

THE POLITICS OF DRIFT

CIVIC VIRTUES, ASSOCIATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP

We need to move beyond the shallow discourse of 'values' and rediscover 'civic virtues' by engaging religious and humanist traditions in order to build a deeper shared moral language of citizenship, argues **Iain T. Benson**

In April, the Australian government launched a project styled as 'Strengthening the Test for Australian Citizenship',¹ with the aim of introducing new citizenship-related legislation by the end of the year. The document states that the government wishes to 'strengthen the pledge of commitment' that forms a part of the *Australian Citizenship Act 2017* and proposes changes to the current citizenship test to strengthen the test of 'an aspiring citizen's understanding of core Australian values' (p.10). The term 'values' or the phrases 'Australian values' or 'core Australian values' or 'shared values' are invoked throughout the document against a supposed base of 'respect', 'freedom' and 'equality'. But note what these 'shared values' are held to accomplish: 'Our values unite us and create social bonds between us. They provide the foundation of our society and a shared future in which everyone belongs' (p.16).

With respect to the originators of this project, which contains many fine things, and to quote the old Irish adage: 'you just can't get there from here'. Philosophers have pointed out that the language of 'values' is not, as claimed, what 'unites' a people or 'creates social bonds' since the language is essentially constructed to indicate personal preferences not shared moral obligations. If what is sought is to 'create social bonds', then what is needed is a

shared moral language that is not afraid to be moral and to speak about the very traditions that the document elsewhere references as a 'commitment to a multicultural Australia' (p.5). Yet it is precisely here, in the current *metaphobia* (defined as 'fear of metaphysics'), that contemporary Western societies are so weak and in need of strengthening.

In this essay, I shall argue that only when we understand the nature of terms such as 'values' themselves, in contrast with 'virtues', can we meaningfully engage religion or any beliefs in cultural matters—Australian or otherwise. Before turning to these terms, however, I would like to place this essay in the context of a series of ideas that has led to



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the replacement of a shared moral sense of ‘virtues’ with the deeply ambiguous and relativistic language of ‘values’. Chief amongst these ideas are four: 1) that the state can be ‘neutral’ in relation to moral claims and, related to this; 2) that metaphysics is an optional field of philosophy; 3) that ‘belief’ is the purview of the religious citizen; and 4) that techniques can be a substitute for purposes (that *techne* can operate without attention to *telos*).

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All four of these notions undergird many contemporary blindspots. First, there is no such thing as the ‘neutral state’; the state may operate impartially but this is not the same as ‘neutrally’. Laws and policies, or the refusal to adopt laws and policies, are necessarily moral decisions of one sort or another. So the idea of ‘neutrality’, while comforting to the morally phobic, is an illusion. Second, metaphysics are, as Aldous Huxley noted in his 1937 book *Ends and Means*, not optional—one can have good metaphysics or bad metaphysics but one cannot have no metaphysics.² Third, there is no such thing as an ‘unbeliever’. Everyone is a believer. The question isn’t whether he or she believes, but rather what he or she believes in. The idea of a realm of unbelief is an illusion similar to the others mentioned.

Finally, the notion that techniques can operate without attention to purposes is also an illusion. Techniques are about how things operate and only an understanding of what they are for, an examination of their purposes, gives us a moral ground of evaluation—an ability to examine whether this or that area of culture is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘fit for purpose’ or not. Operating with systems that are not correlated to their purposes means that we cannot properly evaluate the moral appropriateness of things—a dangerous ‘drift’ that forms part of the concern behind the title of this essay.

My title also uses the word ‘politics’, but I do not mean merely or even primarily that the drift at issue is that of politics understood as party politics.

What I mean is politics in relation to citizenship. All aspects of culture are, in a sense, ‘political’ insofar as they pertain to how we live our lives together, and this essay examines the real consequences of not attending to the moral purposes or ends of our lives in association with, as much as in relation to, formal politics.

