It’s time for a return to duty, not rights

"The moral foundation of political economy is not the satisfaction of appetite, but the fulfillment of duties". This observation, penned by Lord Acton in 1864, goes to the heart of the contemporary debate about "mutual obligation".

It is, however, a point largely passed over by the Uniting Church’s recently released position paper on social security which subjects the notion of mutual obligation to heavy criticism.

In one sense, the report should be commended for asking pertinent questions about the extent to which coercion can be legitimately applied with regard to enforcing mutual obligation. Inevitably, there will be difficult cases requiring prudent handling. But when dealing with such situations, we ought to remind ourselves of the old legal maxim: we do not make law based on hard cases.

Reading the position paper, one is struck by its tendency to engage in what the Harvard professor of law, Mary Ann Glendon, aptly describes as "rights-talk". This is reflected in its numerous references to rights (many of which are simply asserted rather than explained) while obligations are mentioned less frequently.

'The origin of the idea of rights is located firmly in the Western Christian tradition'

This emphasis is somewhat odd for a Christian-authored document. Contrary to much received opinion, the notion of rights did not arise with the French Revolution (which proved remarkably disrespectful of the rights of property and religious liberty, not to mention the right to life) or even the Enlightenment. Instead, the origin of the idea of rights is located firmly in the Western Christian tradition.

One characteristic distinguishing this tradition of rights, which John Finnis traces to Aquinas, is its insistence on linking rights to duties. It finds echoes in documents such as the United Nation’s Declaration on Human Rights (drafted by, among others, the neo-Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain) which states that ‘Everyone has duties to the community’ (Article 29).

Unfortunately, most contemporary political theorists have little interest in the concept of duty. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) is dominated, for example, by notions of justice defined as a matter of equal rights rather than equal duties. The equality of respect due to each individual, in Rawls’ view, similarly rests upon people’s equal rights rather than their fulfillment of equal duties.

Over the years, the flaws characterising Rawls’ philosophy of rights have been highlighted by thinkers ranging from Nozick to Finnis. The latter illustrates that using coercion to remind people of their obligations does not necessarily indicate disregard for their dignity. In fact, such coercion may reflect not contempt, but rather a sense of the equal worth of such people, whose refusal to recognise their obligations is penalised precisely because such a refusal expresses a serious misconception of, and actually degrades, their own dignity, along with that of others who may be tempted to emulate their degradation.

'Mutual obligation is an idea whose time has come'

This attention to the duties of all—including welfare recipients—is understated in the Uniting Church position paper. Instead, primary reference is made to the government’s obligations to respect everyone’s right to, for example, an adequate income. The paper apparently views as irrelevant any consideration of whether people have undertaken what can reasonably be expected of them to secure such an income before seeking welfare assistance.

This may be one of the reasons that the report recommends that Australia’s social security system make "no fundamental distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ ".

With the exception of Rawls, most legal philosophers recognise questions of merit as critical elements in any substantive theory of justice. A refusal even to consider desert is only likely to facilitate policy and legal injustice.

Moreover, does anyone seriously dispute that obligation-free welfare may have detrimental effects on some of its recipients? In recent times, political figures from across the spectrum—most notably Tony Abbott, Mark Latham and Noel Pearson—have had the courage to state this publicly. They also recognise that helping people to assume as much personal responsibility for themselves as possible is a way of affirming their human dignity.

Mutual obligation is an idea whose time has come. While it may require further refinement, its origins lie in concepts as old as reciprocity and duty. We ignore their transformative potential at our peril.
 

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About the Author:
Samuel Gregg is Adjunct Scholar of the Religion and the Free Society research programme at The Centre for Independent Studies.