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The
Gang of Three: Mao Jesus and HayekÊ
by
William McGurn
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here for PDF version
The
transformation of China is real, not because the leaders in
Beijing want such change but because their openings to trade
and investment have led to cracks in the system which the
Chinese people are quick to exploit.
High
atop the red Ming walls overlooking Tiananmen Square, the
air is pregnant with ChinaÕs past. One-half century ago, from
the same rostrum where emperors once handed down their edicts,
a triumphant Chairman Mao proclaimed the birth of a PeopleÕs
Republic. Also filled with history is the square below, which
has become a focal point for Chinese student protest, from
the May 4 Movement of 1919 to the pro-democracy demonstrators
cut down so tragically 70 years later.
But
in one of those delightful ironies peculiar to surviving communist
societies, the portrait of Chairman Mao today stares out at
the Golden Arches of a McDonalds looming up from the opposite
side of the square. Now, no less a historian than Samuel Huntington
has snickered about confusing the Magna Carta with Ôthe Magna
MacÕ. And certainly it is true that the opening of markets,
which China has been doing incrementally since 1979, does
not lead, hesto presto, to Westminster democracy. Yet it is
no less true that the presence of McDonalds here both reflects
and contributes to the awesome changes transforming the Chinese
landscape.
A
prominent conservative once dismissed the view that markets
can open up totalitarian countries as Ôreverse Marxism.Õ But
the evidence inclines to a Friedmanite view of things. Asian
Communists no longer boast, ˆ la Khrushchev, of ÔburyingÕ
capitalism. To the contrary, they recognise that development
has forced them into a damned if they do, damned if they donÕt
situation: the risk of becoming a South Korea if they open
up and the certainty of becoming a North Korea if they donÕt.
And as much as intellectuals would like to believe otherwise,
it is not just the Wall Street Journal and the BBC
that have their salutary effects. A Chinese man I met in Guangzhou
once confided to me that the most revolutionary things he
ever saw on TV were the reruns of the American cop shows like
Hawaii Five O and N.Y.P.D. Blue beamed in from
neighbouring Hong Kong. Watching those shows, millions of
ordinary mainlanders saw American police officers reading
the Miranda warning to those they arrestÑrather a revolutionary
concept in the PeopleÕs Republic.
My
own views have been slow to evolve. I was suspicious of the
laurels being heaped on Deng Xiaoping for his ÔpragmatismÕ
in the mid-1980s. It did not appear that anything dramatic
was in the offing from the limited openings to trade and investment
that Deng had helped make possible. And my visits to China
generally confirmed suspicions about a dreary country mired
in poverty and stuck with a totalitarian government.
Over
the years, however, the slow accretion of experiences has
persuaded me that the transformations we see in China are
real, not because its leaders want such change but because
those openings they have created constitute cracks in the
system that people are quick to exploit. In the grossest terms,
the bankruptcy of the socialist system, as much as real market
openings, means that much of what was once provided by the
stateÑhousing, health care, retirement, livelihoodÑhas become
something the Chinese people are doing for themselves. It
is inconceivable that even on this level such a shift should
be without social and political consequences.
In
trying to communicate how I see these changes, I thought I
would use three handy foils: what I call the Gang of ThreeÑMao,
Jesus and Hayek.
Mao
For
many people the image of Mao is inseparable from that of the
Chinese government. Though Mao was downplayed for a time,
his persistence on the wall overlooking Tiananmen, not to
mention the corporal remains that rest in state on the square
itself, signals his continuing importance to the regime in
Beijing. This is true notwithstanding that MaoÕs successors
have moved fast and hard in the direction opposite from which
Mao had laid out, that the phrases used to justify this shiftÑfor
example, Ôa socialist market economy with Chinese characteristicsÕÑare
in fact rhetorical devices to get around the awkward facts
of jettisoning the Maoist principles that wreaked such damage
on China.
Yet
the need to not take Mao head-on points to a genuine dilemma
for those of us who understand that ChinaÕs future freedom
(not to mention morals) ultimately depends on its embrace
of the market. The difficulty is that in the transition from
totalitarian rule to what we hope will be a more liberal form
of government, the middle is not pretty. In this stage the
government retains considerable control over resources while
allowing for personal profit, which is not capitalism but
fascism.
Up
and down the line, for example, Chinese ministries own their
own business conglomerates. Next is the provincial level,
right down to the town level; if the PeopleÕs Liberation Army
were considered as a business, to name but one example, it
would be a Fortune 500 company. So what you have is a people
who now know what theyÕve been deprived of, are presided over
by an increasingly ineffectual but brutish government, and
are lorded over by well-connected nouveau richeÑnot
infrequently high state officials themselves.
Jesus
Mao,
who thought he was God, leads me to my second topic: Jesus,
who was God. More specifically, I mean Christianity.
Christianity is not the only religion to run up against the
vestiges of Maoist control in todayÕs ChinaÑlook at the ongoing
crackdowns on the Falun GongÑbut it is among the more prominent.
But here China has a problem. Because as it opens up, crackdowns
on Christian Chinese engender understandable outrage in America,
not only from Christians but also from non-Christians. Many
of those people now demand that we cease trading with China
until it begins respecting
religious freedom. My own experience teaches me that to pit
religious freedom against trade is not only wrong, but it
generally hurts those whom it aims to help.
My
first foray into a Chinese church was in 1988, when I visited
the Natang, or South Church, in Beijing. After the Mass the
congregation dispersed quickly, reluctant to be seen talking
to foreigners. Today up to three-quarters of the Catholic
bishops in the governmentÕs patriotic association have secretly
reconciled themselves with the Vatican. Of course, there remain
many Christians harassed for their faith.