The crisis of Western cultures

It is not particularly new to refer to Western cultures as being in crisis. What is interesting at the moment, however, is that what is being increasingly widely documented by scholars is a breakdown in a certain liberal consensus that has been in place for some considerable period of time. For example, Paul Horwitz in *The Agnostic Age* (2011), writes that:

... we are now in the twilight of the liberal consensus as we have known it. It may survive, with important revisions. Or it may collapse all together, and new prophets will arise to predict what will come after it. *One thing, however, seems certain: the liberal consensus that emerged after the enlightenment, gelled in the nineteenth century, and reached a more or less stable form in the twentieth century, cannot last much longer as a basic, unquestioned assumption about the way we live.* From within and beyond its borders, the liberal consensus is under attack. On all sides we are hearing calls, sometimes measured and sometimes shrill, for a revision or an outright rejection of the terms of the liberal treaty.³

Ronald Weed and John von Heyking, in a 2010 collection of essays examining civil religion, speak of a ‘crisis of citizenship’ that is the result of the failure of secular society to ‘satisfy fully its citizens’ desire for meaningful community’ consequent upon a failure ‘to integrate fully the human personality into a schema of citizenship’. This in turn produces a crisis of political unity.⁴

A recent book by John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, *The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future* (2016), addresses what it terms ‘metacrisis’ in relation to politics, the economy,

polity, culture and the world itself. With respect to the ‘metacrisis of liberalism’, the authors take a similar tack to Horwitz when they argue that:

The whole liberal tradition faces a new kind of crisis because liberalism as a philosophy and an ideology turns out to be contradictory, self-defeating and parasitic on the legacy of Greco-Roman civilisation and the Judeo-Christian tradition which it distorts and hollows out.⁵

The authors state that ‘the only genuine alternative is a post-liberal politics of virtue that seeks to fuse greater economic justice with social reciprocity’.

Australian Clive Hamilton has written of ‘the disappointment of liberalism’ and catalogues a significant list of the ‘maladies of affluence’ that ‘suggest that the psychological wellbeing of citizens in rich countries is in decline’.⁶

What all these authors suggest as essential is a recovery or creation of a richer moral and aesthetic framework for life in contemporary societies. They all speak of ‘virtues’ and of the traditions that nurture such virtues. They do not speak of ‘values’ and with good reason: ‘values’ language is, if not bankrupt, at least in need of serious clarification if we believe that, by its use, we are conveying moral meaning.

With respect to the ‘liberal consensus’, there are those who may wish to deny that this consensus no longer exists and who will continue to advocate for forms of interpretation that give their viewpoint particular advantage in the courts and politics. However, the fact remains that there is no longer, if there ever was, a consensus as to either the meaning of liberalism in relation to law, or how law should approach certain kinds of disputes involving rights.

The meaning of central terms such as ‘equality’ and ‘non-discrimination’ needs to be viewed ‘through the associational lens’ or through the different contexts that are allowed in a society if the differences between communities on important matters such as religion and sexual orientation are to be realised. At the moment, the manner in which a term such as ‘equality’ is being placed in opposition

to religion (itself an equality right) shows a failure to appreciate associational diversity and the need for principles of space-sharing in an open society.


Similarly, we need to be wary of claims that a particular position represents ‘*the* state interest’. More often than not, when what is at issue is a contestable viewpoint, the state interest is multiple, not singular. The state, simply put, should not have only ‘one’ view on controversial matters. These are questions that the state should keep ‘open’ as far as possible. It is the nature of the pressures on pluralism, however, that, as with theocracies of old, the ‘new sectarians’⁷ seek to claim ‘the state interest’ or ‘public authority’ and their own viewpoints as one and the same.

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
Secularism is not, as some claim, ‘neutral’, and when viewed historically it was clearly a movement (from its mid-19th century inception) to drive religion out of the public sphere so as to both marginalise and privatise it whilst promoting the idea of an inclusive public sphere and ignoring an associational dimension to religious liberty and the necessary diversity this would entail.

Consider the two Google ‘Ngram’ graphs overleaf showing ‘values’ and ‘virtues’ and ‘secular’ and ‘secularism’. Note the rocketing up of the usage of ‘values’ in contrast with ‘virtues’ and the rise (as we would expect) of ‘secularism’, first coined as a term in 1851, at about the same time. The mid-19th century is the time when ‘secular’ shifts from ‘the age or the times’ to an increasing implicit meaning of ‘non-religious’. In parallel with this is the rise of ‘secularism’ as an anti-religious ideology (despite the claims of its founder that the movement did not take a position either in favour or opposed to religion). With respect to moral language, ‘virtues’ have to face the increasing popularity of ‘values’, which come to be the dominant ‘moral’ language for the future—a future we now inhabit.

