

Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens

by Julian Le Grand

Oxford University Press

2003, 206pp, £25

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With 12 books to his name, Julian Le Grand is no stranger to debates over the welfare state. Now a professor at the London School of Economics, Le Grand's latest book reflects his flair for praxis; melding theory with practical recommendations.

Two questions motivate this tightly argued work: Should government employees be assumed to be altruistic or self-interested? And how much choice should citizens have regarding the services that government provides to them?

To this reviewer, the former question turned out to be the less interesting. Le Grand asks whether government employees (such as teachers, public servants, and police) ought to be assumed to be *knights*, honourably committed to the public good, or *knaves*, interested only in personal gain. He maintains that in the immediate post-war decades, the knightly assumption prevailed, while during the Thatcher era, the knavish assumption prevailed.

Quite reasonably, he argues that the pay and incentive systems that motivate government employees should be structured in such a way as to be robust to both types of behaviour and that outsourcing of public sector work to non-profit bodies should not assume that these organisations are

purely altruistic. All good, sensible stuff.

The more controversial part of the book is concerned with agency: how much control should be given to consumers of government services? Le Grand argues that citizens have traditionally been *pawns*, disempowered users of the education, health, pension and welfare systems; rather than *queens*, endowed with the freedom to choose between competing providers. In two areas—school choice and asset-based welfare—Le Grand's proposals are particularly apposite to Australia.

On school choice, Le Grand points out that Britain (like Australia, but unlike the United States) has a de facto school voucher system, in which per pupil funding follows students when they move from one school to another. Indeed, although Australian States vary in the extent of school choice available, all foster a healthy degree of competition between different public schools, and between public and private schools.

The problem, in both Australia and the UK, is that school choice currently operates with far too little information due to a reluctance to publish relevant information about student performance across schools. Le Grand cites a raft of British studies on the introduction of testing and the publication of test scores during the 1990s, which find that greater competition and more information were associated with rising student performance over this period.

It is difficult to see how Australian educational authorities can justify withholding detailed information on school performance from parents. Indeed, I would go further than Le Grand, and argue that the information should include not only the mean test scores of students, but also the value-added—the gain from one test to the next.

To see the importance of value-added measures, imagine one school in which the average child scores 80% on both the Year 3 and Year 5 tests and another where the average child scores 50% on the Year 3 test, but 75% on the Year 5 test. The former probably has students from more privileged backgrounds, but the latter seems to be doing a better job of improving student performance. (Econometricians may like to imagine an even more accurate measure—the school and teacher fixed effects from a regression that controls for individual student effects.)

The other proposal to enhance agency is Le Grand's advocacy of a 'demogrant'—a fixed sum of money to be given to young adults when they turn 18. Having first proposed such an idea 15 years ago, he is well-aware of many of the questions surrounding it.

Large or small? Le Grand notes that the UK Government has recently committed to a £1,000 demogrant, but argues that such an amount may well 'fall between stools', and favours a grant of £10,000 (A\$24,000).

• Universal or means-tested?

Le Grand argues that the demogrant should be

universal, on the basis that this will ensure it has maximum popular support, and because means-testing based on poverty at birth will be an imperfect proxy for poverty at age eighteen.

- Restricted or unrestricted? Again, to maximise popular support, Le Grand argues that the demogrant should only be usable for four purposes: to pay for education, buy a house, start a business, or begin a retirement account. He does admit, however, that there is no easy way to prevent recipients from converting it into cash.
- Ought parents to be able to add to it? Though he does not say so explicitly, Le Grand seems to believe that they should not, pointing out that matched or tax-free savings accounts invariably benefit the rich more than the poor.
- How should it be funded? Le Grand favours funding the demogrant through an expansion of the inheritance tax, combined with modest reductions in higher education funding.


Should Australia too consider a demogrant? The past quarter century has seen the abolition of the Australian inheritance tax, and a steady increase in income inequality. Moreover, it is likely that those born into poor households are themselves more likely to be poor (we do not yet have good Australian data, but work by Gary Solon at the University of Michigan suggests that the correlation of incomes across generations

in the US is 0.4). In such an environment, a demogrant-style proposal, perhaps funded by the reintroduction of a small inheritance tax for millionaires, appeals as one of the few ways in which to expand the opportunities of the most underprivileged.

