to navigate should cross-strait tensions escalate. Yet a hard choice between supporting one or the other need not arise so long as Australia can learn as Owen Harries put it, ‘to ride two horses at once,’(24) and devise a clever policy with a diplomacy to match. It remains to be seen whether the government or its bureaucrats will be able to formulate such a sophisticated approach, but much will depend on it.
Another issue with outcomes largely dependent on decisions taken in Beijing is the rising hostility between China and Japan. There are serious implications for Australia in this, as both are in the top three of our largest merchandise trading partners, and any instability across the Sea of Japan could lead to a more unstable region in general. An unstable region of competing powers is a strategic nightmare for defence planners, but there are already some signs that in the not-too-distant future Australia may find itself in just such a nightmare scenario. Dr Coral Bell’s vision of a region overshadowed by the strategic competition of ‘giants’ may become a reality.(25) Japan’s eagerness to support an inclusive membership at the inaugural East Asia Summit last year can be seen, in one way, as a pragmatic effort to dilute Chinese dominance of the forum through the presence of a potential geo-political balancer (India) and by bringing in another regional US ally (Australia). Canberra’s best course of action is to do everything within its limited power to reconcile the two erstwhile rivals, which is admittedly not much.
Despite all of this, the Howard Government has so far emerged with an excellent report card. We have a healthy, respectful relationship with Malaysia and, until very recently, we have enjoyed a high in relations with Indonesia. We have been included in important regional groupings and have joined an important regional treaty. We have successfully hosted and co-hosted multilateral forums making huge progress in areas of law enforcement and counter terrorism. We have expressed our solidarity with the region through extremely generous aid contributions in recent years. We have a blossoming and widening relationship with one of our oldest and strongest regional partners. We have a dynamic trade relationship with a newly emerging partner and a growing number of bilateral free trade agreements. Immigration is up, as are the numbers of Asian students choosing to study in our institutions and more and more tourists continue to visit our shores. With a present that looks like this, the future for Australian involvement in Asia is bright.
Endnotes
(1) Alexander Downer, Speech to the Asialink Chairman’s Dinner, Australia’s Engagement with Asia, 1 December 2005.
(2) DFAT, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: DFAT, 1997), iv.
(3) DFAT, Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: DFAT, 2003), 3.
(4) As above.
(5) Alison Broinowski, Howard’s War (Melbourne: Scribe 2003), 28.
(6) Downer, Australia’s Engagement with Asia.
(7) Mari Pangestu cited in News on Trade and Investment in Indonesia, 28 March 2005 http://www.indonesian-embassy.or.jp/menue/information/news/news-trade-28032005.htm.
(8) DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs), Malaysia Country Brief—October 2005 http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/malaysia/malaysia_brief.html#_Toc100128914.
(9) Broiwnoski, Howard’s War,32.
(10) JDA (Japan Defence Agency), 2005 Defence of Japan, (Tokyo: translated by Intergroup Corp., 2005), 75.
(11) For more information visit http://www.japan.org.au/2006_Exchange_Year.htm.
(12) See Jeremy Webb, Aid smooths the path to Asia (Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2005) http://www.aiia.asn.au/archives/article_tsunami_aid.jeremy.webb.pdf.
(13) Alexander Downer, Speech at the launch of Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia Volume 2: 1970s to 2000 in Canberra, 29 May 2003.
(14) DFAT Australia Fact Sheet, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/aust.pdf.
(15) DFAT China Fact Sheet, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf.
(16) DIMIA (Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), Population Flows: Immigration Aspects 2004-2005 (Canberra: DIMIA, January 2006), 4.
(17) DIMIA, Population Flows: Immigration Aspects 2004-2005, 20.
(18) DIMIA, Population Flows: Immigration Aspects 2004-2005, 54.
(19) DITR (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources), National Tourism Emerging Markets Strategy: China and India (Canberra: DITR, December 2005), 9–10.
(20) David Jenkins, ‘After Marcos, now for the Soeharto billions’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 April 1986, 1.
(21) Tony Kevin cited in The Canberra Times, 19 April 2006, 2.
(22) DFAT, Taiwan Country Brief, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/taiwan/taiwan_brief.html#auspos
(23) Tony Pratt, ‘Off the map: missteps in our one-China policy’ The Canberra Times, 13 December 2005, 13.
(24) Owen Harries, interview on ABC Radio National, 18 January 2006.
(25) See Coral Bell, Living with Giants: Finding Australia’s place in a more complex world (Canberra: ASPI, April 2005).