The Rise of 'Values' 1800-2008



The Rise Of 'Secularism' 1800-2008



What are 'values' and how do they differ from 'virtues'?

Historian Gertrude Himmelfarb discusses in some detail the shift from 'virtues' to 'values' and attributes the proliferation of 'values' through the social sciences particularly as a result of sociologist Max Weber's use of the term:

Values, as we now understand that word, do not have to be virtues; they can be beliefs, opinions, attitudes, feelings, habits, conventions, preferences, prejudices, even idiosyncrasies – whatever any individual or group or society happens to value, at any time, for any reason.

'Values' are to be distinguished from virtues in that one does not say of 'virtues' that 'anyone's virtues are as good as anyone else's' or that a person has a right to their own construction of what virtues entail. As Himmelfarb puts it: 'only values can lay that claim to moral equivalency and neutrality'. Most importantly, and it fits perfectly with what I identified at the outset as four areas of current confusion about the state: 'this impartial, "nonjudgmental", as we now say, sense of values—values as "value-free"—is now so firmly entrenched in the popular vocabulary and sensibility that one can hardly imagine a time without it.'⁸

In his important 1946 essay, 'Politics and the English Language', George Orwell identified the

role that ‘meaningless words’ play in relation to politics. He says that thought can corrupt language and language can, in turn, corrupt thought. A bad usage can spread by tradition and imitation even among people who should and do know better.⁹ He identifies, as a matter of fact, the terms ‘progressive’, ‘equality’ and ‘values’ as examples of ‘meaningless words’.

Recall the ‘Ngram’ graphs: it is as if the very framework of ‘values’ suited the materialistic intent of George Jacob Holyoake and the early secularists.¹⁰ Consider why a term that comes from the marketplace—the ‘value’ of something was essentially its price—begins to replace the concept of ‘virtue’, which was a shared category of moral meaning. As the Canadian philosopher George Grant once pointed out: ‘values language is an obscuring language for morality used when the idea of purpose has been destroyed’.¹¹

Values language obscures because it gives us the illusion that moral discussion is underway. It fits perfectly into the post-Enlightenment bias against metaphysics referred to earlier—and it is ideal for a world in which we believe the state can be ‘neutral’ and that citizens can be ‘unbelievers’. In such a world, we need not articulate our moral convictions. When we are forced into that embarrassing situation of actually saying what our ‘values’ are, the background axioms of the values universe appear: 1) ‘you have your values and I have mine’; and 2) ‘don’t push your values on me’.

Yet we need something to stand in for—or in Grant’s telling term ‘obscure’—moral absence so we comfort ourselves that ‘values’ can be ‘shared’ or be ‘core’. But as we never have to actually spell out what these ‘values’ are or why they should be shared as moral obligations, we try to function as if we can ‘give voice to values’ without ever having to name them as judgmental or aspirational truths. ‘Values’ are preferences or options and so the mediation between them is power and manipulation. As the natural law theorist Alessandro D’Entreves put it in relation to positivism, this is nothing other than the pernicious doctrine that ‘might is right’, where ‘values’ are concerned, but dressed up as a quasi-moral framework.

Virtues are those aspects of living which we can perceive by reason, sometimes assisted by deeper

levels of understandings gleaned from religious traditions of revelation. They have been divided into those dispositions or attitudes related to conduct that are understood to conform with what is right and wrong. Here virtues can be seen as distinct from ‘values’, which are more or less a matter of purely personal choice. Sadly, the morally obscuring language of ‘values’ is virtually everywhere today in religion, politics, education and law.

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The good news, however, is that there is a set of moral principles that can be shared across communities and between them in a society that is ‘secular’, ‘pluralistic’ and ‘multicultural’. This language of virtue has two main categories:

Personal or associational virtues: The language of ‘virtues’ is found using different terms from different religious traditions.¹² In the Roman Catholic tradition, these are the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, and the natural virtues, which contain the cardinal virtues of justice, wisdom, moderation and courage.