But a demogrant is not without its pitfalls, and there are at least three issues that should lead us to question whether the proposal is the right solution for Australia. First, much of the rhetoric around demogrants has suggested that their chief importance is in making higher education more accessible. Although most young Australians wishing to attend university today face fewer credit constraints than their parents did, the market for student loans remains less than perfect. But to the extent that borrowing is still a problem, the most sensible answer is for the government to provide credit directly to those who need it—for example, by reinstating the Student Financial Supplement Loans Scheme, or by allowing TAFE courses to be financed via HECS.

Second, to the extent that a demogrant replaces earned income, the proposal would be likely to lower employment rates among recipients, through what economists call the ‘wealth effect’. By discouraging labour force participation, a demogrant could potentially reduce young adults’ experience and therefore their employability in the long term.

Third, to the extent that a demogrant would merely be an expansion of the \$7,000



grant now available to everyone who buys their first home (and \$14,000 to everyone who buys a newly-built home), it would probably have the same effect as that scheme, raising housing prices without making much of a difference to affordability.

Yet while a demogrant has its disadvantages, the same can be said for virtually every policy proposal to improve the well-being of the poorest, such as raising the minimum wage, introducing an earned income tax credit, boosting job training, or cutting welfare. All have their own shortcomings. For its potential drawbacks, it may still be the case that an Australian demogrant remains an effective way to redistribute opportunities in an increasingly unequal society.

Motivation, Agency and Public Policy is one of the most appetising books on welfare to come out in recent years. It is a neat blend of political philosophy and economic theory, seasoned with a dash

of empirical evidence, and accompanied with a healthy serving of policy proposals. Anyone interested in how governments can use markets to provide the right incentives to their employees, and create more choices for citizens, would do well to read this provocative work.

**Reviewed by
Andrew Leigh**

Dr Leigh will shortly commence as a Fellow in the Economics Division of the Research School of Social Sciences, at the Australian National University.

Hayek's Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek

by Bruce Caldwell

Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004
489pp, \$US55
ISBN 0 2260 91910

Friedrich Hayek played a key role in the revival of classical liberalism in the 20th century, notably through the impact of his *Road to Serfdom*. Since his death in 1992 the flow of books and articles about him has increased. In addition, the *Collected Works* of Hayek, of which Caldwell is now the General Editor, is regularly including new and interesting material.

Those who read Hayek will discover that he gave classical liberal ideas a distinctive interpretation. Just what is going on, however, is not always easy to work out. In part, this

is because he was a prolific writer and had inter-connecting interests in a range of academic disciplines. In part, it is because he lived for a long while and the context to his work is not always easily accessible for those who read it today. In part, it is because he grew up in Austria, and was trained in the 'Austrian School' of economics. This was distinctive in itself—much more than a German-language version of marginalist economics—because of the ideas against which it developed its views. These included the German historical schools of economics, whose work is now not well-known, and in some cases even good secondary sources about them are not easily available.


All this is important for understanding Hayek's more narrowly economic ideas, and for the broader themes in political economy that inform his political writings. As Caldwell brings out, when Hayek engaged with Keynes and with other British writers, he often drew upon ideas that were initially developed in a very different intellectual context.

Accordingly, Hayek is recognised as an important figure, and as someone who has made a considerable impact upon our current understanding of classical liberal and conservative ideas. Yet those who have wished to understand what was going on face some difficult problems. They have sometimes found him difficult to understand, or have got the wrong end of the stick.

Bruce Caldwell's *Hayek's Challenge* will resolve many of these difficulties. Caldwell

has given us a clear and careful explanation of Hayek's key economic and methodological ideas. He has also provided a useful discussion of views that influenced Hayek, and of ideas against which he was reacting. Caldwell has a remarkable command of the full range of Hayek's writings (published and unpublished) and of the secondary literature, and he does an excellent job in explaining what was going on. This is a book that anyone with an interest in Hayek should purchase.

Do I have any reservations? Caldwell has given us an invaluable account of Hayek's work. But it is—understandably, given Caldwell's interests—focused upon his economics and methodological ideas, and also on his work in psychology. Caldwell also has an excellent treatment of Hayek's work in Chicago on spontaneous and complex orders. However, some other themes of real importance—such as his ideas about law and political thought—get very short shrift. While Caldwell's exposition of



Hayek's ideas is illuminating, and his sketches of some of the intellectual background are superb, he is also sometimes perhaps unduly cautious in offering broader interpretative ideas about what was going on behind the scenes, outside of his major works.

For my money, it is when Caldwell is disentangling some important intellectual problems about Hayek's ideas that he is at his best. He has excellent discussions of such topics as the origin of Hayek's distinctive ideas about the social division of knowledge that are set out in his 'Economics and Knowledge'. He also has a first-rate discussion of the interplay between Hayek's ideas in economics and in methodology. Caldwell's treatments of Hayek's periods at the London School of Economics and in Chicago are also very nicely done. On some other themes, such as the development of the ideas that inform his *Road to Serfdom*, Caldwell says some useful things but is a bit wooden.

His account of the German-language intellectual background against which Hayek was writing is also very useful. But as I know from having been in the same position myself, he has been largely limited to the rather sparse and largely secondary sources that are available in English. Of these Caldwell makes excellent use. But I was disappointed that, given its importance for Hayek's work, we get almost nothing about Hayek's initial studies in law, and about the development of his interest in legal issues.

Caldwell has done us a great service. Anyone even thinking seriously about Hayek's work will need to refer to this book for a long time to come. However, if someone is also interested in the development of Hayek's political and legal ideas and thus in his wider ideas about politics and society, they will still also need to refer to other work such as John Gray's *Hayek on Liberty* and my own *Hayek and After*.

One problem with Caldwell's book is also that we lose sight of Hayek's normative concerns in politics. This is significant for two reasons. First, it is these that have had most influence, rather than his ideas in economics and on methodology. Second, one question about Hayek is how he came to the relatively strong classical liberal ideas with which he is now identified. We may also ask whether his ideas about economics and its methodology are adequate for the defence of his broad views in political economy. Caldwell's account does not engage directly with these issues. But his discussion of the potential of Hayekian ideas in economics and methodology, while fascinating, may also suggest some problems for those whose main interest is in defending a 'Hayekian' politics. Caldwell's book thus both informs and gives us a lot of food for thought. One can only hope that it is swiftly made available in a reasonably priced paperback edition.

**Reviewed by
Jeremy Shearmur**

Platypus and Parliament: The Australian Senate in Theory and Practice

by Stanley Bach

Department of the Senate
Canberra, 2003, 389 pp
\$29.95 (Available only from
the Senate)

ISBN 0 0642 71291 3

This somewhat oddly titled book very thoroughly details the role of the Australian Senate in both theory and practice. The author's contention is that the Australian Parliament, a fusion of British responsible government and American federalism, is a 'seemingly inconsistent and even incompatible' system which nevertheless functions effectively. This proposition is well supported and well argued throughout.

Both major political parties have canvassed significant changes to the electoral design of the upper house over the years. The Whitlam Opposition, following the 1975 crisis, made it official Labor Party policy to abolish the Senate. This has only recently been amended. The current Howard government, continually frustrated by delay and obstruction in the Senate, put Senate reform on the agenda in this its third term (and may choose to act on such reforms if elected to a fourth term).

However many Australians see a very real benefit to the upper house, acting as a check on executive government and a forum for a diversity of policy scripts. Electoral voting patterns indicate larger and larger numbers of Australians now choose to vote differently between the houses, often for

minor parties and independents in the Senate. This is one area of interest in studies of the Senate, but there are many more.

Stanley Bach wrote *Platypus and Parliament* as a visiting Research Fellow at the Australian National University in Canberra, having been awarded a Fulbright Senior Scholar Award to study bicameralism in Australia. The author has written extensively about senatorial activity in the United States, and his intimate knowledge of that domain is well translated into his writings on the Australian Senate. I particularly liked the many references to his experiences in the US as a comparative guide to Australian Senate activity. An external writer discussing contentious issues such as the 1975 crisis, where a partisan division of opinion has always been evident, is a refreshing change. In this respect, as well as many others throughout the book, his external perspective is of much benefit to the reader.



