An idea sinkable, even as it is floated - The Centre for Independent Studies
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An idea sinkable, even as it is floated

The latest child of the global nuclear renaissance is a floating nuclear power plant. The Russians plan to power remote villages in far northern Russia with a number of these, the first of which will be ready by 2008.

The Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) also plans to export these plants to countries with underdeveloped infrastructure. China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines have reportedly shown interest. While nuclear power may well be a solution to global energy problems, the proposed Russian floating reactors have dangers not shared by reactors on land.

First, the floating reactors are powered by highly enriched uranium. This means the nuclear material can be more easily converted for use in nuclear bombs. Eduardo Fesko, of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, says the scientists at the Afrikantov Experimental Building Design Bureau who developed the plant will not reveal the exact level of enrichment, but they have indicated it is well over 20 per cent. The reactors can run at 90 per cent (weapons-grade). This could seriously undermine efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapon-building capabilities worldwide.

Consider, too, the physical structure of the floating plant: nuclear reactors are loaded onto barges that are towed to their destination, then anchored offshore. While tests carried out on nuclear power plants on land showed that they were extremely well-protected from assault, even by suicide jumbo, no such tests have yet been carried out on these floating barges.

Can they be torpedoed, for example? Their location on the water means reactors cannot be underground, nor do they have the metre-thick concrete walls of their land-based counterparts. They are vulnerable to threats from accidents caused by wave activity, and from terrorist or pirate attacks. Barges carrying highly enriched uranium, bobbing about the Malacca Straits or off the Philippines island Mindanao would be a terribly attractive prize.

The waters off Indonesia are recognised to be the most dangerous in the world because of the high incidence of increasingly sophisticated and brutal pirate attacks. These well-organised sea-faring criminals favour attacking flotillas of barges over large tankers because of their vulnerability. A floating nuclear power plant would be a powerful bargaining chip for any miscreant.

The highly enriched uranium inside would fetch a good price from any terrorist group keen to get into the WMD game. There is also the threat of contamination of coastal areas if the reactor sinks.

Minatom has not specified who will be in charge of security in an exported plant. They assure us the floating plants will comply with the security regulations that apply to Russian reactors on land. This is not necessarily comforting in light of the recent security lapses at these reactors. The floating plants will presumably be slow and vulnerable in the lengthy trip south.

Will the Russian military be responsible for their security as they move through dangerous waters like the South China Sea? Will the reactors be classified as ships and fall under the jurisdiction of maritime law?

Piracy laws do not apply to territorial waters and therefore would exclude barges moored offshore. These questions are specific to a maritime nuclear station – it is important that they are addressed in advance.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty allows Russia to export these floating nuclear power plants to any country that is a signatory to the treaty and is in full compliance with the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Association guidelines.

While this may exclude countries like Cuba, Israel, Pakistan and India, it includes many others. There are possible loopholes due to the moveable nature of the reactor. India, for example, has expressed interest in the reactors. It is possible that the treaty may not be able to prevent India from hosting these floating reactors as long as they are merely leased. India's intentions may be purely peaceful, but an unfortunate precedent could be set.

Floating nuclear power plants are a pioneering step that might make sense in the frozen wastes of northern Russia.

Whether they would be as viable in pirate-infested waters, surrounded by unstable countries fighting insurgents and terrorists, is another matter.

Miranda Darling is an adjunct scholar at The Centre for Independent Studies.