Civic virtues are different. Drawing from the American political philosopher William Galston whose categories of shared resources necessary for his articulation of ‘liberalism’ are an excellent starting point for shared civic virtues, these may be listed as follows:¹³

1. Social peace;
2. Rule of law;
3. Recognition of diversity;
4. Tendency towards inclusiveness;
5. Minimum decency (ruling out the two greatest affronts: ‘wanton brutality’ and ‘desperate poverty’);
6. Affluence (generating as far as possible for all ‘discretionary resources’);

7. Scope for development (a multiplicity of institutions devoted to education and training on many different levels of rigour and complexity and allowing, as much as possible, equality of access not based on differences of birth, wealth and background);
8. Approximate justice (a tendency towards justice not rigid application of strict standards of distributive justice inconsistent with freedom);
9. Openness to truth: reflected in the diversity of universities and research institutes, public and private, and the freedom of scholars to investigate as much as possible free from restrictions on belief. Also, an opposition to what Galston calls the 'civic totalism' of those who hold singular moral viewpoints and force them on everyone else;
10. Respect for privacy: Not everything of importance to people occurs in the public sphere and a sphere of private life, sentiments, affections and beliefs must co-exist with public imperatives and be largely free of them (the law has a jurisdiction and certain matters such as liberty and friendship are prior to law).

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Civic virtues, associations and the necessary limitations on the state

A renewal of federalism that recognises, with respect, human diversity through diverse associational life is what is needed to counteract monistic domination of the sort we are currently seeing in certain strands of constitutional theory and political discourse. Such a tendency is not new, as can be seen in the classic essay on the benefits of diverse associations in Lord Acton's *Essays on Liberty*.

Acton compared and contrasted what he referred to as 'two views of nationality' which he said

'corresponded to the French and English systems'. In the French system 'nationality is founded on the perpetual supremacy of the collective will . . . to which every other influence must defer, and against which no obligation enjoys authority, and all resistance is tyrannical'.¹⁴ This approach overruled the rights and wishes of the citizen and 'absorbed their diverse interests in a fictitious unity'.¹⁵

What Acton refers to as 'the theory of unity' views the nation as a source of despotism and revolution; on the other hand, the theory of liberty (which opposes the theory of unity) regards the nation as a bulwark of self-government and the foremost limit 'to the excessive power of the State'.¹⁶ For Acton, it was 'the tendencies of centralisation, of corruption, and of absolutism' which could be effectively opposed by 'the influence of a divided patriotism'.¹⁷

More recently, Harold Berman wrote of the limits of the use of law to 'guide people to virtue' and, in particular, showed how the total application of state power to lead virtue was most realised under Soviet Communism ('virtue' being used in an almost ironic sense). There, in his words:

. . . not only the law but all social institutions and all forms of social control in the Soviet Union, including the Communist Party, economic organisations, trade unions, the press, the school, the arts and a host of others were used to guide people to virtue . . . it is impossible to isolate the consequences of moral education through law from those of moral education through social, economic, and political institutions in general.¹⁸

Similarly, Charles Taylor has noted that there are essentially two models of society—the first being that of the Marxist Leninist 'vanguard party' made up of a revolutionary elite whose job was to ensure 'the satellitisation of all aspects of social life to this party'. Trade unions, leisure clubs and even churches had to be permeated and made into 'transmission belts' of the party's purposes. The other model is genuine civil society, in which 'society is not identical with its political organisation'.¹⁹ Diverse associations are not only allowed but also encouraged to flourish so as

to establish what Jürgen Habermas has identified as ‘life-worlds’ which must, to avoid being ‘colonised’ by ‘systems’ that are parasitic upon them, operate in ways free of total regulation.²⁰

There are examples of extra-governmental initiatives in relation to such principles as religion and culture (or ‘civic virtues’). The *South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms* (2010)²¹ and its *Explanatory Notes* (2015) provide a strong example of such an initiative (still working its way through that society) in which various guidelines about virtues and respect for difference can be expressed clearly (and this is an analogue for how civic virtues could be framed and introduced into webs of learning in Australia and elsewhere).²²