In other respects, his distance from Australian practical politics limits the book's value as an empirical study. For example, discussion of political lobbying and the Senate is cursory at best, only mentioned in passing in the chapter on electoral systems. The evolving role of major party senators as shock troops in election campaigns, termed by the parties 'duty senatorship', and the effect this has on their legislative capacities is also missing. These sorts of insights are only open to someone working in and observing the Senate over many years, with the kind of access to parliamentarians an outsider would struggle to gain. The intended purpose of the book was to focus on institutional senator activities rather than home state party activities, but to overlook the growing link between the two is, I think, naive. At the very least it limits the interest of the book to a wider reading audience.

The author did however pay some attention to the issue of partisan alignment amongst major party senators. He rightly concluded that major parties of both sides have a strong party expectation that their senators vote strictly on party lines, as they do in the House. He supports this claim with data. In the case of the Liberals he argues that this has evolved (partly as a competitive necessity), while he points out that the ALP have enforced such discipline since their conception.

Such findings put Bach at odds with official publications of the Department of the Senate, also his publisher, which state,

for example: 'Party discipline in the Senate is not quite as rigorous as in the House, because defeat of the Government in the Senate on a major issue is not as serious as a defeat in the House.' The author rightly acknowledges the importance of voting patterns in the Senate, given that government and opposition need to build coalitions. This is one of many examples in the book, illustrating its excellent research into how the Senate is affected by major party and minor party tensions. It is also indicative of the independence of his research.

Having spent much of my academic time researching the Australian Senate and the role of major party senators, I certainly found the book interesting. It is detailed in its analysis, and thoughtfully presented. The 17 tables in the book are accompanied by explanatory text as necessary. The flow of the book dovetails issues of minor party representation and the practical effects they have on the passage of legislation with the institutional design of the Senate and the historical controversies in which the Senate has partaken (such as the 1975 constitutional crisis) very well.

It also charts voting patterns between parties. These figures are time-consuming to accumulate and very valuable to an academic audience. The author highlights the fact that many issues in the Senate are supported by most parties and independents, and the assumption that the major parties perennially oppose one another is flawed. In fact collaborative voting patterns

between the parties increased year by year since 1998. This finding is presented in part to inform the reader of the many uncontentious issues the Senate regularly considers. It is a shame the data did not go back further than 1996 to compare such data historically and between differing governments. However the fact it does not is hardly the fault of Bach. There are limits to all research projects.

This is not however a book to read for pure enjoyment, or even wider political interest without a specific purpose in mind. Outside of academic circles, I would safely predict, the book is not going to be a page-turner. It is essentially a reference book for anyone wanting a comprehensive guide to the Senate's machinations—a good book for anyone researching bicameralism to add to their shelves. In this respect the bibliography is also extremely valuable.

Whilst successfully collating the existing literature on the Senate into a single text, it is a pity that this book did not fill a gap in Australian political science by comparing institutional and partisan practices in a professional and permanent campaigning environment. It is nevertheless an outstanding and very learned institutional analysis.


**Reviewed by
Peter van Onselen**

Making Australian Foreign Policy
by **Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley**
Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 2003
\$46.95, ISBN 0521539978

Intended as a text book, the strength of *Making Australian Foreign Policy* is the factual information it presents for the benefit of students and other readers. Students lack of knowledge should not be underestimated. While they take foreign policy issues seriously—even passionately—knowledge of how foreign policy is produced is beyond the everyday experience of most 18-year olds. Putting them in the picture in a detailed way is commendable. An attitude survey of Foreign Affairs officers is especially useful.

The book's attempt to construct a theoretical framework to illuminate its factual presentation is disappointing. Others shared my impression that it was hard to understand. However, the rest of the book stands on its merits. To contend that the theory section was essential to credibility with international relations teachers underlines the irrelevance of what they teach. That there are grounds for criticism does not devalue the mass of factual information the book lays out. The main deficiencies are that it accords the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) too much attention and overlooks the way that political interest and values drive foreign policy.

Making Australian Foreign Policy concentrates on DFAT. It



is the first institution examined, the foreign policy bureaucracy preceding the political executive. While not quite saying that the foreign ministry is more important than the politburo, the treatment of DFAT has that flavour. And it seems to confuse the volume of DFAT's activity with the importance of its role. Sure, it is influential and handles much of the detail, but ministers ultimately decide and DFAT implements.

Statistics show DFAT's trucking in detail. It also thinks and plans in the long term, and draws on superior knowledge to influence decisions at the political level. Convincingly argued is the way that foreign policy decisions are becoming more important, frequent and pervasive. Although the book acknowledges the overriding nature of political decisions in respect of foreign policy, it risks persuading readers that DFAT's role and influence is more central than is the case.

High value is attached to the collegial attitudes that prevail

in DFAT. That almost 70% of officials surveyed found relations 'collegial but competitive at times' presumably means they tend to think alike but compete for promotion. The fact they think alike is less important than in what particulars. One such issue that puts officials at odds with the book's authors is the DFAT view that Australia's security and economic welfare should drive foreign policy, which the authors dismiss as out-of-date. They think foreign policy has become more diverse and complex in ways that devalue these traditional concerns. Whether it has is a matter of judgment. While differing from much DFAT staff on this point, the authors are well disposed towards them. Most other government officials find DFAT attitudes soft.

The politicisation of DFAT, indeed of the entire bureaucracy, is nothing new. Governments of all shades practise it because ministers prefer loyalty to disinterested advice. Changes intended to promote politicisation are typically represented as administrative reform, and public service careerists are encouraged to take advantage of the opportunities available. Only oppositions resent it. Taxpayers meet the cost in every sense. Evidence of politicisation is the way that officials see assignment to the minister's office as the best guarantee of promotion.

Curiously in today's climate, intelligence is dismissed as a rather marginal influence. Such a judgment fails to differentiate among types of intelligence—

raw, departmental, national—the latter typically shaping Cabinet decisions (on which point Prime Minister Keating is quoted to good effect). It also neglects to point out the resources and effort that successive Cabinets have devoted to improving intelligence—especially national intelligence, which underlines how ministers appreciate the way it helps them decide, notably in matters of strategic security. True, questions of war and peace are particularly susceptible to intelligence judgement. But in the Prime Minister's view, committing Australian troops is the most testing decision he can face. The furore over Australia's involvement in the second Iraq war demonstrates the importance of Cabinet basing decisions on sound intelligence. The issue has become painfully partisan and is a warning against the politicisation of intelligence.

Distance from the centres of international tension tends to increase Australia's sense of security (even more so New Zealand's). This may explain the authors' apparent willingness to accept the mindless activism of much Australian foreign policy, where the number of initiatives undertaken is used to measure success. This ignores masterly inactivity, which is one of the most powerful diplomatic tools. The book attributes the more cautious attitude of regional neighbours to the constraints affecting them, failing to appreciate how alien they find fussy activity. This cultural difference pinpoints why neighbours don't accept us as 'fellow Asians'—and never will.

Ultimately, the pursuit of power drives political interest in foreign policy. In countries like North Korea this means developing weapons of mass destruction to scare others silly. In Australia where governments are elected, politicians aim to persuade majorities through the quality of their decisions, including in foreign policy. *Making Australian Foreign Policy* demonstrates how constitutional differences between Australia and the United States affect the way that foreign policy is decided. But for all such differences—as well as those of size, culture and so on—there is surprising similarity in the way political opinion groups around opposed poles find expression in foreign policy. US Republicans, like Coalition supporters in Australia, tend to emphasise security interests and 'realism'. American Democrats and the Labor Party here are disposed towards 'idealism' or 'liberal internationalism'.

Reviewed by A.D. McLennan

The Howard Years
edited by Robert Manne
 Melbourne, Black Inc.
 Agenda, 2004, 326pp
 \$29.95, ISBN 0 9750769

Robert Manne has attempted to create his public persona and reputation over the past eight years through his intellectual stalking of John Howard. By this I mean that Manne has sought to confirm

his status as a morally superior person through a continuous commentary on what he perceives to be John Howard's flaws and moral failings. At the same time he has indelibly stamped his vision of Howard onto the collective mind of the Australian chattering classes. What has emerged out of that mind has been less a portrait of a real person than a cartoon that depicts Howard as somewhat less than fully human.

So it was with a certain trepidation that I approached this volume. Most of its contributors were not people likely to be sympathetic to Howard. If one read this collection, and had no other knowledge of the Howard government, one would come away with the conclusion that it is the worst government that this country has ever known. We are all, apparently on the edge of the abyss, governed by men and women whose inhumanity is such that, as William Maley puts it, future generations will find it 'impossible to fathom'.

