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Towards
a Global Tax Cartel
David
R. Burton
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here for PDF version
The
true agenda of many advocates of greater financial information
exchange has more to do with tax competition than criminal
law enforcement or national security.
Since
the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, there
has been a renewed focus on obtaining information about the
global financial activities of terrorists and criminals. The
needs of law enforcement officials to combat serious crimes,
prevent terrorism and protect national security are of the
highest concern, but many OECD governments appear to be exploiting
the political climate post-September 11 to promote information
exchange policies that have more to do with limiting tax competition
than enhancing international efforts to apprehend terrorists
and criminals.
Well before
the September 11 attacks, the OECD and the UN had launched
major initiatives designed to abolish financial privacy and
limit tax competition by blacklisting low-tax jurisdictions
or so-called tax havens (the OECD Harmful Tax Competition
project) and enabling the UN to share financial information
among UN members through the proposed United Nations International
Tax Organisation (UNITO).
Both initiatives
are not only anti-competitive, but also constitute a gross
violation of individualsÕ privacy. Moreover, they foreshadow
a process of centralisation similar to that of the European
Union, exacting a steep price in terms of reduced economic
freedom and limits on national sovereignty.
The
campaign against tax competition
The OECD
is worried that low tax countries attract too much capital
from high tax countries, primarily the welfare states of the
European Union. In a 1998 report entitled ÔHarmful Tax Competition:
An Emerging Global IssueÕ, the OECD stated that ÔGlobalization
has . . . had the negative effects of opening up new ways
by which companies and individuals can minimize and avoid
taxes and in which countries can exploit these new opportunities
by developing tax policies aimed primarily at diverting financial
and other geographically mobile capitalÕ.1
The OECD
considers a country a ÔharmfulÕ tax regime if the country
(i) has low or zero income taxes, (ii) allows foreigners investing
in the country to do so at favourable rates, and (iii) affords
financial privacy to its investors or citizens. The OECD identified
41 countries (mostly developing countries) as Ôharmful tax
regimesÕ.
Under
an OECD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), a jurisdiction
must have made a ÔcommitmentÕ by 28 February 2002 to eliminate
Ôharmful tax practicesÕ to avoid being blacklisted as a Ônon-cooperating
jurisdictionÕ. By broadening what constitutes a ÔcommitmentÕ,
the OECD has persuaded over 30 jurisdictions to become Ôcommitted
jurisdictionsÕ. Seven jurisdictions have been blacklisted.2
As a result of the fluidity of the process and the lack of
any governing rule or principle, it is now far from clear
what being a Ôcommitted jurisdictionÕ actually means. The
target date for the elimination of Ôharmful tax practicesÕ
is April 2003. It is quite possible, if not probable, that
the OECD and the Ôcommitted jurisdictionsÕ will have a falling
out in Autumn as the OECD starts to demand binding agreements
that would effectively abolish financial privacy. Alternatively,
the OECD could compromise its aims.
Sanctions
proposed by the OECD for imposition on the targeted low tax
countries include the termination of tax treaties, denying
income tax deductions for purchases made from targeted countriesÕ
businesses (thereby dramatically raising the cost of buying
goods from that country), imposing withholding taxes on payments
to residents of targeted countries, and denying the foreign
tax credit for taxes paid to the targeted government. The
OECD also proposes to explore measures designed to disrupt
normal banking and business operation. These proposed sanctions
are more draconian than those imposed on states that engage
in the most egregious human rights violations.
OECD
member countries like the United States, the United Kingdom
and Switzerland are currently exempted from this initiative,
but they can in time expect the high-tax European Union to
bring pressure to bear through the OECD, the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), and the UN. The US engages in classic tax haven behaviour
by imposing no tax on most foreigners that earn interest or
capital gains in the US while imposing substantial taxes on
US persons that earn US source interest or capital gains.
These provisions, originally enacted into law in the 1980s,
have attracted over US $1 trillion to US capital markets.
Furthermore, by targeting certain countries while exempting
the United States and others, the OECD initiative is inconsistent
with national treatment and most favoured nation treaty commitments
as a member of the WTO.
The OECD
initiative provides for the abolition of financial privacy
in the 41 targeted countries as it relates to the 30 OECD
member countries. The targeted countries would be under an
obligation to routinely share banking, tax and other financial
information with OECD member countries. There would be no
requirement for the recipient country to show probable cause
to believe that a crime had been committed in either country.
There would not even be a requirement to show that some civil
wrong had been committed or was even suspected. The information
would simply be sent to any OECD country that asked for it.
Nor are there any restrictions on the use to which the information
may be put. For instance, nothing in the OECD proposal prevents
OECD countriesÕ intelligence services from sharing this kind
of information with their own private companies.
Once
this step has been taken, there will be no principled reason
for the exchange of information not to be generalised so that
any government in the world will be entitled to the information.
The logic of the OECD proposal is the total abolition of financial
privacy and a world where all governments can access the financial
information of any individual living anywhere on the planet.
United
Nations International Tax Organisation The United Nations
has adopted the logic of the OECD proposal and seeks to generalise
its provisions to all UN member states. In recommending the
creation of a United Nations International Tax Organisation
(UNITO), the 2001 report of the UN High Level Panel on Financing
for Development to the General Assembly stated:
The
taxes that one country can impose are often constrained
by the tax rates of others: this is true of sales taxes
on easily transportable goods, of income taxes on mobile
factors (in practice, capital and highly qualified personnel)
and corporate taxes on activities where the company has
a choice of location. Countries are increasingly competing
not by tariff policy or devaluing their currencies but by
offering low tax rates and other tax incentives, in a process
sometimes called Ôtax degradationÕ.3
The proposed
ITO would engage in negotiations with tax havens to persuade
them to desist from Ôharmful tax competitionÕ. It contemplates
taking a lead role in restraining the tax competition designed
to attract investment by multinationals in developing countries.
Another task that might fall to an ITO would be the development,
negotiation and operation of international arrangements for
the taxation of emigrants. At present emigrants pay taxes
only to their new country once they have changed nationality.
This exposes high tax countries to the risk of economic loss
when many of their most able citizens emigrate.
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Why
OECD Initiative is Bad Tax Policy
As every Economics 101 student understands, competition
is good. Imagine, for example, that a town has only
one gas station. The owner of the gas station can charge
high prices and offer poor service. But what happens
if a couple of new gas stations open up? All of a sudden,
the consumer is in charge. The gas stations must compete
to attract business. Prices fall and services improve.
The same thing happens with governments. If politicians
know that taxpayers have no escape, they are much more
likely to impose excessive tax burdens.
Now
imagine if new gas stations could enter a market, but
customers still had to pay the monopoly prices of the
gas station that used to control the market. Needless
to say, there is no competition in this system. The
original monopoly station would have no incentive to
lower prices, and the new stations would have scant
incentive to enter the market since they would have
no ability to offer a more attractive pricing structure
to customers. To make the analogy exact, they technically
could charge lower prices, but they would be compelled
to report customer purchases to the old monopoly station
and that station would have a right to charge those
customers the difference between the two prices. This
sounds absurd, but this is what the OECD and EU are
trying to impose on the world economy.
From
Daniel J. Mitchell, ÔEnding the Tax Harmonization ThreatÕ,
The Insider No. 299 (Washington D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation, September 2002).
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The idea
that a government should be able to impose taxes on the future
income of those who have emigrated from its jurisdiction is
repugnant and a violation of fundamental human rights. It
rests on the premise that the state retains a right to the
fruits of its former nationalsÕ future labour and investment
income even after they have emigrated. It should be viewed
as a violation of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948,
which states in relevant part that Ô[e]veryone has the right
to leave any countryÕ.
Providing
the United Nations itself with the ability to tax directly
the nationals of its several states, as is proposed, would
effectively create the first global government. Indeed, the
report endorses steps to create a global council to promote
global governance because Ômodern globalisation calls for
global governanceÕ.
Moreover,
the proposed UNITO would result in governments using the information
they receive not only for tax purposes but for intelligence
purposes and to oppress minorities and political opposition.
Corrupt officials in governments could provide the information
to criminal elements. It is extraordinarily na•ve to believe
that governments, particularly those known to be corrupt or
to systematically violate human rights, will not use sensitive
information provided to them by the UN to achieve political
objectives within their own countries. If the UN enables them
to track the financial activities of their political opponents,
then it will make it much easier for repressive governments
to identify and oppress their opposition.
A better
way In the United States, a Task Force on Information Exchange
and Financial Privacy was convened in 2001 to examine the
needs of law enforcement in the light of September 11. Composed
of leading former law enforcement officials, tax attorneys
and economists, it developed a programme that would enhance
the ability of Western governments to fight terrorism and
organised crime while enhancing the financial privacy of ordinary
law abiding citizens.
The Task
Force recommended the formation of an international Convention
on Privacy and Information Exchange composed of democratic
governments that respect the rule of law. The proposed Convention
would streamline and improve the exchange of information for
law enforcement, national security and anti-terrorism purposes
and establish under international law enforceable restrictions
on the use to which collected information could be put. Moreover,
the Convention would establish a private right of action to
enforce individual legal rights under the Convention.
The Task
Force also proposed that money laundering laws be better targeted.
Rather than bury investigators in a mountain of millions of
currency transactions reports or suspicious activity reports
with respect to law-abiding citizens, a more effective system
should be developed where the activities of persons on a government
watchlist are provided by financial institutions to the appropriate
national authorities. Persons could be placed on the watchlist
if the government had a reasonable and significant suspicion
of unlawful activities.
Conclusion
Information
is power. Given the propensity for harm that the modern state
has demonstrated time and again during the last century, is
it prudent to trust governments with the power to identify,
defund and cripple their political opponents, to suppress
religious freedom and to control the lives of their citizens?
The UN and OECD initiatives should give pause to anyone who
attaches even the slightest value to financial privacy and
the benefits of tax competition.
Endnotes
1 OECD,
ÔHarmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global IssueÕ, (Paris:
OECD, 1998), p. 14, section 23.
2 They
are Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, the Marshall
Islands, Nauru and Vanuatu.
3 Report
of the UN High Level Panel on Financing for Development to
the General Assembly, p.65. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf
David
R. Burton is a principal in the Argus Group, a Virginia-based
law and government relations firm. He was Executive Director
of the Prosperity InstituteÕs US Task Force on Information
Exchange and Financial Privacy. This article is based on the
Task ForceÕs report, which may be accessed in full at www.prosperity-institute.org
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