On the World Wide Web, one can tune into www.freechurchforchina.org
to see a video clip of a Catholic church in Fujian Province
being destroyed. Again, whatever the intended outcome, market
openings have increased the de facto freedom of the churches
and opened up the possibility for communication with their
brothers in faith overseas.
The
pro-market side needs to concede that the situation in China
remains far from good and that it is only the threat of sanctions
that persuades Beijing to move on some things. But the
pro-sanctions side needs to recognise that the world has not
stood still waiting for the perfect piece of US legislation.
ChinaÕs critics have no shortage of real violations to point
toÑthe arrest of bishops, the sentencing of evangelicals,
and the harassment of churchesÑbut they are wrong about the
context. As bad as it can be today, this is not 1966.
Specifically,
by opening their doors to trade and investment, the Chinese
people have set off a chain of events that each day expands
the margins of opportunity. One example: In August 1997 The
New York Times carried an article about a Sichuan village
where couples can now pay a fine instead of having their second
babies forcibly aborted. Is this freedom? Of course not. Is
it better? Yes. As the Times noted, ÔEconomic growth
is eroding the old system of control over ordinary peopleÕs
lives, creating loopholes large and smallÕ.
How
different this is from the atmosphere that prevails in societies
in which the United States has played the embargo card for
decades; North Korea, Cuba, and, until very recently, Vietnam.
In many ways, what we now see is classic Marx: The rise of
a merchant society created a power base that tempered that
of the monarchs. What would be the effect on religious freedom
if, for example, instead of trying to cut off trade, American
Christians went into China to make business deals with their
coreligionists? If US Catholic universities sponsored more
scholarships for Chinese clergy? If instead of cursing the
darkness, conservative Christians began lighting a few more
candlesÑby, say, pushing their congregations to adopt sister
parishes in China?
Hayek
F.A.
Hayek could not have put it any better than the Times story
on forced abortion in Sichuan. Central to HayekÕs thought
was his notion of Ôspontaneous orderÕ. At a time when intellectuals
across the world associated progress with planning, Hayek
posited a theory of spontaneous order emerging from the bottom
up, as people made their own arrangements and developed institutions
accordingly, taking into account not only goals but also culture,
traditions and values.
That
was too messy for most intellectuals, who preferred the crisp
rationality of, say, a five-year plan. But Hayek argued that
a workable messiness was the price of freedom, just as force
was the inevitable conclusion of socialism. Small wonder that
an internal Chinese Communist Party translation in 1962 of
The Road to Serfdom characterised HayekÕs work as Ôfull
of poisonÕ.
As
Mao Yushi will tell youÑhis think tank two years ago caused
a stir by publishing a Chinese version of HayekÕs The Constitution
of Liberty and holding a conference on itÑeven though
Hayek never wrote about China, his writings are immediately
understandable because the Chinese people have firsthand experience
in living without property rights. Even the man who doesnÕt
own a printing press, Mao YushiÕs associate told me, has a
stake in seeing that someone else doesøøor else he will have
no access to independent information. On the streets of Beijing
the vivid improvements in housing, diet, transportation and
fashion illustrate the point: Other peopleÕs property rights
give us options. And that explains why even a colonial Hong
Kong with no democracy was still arguably the freest place
in Asia.
It
is hard to look at todayÕs China and not see early signs of
the spontaneous order Hayek so celebrated. The unevenness
of the process can be frustrating. But in China liberals understand
that the government cannot just decree freedom, even were
it so inclined. Far better to expand the boundaries of the
possible and allow nature to take its course.
Conclusion
None
of this is to say that the West should not be firm with China,
since the hard old men in Beijing are acutely sensitive to
criticism. But we should now recognise that a country where
the Golden Arches now look across Tiananmen Square from the
balcony whence Mao once addressed the throngs of Red Guards,
where millions of Chinese now have email and access to foreign
Web pages, and where Christianity can no longer be dismissed
as a foreign importÑthat such a China exhibits possibilities
lacking only a few years ago and that ought to be encouraged
and pushed.
In
April 1999, Communist officials were taken completely by surprise
when more than 10,000 adherents of a quasi-Buddhist movement
of breathing and healing exercise, the Falun Gong, surrounded
the compound where party leaders live and work, demanding
that the government recognise their sect.
The
truth is something the party has to fear, not those of us
who believe in more freedom. That is why the party has been
sentencing them in secret one-day trials that it dare not
report to its own people. Perhaps 30 years ago an isolated
China might simply have given to dissenters its traditional
answer: the club on the head. But today, the advance of communications
plus ChinaÕs own efforts to reach out to the world economy
will make it exceedingly more difficult to crack down as effectively
as it once did.
The
delusion of both the right and the left is the notion that
we can come up with some legal blueprint for China and sell
it to China or bully Beijing into adopting and it andÑvoilˆÑChina
will be free. Stirring declarations of rights and justice
will always enjoy the dramatic advantage, but people who have
to live under repressive regimes typically have different
priorities. The left dislikes China today because people are
making money. But the rightÕs delusion is that you canÕt have
full freedom until it is enshrined in the law.
During
ChinaÕs commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the founding
of the PeopleÕs Republic, the papers were full of op-eds and
editorials telling us of a Chinese leadership whose spots
have not changed much in the 20 years since Deng opened ChinaÕs
door. The papers may well be right. For it is not clear that
ChinaÕs leaders fully comprehend where the market is taking
them. If Hayek is right, it may be better that they donÕt.
References
Faison,
Seth. 1997, ÔChinese are Happily Breaking the ÒOne ChildÓ
RuleÕ, The New York Times, 17 August.
Author
William
McGurn is chief editorial writer
at The Wall Street Journal and former senior editor
of the Far Eastern Economic Review. This is an extract
from a new book titled ChinaÕs Future: Constructive Partner
or Emerging Threat? published by The Cato Institute in
June 2000.
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