Why Kevin Rudd’s ‘security community’ will annoy Asia

New Zealand places a lot of emphasis on multilateralism and a rules-based foreign policy. Last week, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd argued that Australia should learn lessons from the set-up of the European Union and seek to lead and promote an Asia-Pacific community engaged in the full spectrum of economic, political and security cooperation. This sounds like multilateral speak but New Zealanders would do well to stay well away from it.

In response to Rudd’s comments, Australia’s most recent Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating, himself a strong advocate of Australian engagement with Asia during his time and one of the key backers behind the formation of APEC, immediately retorted to the press that Rudd’s idea would be “a very difficult task and not necessarily an appropriate one.”

Keating is correct – the proposal is politically impossible. But more than this, the proposal shows that for all his undoubted foreign affairs expertise, Prime Minister Rudd is displaying a worrying lack of understanding of the security dynamics driving developments in Asia.

Australian Labor leaders since Whitlam have had a near obsession with building ‘security architecture’ in the Asia-Pacific region. There is nothing inherently wrong with this provided that the major players in the region want it and see it to in their interest. If not, those behind it are more likely to annoy and even antagonize Asian states rather than be warmly welcomed as a constructive player in the region.

Let’s face it. Much of this is about ‘managing’ China’s rise. There has never been a powerful China and Japan, let alone India as well, in our neighborhood. But it is China which poses the most dilemmas. China is not democratic. Its military capability and intentions are far from transparent and its geo-political aims are still unclear. How the region responds to the rise of these countries—but China especially— will determine how we fare over the next few generations.

China’s rising economic clout is naturally exerting a pull in the region. But the major players in the region have wisely caught on to World Bank President Robert Zoellick’s idea of encouraging China to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’, they are persuading China to keep to its own proclamation of a ‘peaceful rise’. This means that China must be persuaded that it has much to gain from peacefully integrating into the existing political and security order, and much to lose by trying to shake it up or defy it.

This ‘responsible stakeholder’ idea does not offer us a pre-determined strategy in dealing with China and nor should it. It relies on our leaders coming up with an appropriate mix of carrots and sticks as developments occur. China is more integrated into the region economically and increasingly politically as it has ever been. But its foreign policy still shows a side to it that is deeply concerning, for example its cheque-book diplomacy in the Pacific or its support for regimes such as those in Myanmar, North Korea and Iran. China yearns to be the dominant political and naval power in East and Southeast Asia. This means that finding the balance of ‘give and take’ with China in persuading it to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ is difficult. Give too much and China will feel little pressure to compromise or be more transparent about its intentions and capabilities. Take too much and China will increasingly want to buck the existing system.

Why is the thrust of Rudd’s speech out of whack in terms of the appropriate balance of its ‘give and take’ vis-à-vis China?

Australia has a relatively benign view of China’s long-term political and security intentions. In contrast, Japan and India openly watch the rise of China warily. Without exception, ASEAN has knocked back every Chinese proposal for greater cooperation on ‘hard’ security matters, preferring instead to sign agreements only on ‘soft’ security arrangements such as those dealing with terrorism and trafficking humans and drugs. ASEAN has even politely knocked back every Chinese proposal to include ‘hard’ security matters into the agenda of forums that do not include the United States. ASEAN even rejected China’s offer to join the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (which the US rejects), the rejection explained by the fact that ASEAN preferred all nuclear powers to join at the same time. This shows a clear reluctance to allow China to out-maneuver other major powers on hard security matters. For all the enthusiastic talk about ‘security architecture’ coming out of Australia, all the major Asian powers prefer the US to continue to take the lead in security matters. For example, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand have all reinforced and upgraded military ties with the US in the last few years whilst rejecting a greater security role for the Chinese.

Forming a ‘security community’ that includes China is not just “politically impossible” as former Prime Minister Keating suggests. It is also out of whack with the balance that key Asian states consider appropriate in terms of how much to ‘give’ to China at the present time.

Significantly, the Chinese were the strongest supporter of the idea. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang quickly responded that such “enhanced cooperation” would be “win-win” for all. Most other Asian members will be polite but Australia will stand largely alone on this one. Helen Clark made little comment in response to Rudd’s plan. Some friendly advice from across the ditch: it should stay that way.

Dr John Lee is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies.