A Crisis of Democracy Again
Review by Ian McAllister
Click here for PDF version

WaterÕs Fall: Running the Risks with Economic Rationalism
by Chris Sheil
Pluto Press 2000, AU$32.95, 209pp ISBN 1 86403 115 8Disaffected Democracies: WhatÕs Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Edited by Susan Pharr and Robert D. Putnam Princeton University Press, US$65.00, 360pp Paper ISBN 0 691 04924 6 Cloth ISBN 0 691 04923 8

Can Australia avoid the debilitating effects of declining public confidence in politics found elsewhere? The evidence suggests that it can.

Crises of democracy are as old as democracy itself. Philosophers from Plato onwards have devoted much of their time and energy to making democracy less vulnerable to the forces of populism which always seem ready to engulf it. But since 1945, debates about the health of democracy have grown more intense, as more and more countries have adopted the system.

By any standards, the surge in democracy in the late 20th century has been astoundingÑwhat Huntington has called Ôthe third waveÕ of democracy. By the close of the century, 120 of the worldÕs 192 countries had embraced democracy as their system of government, covering an unprecedented 58.2% of the worldÕs population. We hear mostÑand worry mostÑabout the viability of democracy in the former communist states of Russia and Eastern Europe. But democracy has also been adopted in countries as diverse as South Africa, Brazil and the Philippines, with varying levels of success.

The current debate about the crisis of democracy can be traced to the anti-Vietnam War protests of the 1960s and early 1970s, and to the student-led demonstrations in Europe in 1968. Concern spread to the middle classes with the prolonged period of ÔstagflationÕ which followed the 1973 OPEC oil crisis. In the United States, a combination of the oil crisis and the Watergate scandal produced an unprecedented decline in votersÕ trust in politicians, which halved in just a decade. This seemed to support the view of many that democracy was heading for a major crisis, which policymakers could do little to avoid.

Many argued that the problem was less the system of democracy itself than the institutions which had evolved to service it. Democratic institutions crafted in the 19th century to cope with 19th century problems were seen as inadequate to meet the demands of the 20th century. The dramatic increase in the role of government since 1945 and the rise of the mass media were all creating new stresses and strains. Many believed that radical surgery was required to restore popular faith in the system. ÔOverloaded governmentÕ became the topic of discussion for policy analysts.

No sooner had the crisis of democracy debate taken hold when the health of democracyÑat least in the eyes of the mass publicÑseemed to take a turn for the better. The ascendancy of radical conservatism in Britain and the United States, personified by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan respectively, appeared to restore some faith in the system. This was assisted by the collapse of the political left in the face of obvious public support for privatisation and reduced government costs.

But by the 1990s the old doubts had re-emerged; books with titles such as Blaming the Government, Why Americans Distrust Government and Critical Citizens reflected this new intellectual climate.

What is the evidence to support the view that there is a crisis of democracy? Is it a crisis or merely persistent, nagging problems which can be resolved, given the political will? And do these problems affect a range of countries equally, or just a few? Apart from the obvious fragility of many of the newer democracies, a variety of changes have been occurring in the established democracies which do suggest deep-seated change, if not yet full-scale crisis.

The most important indicator of an emerging problem is the declining importance of political partiesÑthe institutions which manage and structure democratic competition. The major parties in the established democracies have been declining in membership and, most crucially, in voter support. As votersÕ attachments to the major parties have weakened, increased electoral volatility has enhanced support for minor parties and independent candidates.

At one level, party decline should hardly be surprising. Most parties reflect political divisions and socioeconomic interests a century or more old; in Australia, the Labor and Liberal parties are the direct descendants of late 19th century class conflict, a cleavage which has become increasingly irrelevant a century later. But at another level, parties have been exceptionally adept at adapting to any changes that might threaten their electoral hegemonyÑotherwise they would have disappeared decades ago. Their ability to adapt in recent years appears to be impaired.

The decline of political parties and their apparent inability to arrest the decline is often traced to the increasing role of the mass media. The media has assumed many of the functions of political parties, notably in the dissemination of information. Before World War II, parties were crucial to publicising political issues through party meetings, canvassing voters and townhall meetings. The rise of the mass media has changed all that. Where voters once asked a politician or attended a meeting to gain information, they now read a newspaper or watch a television programmes.