There are other examples of shared respect across religious divides and the possibility of religions learning the limits of their own capacities in relation to the state. In Islam, Turkish Muslim scholar Beduziamman Said Nursi noted the corrupting influence of ‘politics’ on the Muslim religion. More recently, Abdullah An Naim has argued that politics corrupts religion and noted that if Sharia is legislated it ceases, in his view, to *be* Sharia, just as Christians have noted that legislating Christianity corrupts the faith itself. Religions can learn to abjure theocracy and non-religious movements must learn this too.

From the Jewish perspective, Rabbi and philosopher David Novak has written powerfully about the resources within Judaism to re-understand ‘rights within the idea of a ‘covenant’, and the importance of associational life to the common good.²³

There is also important common ground shared between humanists and religious believers on such matters as the idea of the ‘human family’ and ‘the dignity of the person’. While there are obviously differences in the derivation of the concepts, the fact of the commonality of respect is a very important datum in the conversations that are necessary about ‘shared virtues’ and ‘the common good’ as well as what forms of civic ordering are more just than others. That we are all believers is important to keep in mind as we seek the common good.

Understanding the role and nature of virtues, personal/communal and civic/public, may help us to bridge communities and religious and non-religious belief systems in the task of understanding

what matters to us as human beings. We need, in common, to understand how the limits of both law and religion help us to realise human goods including civil order, civic friendship and sustained peace.²⁴

What is also certain is that attempts to form civic bonds between different communities will require greater attention to the shared moral language of citizenship. This must build upon the ‘civic virtues’ and traditions of civic friendship discussed above, informing these with the richness and differences of the religious and moral traditions that form the basic allegiances of citizens in their community and family lives. Associations, chief amongst these the religions, frame the subsidiary dimensions to culture that are properly beyond the complete control of law and politics and also the blank slate of a supposedly ‘neutral’ state.

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The state, law and politics are necessary *but not sufficient* to deal with the deeper issues that concern Western cultures. To deal with them more effectively, we need recourse to the headwaters that have always fed the waters lower down—and those are the religions and the communities they have fostered for millennia. The avoidance of religions, which forms a main plank of the platform of secularism, and similar unwillingness to examine the ongoing importance of religions to culture, is neither wise nor sustainable. Religions continue to be critical to culture and their appropriate involvement alongside other groups (non-religious ones as well) to create a moral language for citizenship is now a matter of considerable importance. Values language, with its roots in private preferences rather than rich narratives of moral obligation, is simply not fit for the purposes that are required. A reinvigoration of virtues is essential.

Towards a better ground for Australian citizenship

Drawing upon the experience of South Africa's *Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms* (2010) and *Explanatory Notes* (2015), it is clear that cooperation on some of the most important matters to culture can, in fact, be agreed upon between widely divergent religious traditions. I would argue that this can and should be extended towards cooperative principles between religious and non-religious citizens, and would make the following recommendations to strengthen what the Australian citizenship test and oath might reach towards:

- Avoid the language of 'values' and replace it with more descriptive moral and ethical language (religious and non-religious) including the recognition of 'civic virtues'.
- Be more specific about concepts within the already recognised multicultural traditions and clarify what a better society looks like (recognising the various 'crises' discussed at the outset of this essay). For example, seek the beliefs *within* multicultural traditions that support important ideals such as generosity, compassion, mercy, love and forgiveness.
- Rather than shying away from the recognition of richer moral language in diverse associations, use such terms as 'the inherent dignity of the human person', 'the importance of the human family', 'civic friendship', and 'the common good'.
- Refer to such documents as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966), the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1966) as well as other relevant Covenants, Protocols and Agreements (including the *South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms* 2010) which highlight the duty to strive to bring about full recognition of the civic virtues listed earlier as well as the idea of 'the common good' and the fact that one can not

only join but also *may leave a religion* as an aspect of human liberty guaranteed to all.

With these changes made, Australia would be moving beyond 'values' and would be making an important statement in relation to the identified crises now facing Western liberalism and the states that are drifting within it.