In fact it is difficult to find a kind word for the Howard government in this book. According to Ian Lowe, in environmental matters, Australia under Howard, in partnership with the United States, are 'two rogue states which constitute an axis of irresponsibility'. When it comes to foreign affairs, we are told by Tony Kevin that we are at 'the nadir of many relationships', including South-east Asia, Europe and the Islamic world. China, apparently is willing to be 'patient' with Australia, just as I suppose an adult is patient with a little child as, in Kevin's words,

it seeks to 're-civilise' Australian foreign policy. We should all be pleased that the Chinese government with its well-known human rights record is willing to be so condescending towards young Australia. What Kevin cannot abide is the American relationship seeing it as a 'form of dependency relationship'; he appears to wish that we shift that dependency to that bastion of liberty China. But then Kevin believes that Guy Rundle and Mungo McCallum are good on Australian internal politics and describes Paul Keating's recent book on Australia and the Asia-Pacific as a 'must-read'.

Even in areas that we might think that the current government has scored some successes, such as economic management, we learn that this is not the case. John Quiggin tells us that 'the most the current government can claim is that it did not interfere with the judgement of the Reserve Bank'. In fact all that the Howard government has done is to miss opportunities in policies regarding unemployment, superannuation, and post-secondary education. Drawing on Donald Horne, Quiggin characterises the government as composed of 'second-rate people' who survive only because they live in the 'lucky country'.

And of course Howard himself is the most malignant second-rater of them all. Mick Dodson calls him a 'deliberately divisive', and insensitive to Australia's indigenous people. The problem is that Dodson, a fan of the 'insightful' John Pilger, seriously overplays his

hand by trying to make the Australian experience unique and Howard uniquely awful. He makes the extraordinary statement that 'Simply because of Howard's intransigence on these matters, Australia is the only nation in the world that has not made a formal apology to its Indigenous peoples for past injustices.' The only! Maybe I missed something but have the Russians, the Brazilians, the Argentinians, not to mention the Indonesians in West Papua, recently made apologies?

Manne himself, who dwells excessively on what he considers to be the faults and mistakes of Howard, cannot bring himself even to mention those occasions on which one might have thought that he would have approved of Howard's actions, such the aftermath of the Bali bombing and the uniform gun laws. Only after criticising him as 'inexperienced' and 'negligent' does Manne grudgingly concede that East Timor was 'probably John Howard's finest hour'.

Helen Irving will not even allow Howard to be a



conservative. Howard makes claim to be a Burkean but, according to Irving, he does not deserve the title as he has 'regrettable disregard for constitutional principles' and a 'limited faith vision of how the parts of the constitutional system holds together'. But then Irving, as a well-known republican, does have an axe to grind when it comes to the constitutional monarchist John Howard.

The real puzzle is: why do they hate him so far beyond the realms of normal political partisanship? Two pieces in this volume provide some of the answer to this puzzle. The first is by Simon Marginson on higher education. He states that the 'Howard government's policy on universities is driven by the political prejudices of the cabinet, rather than by a more dispassionate assessment of long-term national need.' In other

words there is plenty of money available for universities but the Howard government won't spend it because the universities are full of anti-government lefties. This argument simply does not appreciate the financial exigencies under which any contemporary government has to operate.

The second is by Judith Brett. She says that the problem with the Howard government is that it ignores 'informed public opinion'. Of course by informed public opinion she means people like her, left-liberal academics and ABC journalists and commentators. Put Brett and Marginson together and you get the reason for the hatred. The 'good' want power, lots of jobs and prestige. The Howard government doesn't give them any of these things. In fact it doesn't even think that they are particularly good! How mean-

spirited could such a government, and its leader, possibly be?

Of course this is where the greatest irony lies. The contributors to this volume decry John Howard as mean-spirited and narrow-minded. But there is nothing in this book that suggests any greatness or nobility of spirit on the part of its authors. At the end of the day it is a pricked *amour propre* that dictates so many of the responses in this volume to the Howard government. It would be a pity if future generations were to see the Howard years through the soured spectacles of Manne and his supporters. We are desperately in need of an account of the Howard government that is not based on wounded pride and the desire to display moral vanity.

Reviewed by
Gregory Melleuish

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