Moreover, the importance of television from the late 1960s onwards has undermined parties by focussing public attention on the personalities of the political leaders. Leaders are now the political symbols of public accountability and trust. Most voters now think of a party in terms of the leader rather than of the party label. Such a personalisation of politics frequently trivialises major policy issuesÑor more often simply results in them being ignored, particularly if they are complex.

The party leaders have to some extent been complicit in this process. Freed from their reliance on the parties, candidates have appealed directly to the public, bypassing their parties. For example, in the United States, Harry TrumanÕs nomination acceptance speech mentioned his party 27 times; in 1996, Bill ClintonÕs speech did not mention his party once. The eagerness of leaders to exploit the mass media and to attract support has also heightened votersÕ expectations about what leaders can realistically deliver in policy terms. Their inability to fulfil popular expectations has fuelled voter cynicism and distrust about parties and politicians alike.

Disaffected Democracies is the latest attempt to measure the health of the established democracies, and reassesses the results of work completed by many of the same authors a quarter of a century earlier. The survey evidence shows a stark decline in votersÕ confidence in democratic institutions: confidence in politicians declined in 12 of 13 countries examined; partisan attachments in 17 of 19 countries; and confidence in parliament in 11 of 14 countries. The authors fall short of interpreting these results as a Ôcrisis of democracyÕ, but suggest that remedial action is required to restore popular faith in democracy before a crisis does emerge.

The authors believe that this malaise is attributable to three factors. First, they see a primary cause as the declining capacity of governments to deal with the expectations of citizens, and to manage effectively the problems placed before it (often because the resolution of these problems is beyond their control). Second, there is the perception (supported by much evidence in some countries) that public officials are, at worst, corrupt or, at best, looking after their own interests. And third, there is the question of how information is conveyed to voters, particularly through the mass media.

To what extent does this malaise exist in Australia? Are we immune from these apparently relentless trends in the other established democracies? The evidence, though not as convincing as that found in the United States or Europe, is that the trend is there, but that it is neither as deep-seated nor as widespread as elsewhere. Eight out of 10 Australian voters still identify with a political party, admittedly down from nine out of 10 in the late 1960s, but nevertheless substantially more than most other countries. Trust in government has also remained fairly stable, after an initial decline in the early 1970s. Confidence in federal MPs has declined noticeably, but admittedly from a small base at the start of the period.

How has Australia avoided the debilitating effects of declining confidence in politics found elsewhere? Or are we simply in the process of catching up with the rest of the world? The evidence suggests that there are institutional and cultural reasons why the crisis of democracy may not emerge here.

First, our system of compulsory voting coupled with (by international standards) short periods in between elections, ensures that voters attend the polls regularly. This is often as frequently as once every 18 months for either a state or federal election. Such regular voting keeps parties in the forefront on votersÕ minds, and ensures continuing high levels of party attachment. The international evidence is that voter abstention fuels political apathy and alienation; compulsory voting helps to keep that at bay.

Second, our utilitarian political culture, grounded in the Benthamite ideas of the early settlers, produces a robust view of politics, but one in which citizens see the democratic system as the best available, and therefore to be supported come what may. Voters may be cynical about politicians and their motives, but they distinguish between the system and the actors within it. The opinion poll evidence shows that even voters who are cynical about politicians still believe that the system will treat them as well as anyone else; elsewhere, such cynicism has the opposite effect, eroding confidence in the system itself.

The net result is that Australia has one of the highest levels of satisfaction with democracy among the OECD countries. Among 12 OECD countries included in the 1995-97 World Values Survey, Australia was surpassed only by the USA, Switzerland and Norway in popular levels of satisfaction with their democratic system. In total, 45% of Australians said that they were ÔveryÕ or ÔfairlyÕ satisfied with the system. By contrast, just 10% of Japanese voters felt the same way about their system. All of which does not mean that we will never experience a crisis of democracy or suffer the ripples from the international trends. But they do suggest that Australia is, for the time being at least, insulated from what is happening elsewhere. Which is perhaps just as well. While the authors of Disaffected Democracies breathe long and heavy about the symptoms of the crisis, they are remarkably brief about solutions.

One solution is seen in governments returning the deliberative function to parliaments, and curbing executive authorityÑin other words, regulating themselves. Another solutionÑand a very long-term oneÑis to rebuild civil society in the face of the atomisation caused by the mass media and the breakdown of the traditional family. Such solutionsÑeven if overwhelming support emerged for themÑwould take generations to have an impact. Democracy in some countries may not be able to wait that long.

Ian McAllister is Director of the Research School of Social Sciences at The Australian National University.

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