Endnotes

- 1 *Strengthening the Test for Australian Citizenship* (Commonwealth of Australia, April 2017), <https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/discussion-papers/citizenship-paper.pdf>
- 2 Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1937), 252.
- 3 Paul Horwitz, *The Agnostic Age: Law Religion and the Constitution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 22 (emphasis added).
- 4 Ronald Weed and John von Heyking (eds), *Civil Religion in Political Thought* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2010), 7.
- 5 John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, *The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 2.
- 6 Clive Hamilton, *The Freedom Paradox: Towards a Post-Secular Ethics* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2008), 3.
- 7 Graham Good, *Humanism Betrayed* (Montreal: McGill/Queens U.P., 2001).
- 8 Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The De-Moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues to Modern Values* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 11-12. Here she echoes George Grant in an important essay on Grant's concerns about 'values language' by Joseph Power, 'Grant's Critique of Values Language' in *George Grant in Process*, Larry Schmidt ed. (Toronto: Anansi, 1978), 90. 'Grant is saying, as forcefully as he can, that "values" is not what has been meant by "the good"', 94.
- 9 George Orwell, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters*, Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (eds), vol VI, 1945-1950 (London: Penguin), 156-170 at 161-162.
- 10 I have reviewed Holyoake's project of 'secularism' in Iain T. Benson, 'Considering Secularism' in Douglas Farrow (ed), *Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society* (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 2004).

- 11 For detailed critiques of the nature and limitations of values language and a review of the literature in relation to this contested category, see Iain T. Benson, 'Do "Values" Mean Anything at All?: Implications for Law, Education and Society', *Journal for Juridical Science* 33:1 (2008), 117-136.
- 12 A useful starting point for groupings of such virtues may be found in the Appendix 'Illustrations of the Tao' in C.S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1943). Lewis himself was insufficiently attentive to the shift that was occurring where essentially subjectivised and relativised 'values' were coming to swamp more rigorous conceptions of 'virtues'; he did not write expressly on this shift and, on occasion, wrote of 'values' as if the term had settled objective meaning.
- 13 William Galston, *Liberal Purposes: Good, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 301 ff.
- 14 Baron Acton, J.N. Figgis and R.V. Laurence (eds), *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1907), 288.
- 15 As above.
- 16 As above, 289.
- 17 As above.
- 18 Harold Berman, 'The Use of Law to Guide People to Virtue' in *Law and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 367-380 at 376.
- 19 Charles Taylor, 'Invoking Civil Society' in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 204-224 at 204 and 211. In both this work and even more so in *A Secular Age* (Harvard: Belknap Press, 2007), Taylor has a frustrating habit not only of failing to identify the deliberately anti-religious dimension of 'secularism' (which he wants to endorse as 'open secularism') but also of continuing the unhelpful and misleading bifurcation of 'believers and unbelievers' which I suggest misleads us from the greater truth about shared beliefs even in our diverse cultures.
- 20 Iain T. Benson, 'Pluralism, life-worlds, civic virtues and civic charters' in *Religious Freedom and Religious Pluralism in Africa: Prospects and Limitations*, Pieter Coertzen, M. Christian Green and Len Hansen (eds), (Stellenbosch: African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies, 2016), 287-306. I have drawn upon some of this article in the preparation of this essay.
- 21 *South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms* (2010), <https://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/content/blurb/files/South%20African%20Charter.pdf>
- 22 I use the term 'web' here in relation to education as Ivan Illich used it in *De-Schooling Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971).
- 23 David Novak, *Covenantal Rights: A Study in Jewish Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also Iain T. Benson, 'The Search for Pluralism in Islam, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism', in W. Cole Durham, Jr., and Donlu Thayer (eds), *Religion, Pluralism, and Reconciling Difference* (Routledge, forthcoming 2017), chapter 3.
- 24 On the important category of civic friendship see James V. Schall, *At the Limits of Political Philosophy* (Washington DC: CUA Press, 1996), 218-237; John von Heyking, *The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2016); John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko (eds), *Friendship & Politics: Essays in Political Thought* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2008); and T. J. Haarhoff, *The Stranger at the Gate* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948).