Not bedfellows, but a political attraction - The Centre for Independent Studies
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Not bedfellows, but a political attraction

As a new year begins, the combination of Saddam Hussein's execution, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca by Muslims and another outburst by the cartoon-like Sheik Taj Din al-Hilali maintain the place of politics and Islam at the centre of world affairs.

Meanwhile, many progressive groups are increasingly finding common cause with radical Muslims.

Political outrage towards international conflicts, especially with regard to the Middle East, conjures up some odd images in the modern era. For example, during protests against last year's war in Lebanon, alliances between left-wing and Muslim groups produced images of union leaders wearing the kaffiyeh, the headgear made famous by Yasser Arafat, of the Socialist Alliance marching adjacent to the Hezbollah flag, and of environmental supporters trying to mouth an occasional "Allahu Akbar".

It is indicative of a growing convergence between some Islamic groups and the wider Left, most clearly reflected in the realm of foreign policy, where many non-Muslims view Islamic radicalism as a kind of resistance force against the global hegemony of the West.

But the rise of many Islamist groups has as much to do with Western trends as it does with Islam, in particular the Western tradition of individual and pessimistic revolt in search for an elusive ideal world. This kind of identification with Islam is more a form of social protest than a celebration of God.

While many intellectuals continue to cast Islam as the otherness of the West, its flip side is that it can form the basis of an alternative identity for those disaffected groups seeking a reactive identity.

This is true for many second-generation Muslims living in the West, some of whom feel disconnected from their adopted home as well as the land of their parents. Their religiosity, so often stronger than that of their parents, is a reaction to their marginal status.

It is particularly reflected in this year's pilgrimage to Mecca, where there was a marked increase in the number of young people.

What is traditionally a ritual attended by those in their 50s and 60s this year showed a sharp spike in the numbers of people in their late 20s and early 30s.

They were primarily from the West, in particular Britain. Young Australians figured prominently, seeking solace in a religious identity. It is their form of social protest as they feel increasingly isolated from what they see as an anti-Muslim discourse in their home countries.

Religion was also a form of protest for the Lebanese and Pakistani boys involved in two of the most notorious gang rapes in Sydney, where they repeatedly made allusions to Islam and shouted "Allahu Akbar" during the trial. After the race riots, the reprisal attacks by some Lebanese boys were held aloft as some kind of jihad. This is despite the young men showing little inclination towards practising their faith before their outbursts.

And it is clearest of all among Western converts, from "Jihad" Jack Thomas to shoe bomber Richard Reid. So often from troubled backgrounds, usually criminal, their conversion to Islam was a mark of their place on society's fringes. The growth of Muslim converts among those in jail, from blacks in the US to Aborigines in Australia, can also be seen in this light. Stripped of its many ethnic flavours, Muslim converts are a purer example of the modern symbolic appeal of the religion.

One of the few outlets for radical protest now is through Islamic groups. As the French convert Lionel Dumont, who fought in Bosnia, said: "Muslims are the only ones to fight the system." A couple of decades ago he would have joined a leftist organisation, because both movements recruit from the same demographics: outcasts from the educated middle classes and dropouts from the working class. They also have the same distaste for the bourgeouis and make similar claims about the international nature of their cause.

Instead of the international working class, Islamists refer to the ummah. Even controversies about whether to resort to violence within Islam are remarkably similar to those experienced by the early communists. The Red Brigade was to socialism, to some degree, as al-Qa'ida is to Islam.

oliver Roy, a French scholar on European Islam, notes that: "Islam has replaced Marxism as the ideology of contestation. When the Left collapsed, the Islamists stepped in."

The links between Islamists and the Left should be seen as part of the modern history of social protest. It is a new version of the old, a modern cry for the modern age. Disguised as religion, it remains very much the stuff of politics.

There is a strong historical basis to the phenomenon. The practise of Islam is dominated by the world's poor. It is attractive to them because of its strong egalitarian flavour, and especially attractive to low-status groups in hierarchical societies. One such case is in the subcontinent, where the untouchables of the caste system rapidly embraced Islam, freeing themselves from a life of bondage. The large number of high-caste Hindus who look down on Muslims today has its roots in this phenomenon.

In the West, Muslims were often among the poorest arrivals. This is true of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain, North Africans in France and Lebanese refugees in Australia. The latest influx of African refugees into Australia is also dominated by Muslims. These groups often perceive themselves as marginalised or undervalued in their society and thereby feel a connection with the "real" poor and dispossessed Muslims in other parts of the world.

As a result, it is no surprise that the Left is likely to show sympathy for some Islamist causes, feeling a natural concern for the poor and vulnerable. How far is it likely to go?

There is just too much of a gulf between Islamic groups and the Left in the areas of civil liberties to sustain any meaningful bond. Islam openly despises homosexuality and views the liberation of women suspiciously, believing it is the leading cause of an apparent breakdown in the family. Many leftist groups also have a strong anti-religious flavour.

Their potential for overlap and co-operation remains largely limited to foreign policy, where their ideological alliances are clearer.

Their growing overlap with Islamist interests should, however, worry large sections of the Left. A desire to avoid offending their new allies is likely to hamper their voice in condemning human rights abuses within the Islamic world, occurrences that are all too common.

But in seeing their urges for social protest mirrored within Islamic groups, leftist organisations and sympathisers risk undermining their hard-won gains, as well as preventing the spread of civil rights throughout the developing world.

Dr Tanveer Ahmed is a Sydney-based psychiatry registrar and writer. He is writing a book about Islam in Australia to be published by ABC Books later this year. This is adapted from "The unholy alliance" in the summer edition of Policy magazine, published by the Centre for Independent Studies.